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Abstract 
This thesis presents work on analytical reasoning with external representations (ERs) 
using problems similar to those used in the US GRE college-entrance examination. 
'fhe work investigates the factors associated with effective ER use in situations where 
subjects select, construct and reason with their own ERs. Practically all previous work 
has tended to focus solely upon performance rather than process. In this thesis the 
emphasis is upon cognitive processes during the entire time-course of reasoning with 
ERs, from problem comprehension through to answer selection. A background to the 
work is provided by 2 comprehensive reviews of: 1.) previous research on ERs and 
reasoning and 2.) the cognitive and semantic properties of ERs. 
Results from three empirical studies are reported. The first study examined a large 
corpus of 'workscratchings' produced by subjects as they solved paper and pencil-based 
analytical reasoning problems under test conditions. The workscratching ERs showed 
great diversity between and within subjects and across a range of problems. They 
included lists, various kinds of table, set diagrams, node and arc diagrams, first-order 
and propositioned logic, plans and natural language. It is shown that problem-solving 
performance is related to the type of ER used in the solution. 
The second study utilised a computer-based system (switchERI). The system admin-
istered analytical reasoning problems and provided a. range of ER construction envi-
ronments for the subject to choose and switch between. User-system interactions were 
recorded dynamically cl uring problem solving. This methodology permitted micro-
analyses of the cognitive events at each stage cl uring the time-course of problem solv-
ing. A process account of analytical reasoning with ERs is developed in which five 
major stages are identified - problem comprehension, ER selection, ER construction, 
read-off from the ER and answer selection/responding. A range of common slips and 
misconceptions are identified at each stage. The results show, inter alia, that subjects 
\\·hose responses are consistent with their ERs perform better than subjects whose 
responses are inconsistent with their ERs even if the ER is partially incorrr:ct. 
The data from the workscratching analysis and switchERI study informed the desi~n 
of' switchERII, a second system. SwitchERII incorporates a. representation of the 
semantics of Etder's Circles, dynamically parses the user's representation a.nd provides 
fC'cdback and advice. A third study was conducted with the switchERII system. 
Few. if any. studies to date have attempted to relate subjects' prior knowledge of ER 
forma.lisms to their reasoning performance. Subjects' prior knowledge of ER formalisms 
was assessed in both switchER studies. It was observed that subjects' performance on 
representation interpretation tasks does not necessarily predict their performance in 
con cl i tions where they sf.lect and construct their own representations. The reasons for 
the> decoupling are discussed. 
Data from all three studies show that subjects often utilise multiple representations 
in t.ln'ir solu t.ions, either concurrently or serially via. ER switching. Two d istinctl~r 
different types of switching were observed. One kind Cthrashing') is associated with 
poorer performance and reflects less comprehensive prior knowledge, inability to select 
au appropriate ER and hazy problem comprehension. Judicious switching, on the other 
hand, is associated with high levels of problem comprehension and skilled matching of 
ll 
the ERs~ properties to changing task demands. 
lt is claimed that effective reasoning with ERs involves complex interactions between 
at least three factors: (a.) within-subject variables such as the subject's representa-
tional repertoire (prior knowledge) and representational modality preferences (cognitive 
style); (b.) skill at overcoming a variety of barriers to comprehension and an ability to 
discern the salient attributes and characteristics of different problem types and (c.) an 
understanding of the semantic and cognitive properties of graphical and non-graphical 
ERs coupled with an ability to match those properties to the problem's task demands. 
It is suggested that the role of externalisation in reasoning with ERs may be to fa-
cilitate the swapping of information between cognitive subsystems. A mechanism by 
which the use of diagrammatic ERs may facilitate self-explanation is also proposed. 
The thesis concludes with an argument in favour of a domain-independent 'ER curricu-
lum' . It is suggested that direct instruction in the use of a range of ER.'3 might equip 
students with wider representational repertoires and hence allow them more scope to 
in cl ulge their representational preferences. Finally, several directions for future work 
are proposed. These include extending the representational semantics of switchERII, 
evaluating various types of system feedback and implementing a mechanism for check-
ing for slips during read-off from ERs. 
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What this thesis is about 
This thesis examines the use of graphical and linguistic external representations (ERs) 
by subjects solving constraint satisfaction puzzles (a.nalytica.l reasoning problems). The 
work addresses the role of ER.s in problem solving and the focus is upon externa.! 
representation as an activity of the reason er. 
The work adopts a constructivist perspective and examines the processes of ER selec-
tion, construction and use by subjects who spontaneously choose and build their own 
representations. The intention is to develop a. process account of reasoning that moves 
bey·ond those based solely on outcome (performance) cl a.ta.. 
Analytical reasoning problems are constraint satisfaction puzzles - they are computa.-
t.ionally tractable and programs in languages such as Prolog can be written to solve 
t lt<'lll. This is an important characteristic since one of the aims of the work reported 
here \\"as to gather information in order to inform the design of an intelligent learn-
ing environment capable of providing support to problem solvers using ERs in their 
solutions. 
:\na.lytical reasoning can be characterised as a. five component process In which the 
subject: 
l. reads and comprehends the problem 
2. selects an ER 
1 
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:L constructs the ER 
4. uses the ER to read off solutions 
5. responds to (answers) the problem questions 
lt should be emphasised that the components are not sequential or fixed - they are 
iterative. Problem solving evolves as the process of representation proceeds. 
At each stage of ER selection, construction and use, the interplay of three factors 
should be considered. The first factor is concerned with cognitive processes within the 
subjects- these include individual differences in cognitive style and prior knowledge. 
Secondly, the cognitive and semantic properties of various types of ER must be taken 
into account. The third important factor consists of the task demands of the problem 
and the linguistic/structural features that are associated '.vith 'puzzle' problems. 
Switching between different representations and the use of multi pie representations are 
also examined since they are strategies used by subjects in order to resolve impasses 
in reasoning and in response to changing task demands. The term 'switching~ refers to 
situations where, during problem solution, the subject constructs a. representation in 
one modality but su bseq uen tly bu ilcls another, different, ER. 
The results of three empirical studies are reported in Chapters 5, 6 & 7. The first study 
examined a. large corpus of 'workscra.tchings' produced by subjects as they solved pa-
per and pencil-based analytical reasoning problems under test conditions. The results 
informed the design of switchERI, a computer- based system which administered ana-
lytical reasoning problems and which provided a range of ER construction environments 
for the subject to choose and switch between. 
Data from the workscrat.ching analysis and switchERI study informed the design of 
sll'ilchE'R/1, a second system 1 • SwitchERII incorporates a representation of the se-
mantics of Euler~s Circles, dynamically parses the user's representation and provides 
f0edback and advice. 
The use of interactive learning environments in data. collection was motivated by a. 
1 This process might be termed 'iterative design', but this is a secondary theme which \vill not be 
developed in this thesis. 
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number of factors. The first of these was a wish to develop a process account of ER 
use, rather than to simply analyse the residual ER products of reasoning. As Vygotsky 
observed, when signs (language, diagrams etc.) are included in an action, they do 
more than facilitate manoeuvres that are impossible in the absence of the sign system. 
'J'hey fundamentally transform the action (vVertsch & Toma, 199.5; \t\Tertsch, 1991). 
Therefore, a major reason for using interactive learning environments was that the 
switchER systems facilitated the study of the action-transformation aspects of ER use. 
'fhis was achieved by means of recording detailed, time-stamped, dynamic protocols 
of the students' interactions with the systems. 
Another factor concerned the role of audience and its effect upon the use of ERs. ERs 
produced for private use differ from those produced for others. For example, a diagram 
drawn for purely personal use may not be annotated linguistically, whereas diagrams 
produced for publication almost always are. Subjects sometimes produce and use 
ERs purely privately (e.g. 'v.rorkscratchings' produced on scrap paper whilst problem 
solving under exam conditions). ?viostly, however, a person's ERs are also seen by 
others, a.nd may be commented upon by others, as in classroom settings. ER use often 
represents socially shared cognition. SwitchERII approximates ER use in naturalistic 
settings since the system parses the student's diagram and provides feedback. 
In naturalistic educational settings, human tutors may or may not notice errors in 
students' representations and they may or may not provide feedback to the student. 
The inability to control curriculum delivery and feed ba.ck to the student poses severe 
problems for educational researchers who wish to study classroom behaviour. Hence, 
a not her advantage of using interactive learning environments for data collection is 
that the antecedants and consequences of particular representational behaviours can 
bP precisel~r specified and that the system's responses are consistent. Thus the use 
of interactive learning environments permits the study of ER use in quasi-naturalistic 
sPt ti ngs
1 
but with considerable methodological advantages. As Lepper & Gu rtner 
( 1989) observe, computers provide a 'particularly propitious vehicle for examining a 
number of classic issues in education in a more controlled and precise fashion than has 
been possible in the past' (p. 116). 
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What this thesis is not about 
ivlenta.l representations may be external or internal. The nature of internal represen-
tations is hotly debated within cognitive science - advocates can be found for the 
position that internal imagery is causally implicated in reasoning and for the position 
tha.t internal imagery is merely epiphenomenal. The focus of this thesis, however, is 
on the use of external representations in reasoning. 
This work is not about viewpoints (Moyse, 1989; Cheng, 1993) - research on view-
points is concerned with assessing the educational utility of providi·ng multiple repre-
sentations of domain knowledge which subjects can choose between. In contrast, the 
work described in this thesis addresses the issue of subject-constructed representations 
of domain knowledge. 
Nor is this thesis about mental model developments or mental model transitions (e.g. 
Bibby, 1992; \Vhite & Frederiksen, 1990). In some respects it is related to the work of 
[\:ieras & Bovair (1984) but whereas those authors were concerned with the facilitating 
effect of an appropriate internal representation (mental model) upon learning t.o operate 
a device, this thesis is concerned with the role of external representations in problem 
solving. 
T'he concern here is not with rare, highly creative and 'radical' re-representations. 
Peterson ( 1994) and Norman ( 1993) present exam pies of that kind of problem re-
representations such as, for example, the re-representation of nine-card number scra.b-
ble2 as noughts and crosses played over a 3 by 3 magic square (Newel! & Simon, 1972). 
Such i nnova ti vc and creative re-representation improves performance drastically. In 
the work reported here. ho\\'eveL the interest is in less radical re-representations of 
problem i nforma.tion. 
Another category that is not addressed by this thesis is that of 'everyday' representa-
tioncd activity i.e. drawing, graphing or diagram-making associated with study. Those 
rPpresenta.tions were the subject of a series of studies by Van So m mers ( 1984), which 
will briefly reviewed here, since they serve to elucidate some of the ways in which ERs 
2 Nine cards, numbered one to nine, are placed face up. Two players draw cards alternately. First 
player t.o pick 3 cards that sum to 15 wins. 
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prod ucecl for private use differ from those prod ucecl in the knowledge that they will 
be seen by others (this notion of 'audience' will be discussed further in Chapter 4). 
Vall Sommers (198,1) asked 86 adult subjects to recall their recent 'everyday' external 
rcpresen tations. for females the most frequently reported five categories of private 
drawings were, in rank order, doodling, defacing pictures (e.g. in magazines), draw-
ing an imaginary person, expressing feelings (e.g. drawing a sad or ~smiley~ face) and 
sketches of clothing. For males, the equivalent categories were very similar: clooclling, 
clrcnving an imaginary person, expressing feelings, defacing pictures and sketches of 
clothing. In the case of public drawing, females produced, in order of frequency, local 
district maps, clothing sketches, puzzle or game related drawings, drawings to amuse 
a child and plans of the house. For males the equivalent five most frequent public 
drawings were local district maps, doodling, game or puzzle related drawings, drawing 
of a real person and house plans for maintenance tasks. Hence in the private category, 
recreational or expressive drawing are most common with a second, less common, group 
of personal planning related drawings (house plans, clothing , hair styles, time tables, 
flow charts ... ) . \V hen cl rawings are produced for an audience, cl irection-giving maps 
a. re most frequent. Child-related public cl rawings (homework help, amusement) are 
also common. Interestingly, some items that might be thought of as private are pro-
cl ucecl relatively often in the presence of an audience- these include clooclling, defacing 
pictures, and drawing imaginary people. 
Finally. this thesis is not about graphic communication or the role of sketches in design 
(e.g. Goldsch mid t, 1991; Goel, 1995) - it is about the spontaneous construction and 
use of a variety of external representational forms3 in a self-communicative manner as 
~~~ bjPct s dc>velop and examine their ideas. 
Defining the tern1 'external representation' 
:\definition of representation has been proposed by Davis, Young & 1vicLoughlin (1982) 
A representation may be a. combination of something written on paper, 
something existing in the form of physical objects and a. carefully con-
3 Including but not limit.ed t.o graphical ones. 
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structed arrangement of idea in one's mind 
This definition includes both internal and external representations, but does not ex-
plicitly include graphical external representations. It could be extended to include 
representations constructed on paper other than those that are written, since external 
graphical representations can be said to be drawn or constructed rather than 'written'. 
An attractive feature of the Davis et al. definition, however, is that it highlights the 
interaction between internal and externa.! representations in reasoning. 
Another definition is provided by Mason (1987a): 
... it is not clear that 'representation' is a sensible or consistent way to de-
scribe what goes on inside a person, because their inner experiences are 
their world, and not merely a representation of the world, whatever that 
may be .... it is more sensible to speak of inner experiences as a person's 
world, and to speak of their manifestations in terms of pictures, diagrams, 
words, and symbols as a. 'presentation' of their world. Furthermore this per-
spective emphasizes the importance of getting students to use and become 
fluent with a variety of modes such as diagrams, symbols, and metaphor to 
express what they perceive ... 
?viason would speak, not of reasoning with ER5, but of construing (making sense) with 
externa.! presentations. In his view, presentations are the record of what someone says 
about what they see. Using ERs (EPs'?) serves to make person aware of their learning. 
:\ nderson & Helstru p ( 199:3) studied the effectiveness of mental imagery with and 
without drawing support and use the term ·perceptual assistance' to describe the fa-
cilitatory effect of externalisation (drawing) upon the synthesis of novel patterns from 
simple shapes. Anderson & Helstrup ( 1993) conclude that mental imagery seems to 
be the initial source of discovery and synthesis but that drawing seems to be useful in 
production and refinement of patterns. 
The term ER, as it is used in the work reported here, includes propositiona.l or linguistic 
representations such as sentences of na.tura.llangua.ge and sentences of formal languages 
( r.g. first-order logic), as well as graphical or analogical representations such as graphs, 
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maps, plans, and set diagrams. Various matrix graphics such as tables and lists can 
be considered as intermediate forms between 'pure' examples of graphical or linguistic 
representations. In practice, however, there is no such thing as an example of a 'pure' 
modality - sentences of natural language have graphical elements (e.g. punctuation 
symbols) and graphics almost always require linguistic annotations if they are to be 
successfully interpreted by persons other than the producer. 
Gra.phical ER.s such as freehand idea sketches are an invaluable aid to creativity in 
design disciplines such as architecture (Goldschmidt, 1991; Goel, 199.5). ERs are also 
an everyday phenomenon. \Vhen we buy new floor covering, we take along an annotated 
plan to the carpet store. If we need to communicate the directions to a party to our 
friends we draw a map. \Ve take shopping lists to the supermarket. All these are 
examples of the use of ERs in problem solving or related activities. 
In addition to 'everyday' examples, it is well known that ER.s are effective aids to 
problem solving for a. range of more formal problem types. These include analogi-
cal reasoning (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987), classification of hierarchical information 
(Greene, 1989), vector arithmetic (Katz & Anza.i, 1990), algebra word problems (Sin-
gley, Anderson, Gevins & Hoffman, 1989), programming (Merr·ill, Reiser, Beekelaar & 
Ha.mid, 1992), logical and analytical reasoning (Ga.rclner, 1982; Barwise & Etchemendy, 1994; 
Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1994; Cox & Brna, 1995; Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 
1995; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Stenning & Cox, 1995; Cox, Stenning & Oberla.n-
der, 199.5), physics (Anzai, 1991) and, more generally, in scientific and mathematical 
discovery (Davis & Hersh, 1981). 
To summarise, an adequate definition of the term 'external representation' must dis-
t inguislt between moda.lities (graphical versus linguistic) and must acknowledge the 
in tcract.ion between in terna.l and external representations and the role of ERs in help-
ing to disa.mbiguate internal representations. It must also acknowledge a distinction 
between formal and ·everyday' external representational activity. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
ER taxonomies 
8 
Several taxonomies of external representations have been developed. For example 
Twyma.n (1979) organises representations by means of a matrix with methods of config-
uration and modes of symbolisation as column and row headings, respectively. Methods 
of configuration are the 'graphic organisation or structure of a message which possibly 
determines the 'searching' and 'looking' strategies adopted by the user' (pp 119-121). 
The 7 'methods of configuration' range from pure linear forms to lists, linear branching 
and matrix representations to non-linear forms. The 4 modes of symbolisation consist 
of verbal/numerical, pictorial and verbal/numerical, pictorial and schematic. The ex-
ample given by Twyman for the intersection of the column 'pure linear' with row the 
'pictorial & verbal' is the Bayeux tapestry. A 'pure linear' and 'verba.!' example is the 
Phaistos disc (an ancient 11inoan artifact consisting of pictograms read in a spiral from 
the outside to the centre). Twenty-eight types of 'graphic language' can be identified 
with Twyman 's schema, though finding examples for two of the matrix cells is prob-
lematic. Twyman can find no example of a list configuration with a schematic mode of 
s~'mbolisa.tion. Twyman also notes that it is almost impossible to find a.n example of 
a non-linear, open pictorial representation (£.e. a photograph that does not influence 
the viewer by its organisation). 
Lohse, Biolsi, \Valker & Reuter (1994) also present a. classification of visual represen-
tations. Their scheme is based on cluster analyses of subjects' subjective ratings of 
graphics along 10 dimensions. They identify eleven basic categories of graphics: graphs, 
tables, graphical tables, time charts, networks, structure diagrams, process diagrams, 
lllaps. cartograms. icons and pictures. 
Treu ( 199:2) ~ in a. paper on H Cl design~ attempted to identify a set of structures 
·amenable' both to the user~s mind and to the computer-based application·. On the 
basis of the cognitive science literature, he developed a taxonomy of representations 
that a typical computer user can understand. Treu starts with the classification of 
representational system proposed by Rumelhart & Norman (1988) in which repreEen-
tations ca.n be propositionally· based, analogicaL procedural or based on distributed 
knowledge. All representational systems also consist of data structures and processes 
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that operate on them. The basic interface structures Trcu (1992) identifies include: 
l. knowledge Objects (nodes) within patterns of association links (arcs) 
2. Sets of features, logical clustering 
:1. Vertical layering- ordering, levels of abstraction, sequences, lists .... 
4. Ilol'izonlallayering- ordering, levels of depth (perception), lateral sequences 
5. Language bi-directional human-human language, NLG, word sequencing 
The basic structures can be combined as in the case of tree structured representations 
(Objects + Vettica0, hierarchically related sets of objects (Sets + Vettical), and 2- D 
a.rrays ( 11 otizontal + Vertical). In Treu 's taxonomy, ubiquitous ER forms, such as a 
matrix or table and trees, are composite representations rather than basic forms. 
Sten ning & lnder ( 199.5) provide an analysis of three families of representational sys-
tems - matrix graphics (tables, histograms, graphs and maps), logic diagrams (Venn 
diagrams, Euler's circles) and semantic networks (node and link diagrams). In their 
account, tables are a mixed modality in which both spatial relations and linguistic 
components are intertwined in interpretation. In the view of Stenning & Oberlander 
(1995) matrix graphics and tables are !viinimal Abstraction Representation Systems 
(.lviARS) in which one graphic represents just one model4 . Such graphics are said to be 
weakly expressive (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995) or vivid (Levesque, 1988). Ells in the 
linguistic modality, such as first-order logic and natural language, are expressive and 
pallid. They are capable of expressing unlimited amounts of abstraction (UARS). Some 
~raphics can be made to express a limited amount of abstraction by means of ·tricks~ 
~nch a~ special notations or multiple diagrams. These then become limited-abstraction 
rC'presenta.tional systems (LARS - Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
In the artificial intelligence domain, Hayes (198.5) describes representational schemes 
con~isting of logical calculi, programming languages, the systematic use of data struc-
t u n's to depict a world (e.g. the use of an array as a room map), musical notation, maps 
·t ·Generally speaking, a system B represents a model of system A if, on the basis of a certain isomor-
phism, a description or solution produced in terms of A may be reflected consistently in terms of B 
and vice versa' (Fischbein, 1987, p. 121). 
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and circuit diagrams. A particular map, he argues, is one configuration in a scheme. 
A scheme is a set of configurations. Haycs distinguishes between well-formed config-
urations (e.g. formal representations) and non-schemes (e.g. drawings, photographs, 
conversational English). In formal schemes, knowledge can be stored and used by a 
computer program whereas 'informal scenes' or 'perceptual situations' require the de-
ployment of large amounts of background and general knowledge for their successful 
interpretation. 
Pctre & Green (1993) suggest that graphical representations are distinguished from 
non-graphical ones because graphics have 'secondary notations'. For example, in di-
agrammatic representations, lines represent connectedness and adjacency represents 
relatedness. In electronic circuit schematics, the adjacent placement of electronic com-
ponents indicates a relatedness of function or purpose over and above the information 
contained in the wires (lines) that connect the components. In textual representations, 
however, adjacency indicates both connectedness and proximity. They write (p. 57) 
The strength of graphical representations-almost universally-is that they 
cam plemen t perceptually something also expressed symbolically. 
In addition to secondary notations, Green ( 1989) has proposed the following further 
·cognitive dimensions' of ER notations: 
• viscosity (resistance to editing or modification) 
• hidden dependencies (e.g. the inability of a spreadsheet to indicate that data. in 
a cell is used by a formula in another cell) 
• premature commitment (learner forced to make choices too soon) 
• perceptual cueing (indenting subroutines in computer programs) 
• role expressiveness ( visibility and parsability - this varies with the user's under-
sta nding and prior knowledge) 
\V hen subjects are free to choose a representation for problem solving, they should, 
ideally, choose one that is capable of expressing the problem's information adequately 
CHAPTER 1. INTHODUCTION 11 
a.nd which is com pu tationa.lly efficient to construct and use. The issues of cxpressi vity 
a.nd efficiency will be addressed in more detail below. In practice, as it will be seen, 
subjects often have limited repertoires of representational forms on which to draw, 
often make poor choices of representation, make errors during ER construction and 
make slips when reading off information from their ERs . 
. As this brief review illustrates, there is little consensus in the literature about the type 
or number of dimensions to use in categorising ER forma.lisms. Twyma.n (1979) pro-
poses two - methods of configuration crossed with modes of sym bolisa.tion. Lohse et 
a.!. (199t1) identify 11 discreet categories based on subjective judgements. Treu (1992) 
identifies 8 basic structures of which 3 are 'composites'. Stenning & Oberla.nder (199.5) 
suggest that the ER family divides into linguistic and graphical representations at top 
level. Those two moda.lities differ in the 'strength' with which they are capable of 
expressing indeterminacy. Ha.yes (198.5) introduces a. distinct,ion between schemes and 
non-schemes - this points up the difference between representations that have under-
lying semantics that a.re computationally tractable and representations that require a 
large amount of background knowledge for their interpretation and so a.re difficult to 
program (e.g. photograph recognition). Finally, Pet re & Green ( 1993) introduce the 
secondary notational properties of external representations - these a.re lea.rned con-
ventions for interpreting, for example, adjacency of graphical elements as representing 
conceptual relatedness. Amalgamating the studies produces at least seven dimensions 
along which to characterise ERs, prior knowledge and the nature of the task. 
Conceptualisations of representations in related fields 
Representations in 1nathen1atics and artificial intelligence 
In fi('lds such as mathematics, it has been known for long time that individuals differ in 
11se of internal imagery (e.g. Poincare). Poincare (cited by Fischbein, 1987) classified 
mathematicians into two groups: ·geometers' (ones who think in images) and 'analysts' 
(conceptual thinkers). However, it is not clear whether mathematicians of the •geome-
tPr· kind use external graphical representations more than ·analysts'. Conversely, do 
analysts externalise their reasoning via the use of mainly linguistic forms? Fischbein 
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( 1987) argues that the role of internal images or visualisations in discovery is dynamic 
and that those kind of representations are not fully developed conceptualisations. Sci-
entists and mathematicians play with images (e.g. Kekule mentally 'playing' with an 
image of the benzene ring as a snake with its tail in its mouth). Fisch be in states that 
such rnenta.l images, while not representing fully developed ideas, are associated with 
intrinsic feelings of certainty about their correctness. This intrinsic feeling of certainty, 
Fischbein points out, is not confined to creative discovery via internal imagery. As Ein-
stein's famous conversation with vVertheimer revealed, the same conviction can derive 
from non-imagistic mental conceptions: 
These thoughts did not come in any verbal formulation. I very rarely think 
in words at all. A word comes, and I may try to express it in words 
afterwards. 
Among teachers of logic and mathematics, graphical methods of external representa-
tion remain highly controversial. In a. recent discussion of beliefs about the nature 
of mathematics, Eisenberg (1992) points out that, in the mathematics community, 
the idea that mathematics must be communicated in a non-visual manner is 'deeply 
rooted'. Sutherland (199.5, p.SO) also makes the point that: 
In our culture where sentential systems have higher status than visual sys-
tems, 'academic' is almost always synonymous with articulate. 
Attitudes towards graphical representations are sometimes seemingly inconsistent. Gra.ph-
ice:d representations can be assigned different status depending upon whether they are 
used a~ a conceptual aid or as a. medium of communication. Eisenberg (1992) illustrates 
this by citing Hi I bert: 
I have given a simplified proof of part (a.) of Jordan's theorem. Of course, 
my proof is completely arith metizable (otherwise it would be considered 
non-existent): but. investigating it. I never ceased thinking of the diagram 
(only thinking of a. very twisted curve), and so do I still when remembering 
it. 
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In the logic domain, Barwise (1993) quotes the views of Tennant (1986) as representa-
tive of the attitude of traditional logicians to the role of diagrams in logical proofs: 
[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; 
... it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, ... it has no proper 
place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting 
only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array. 
There are at least two historical reasons for such negative attitudes towards graphical 
representations. One is that diagrammatic representations may lack generality - a. 
single diagram of a triangle can portray only one of the whole universe of possible 
triangles. Mathematics, logic and other formal fields require general proofs which do 
not suggest particular models but which apply to all possible models. A second reason 
is that in the history of mathematics there have been instances where diagram-based 
proofs ('proofs without words') have subsequently been shown to be erroneous or based 
on accidental properties of a particular diagrammatic model that the reasoner happens 
to have chosen. However, as Shin (1994) has shown, the misapplication of diagrams is 
not intrinsically related to the nature of diagrams, at least in the case of Venn diagrams. 
She cites Barwise & Etchemendy ( 1992): 
If we threw out every form of reasoning that could be misapplied by the 
careless, we would have very little left. !viathematical induction, for exam-
ple, would go. 
:\not her factor in the dispute concerns the issue of whether teaching mathematics or 
logic is undertaken to improve general reasoning as well as teach the domain material 
or whether it is taught solely to prepare students for further advanced symbolic logic 
courses and their application to computer science, for example. 
:\marel's ( 1968) work on representation in reasoning about actions is very important 
since he suggests that much of problem solving is concerned with selecting the right 
representational system and translating information into that system. 
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... our general thesis ... (is that) it is an important function of the problem 
solver to find the most appropriate representation of his (its) problem.' 
(p.lGG) 
14 
l-Ie addresses the problem of choosing an appropriate (machine) language into which 
the verbal statement of the problem should be translated. He considers production 
systems (P systems) and N-state language, extended description language, rules of 
action and the two N-states that correspond to initial and terminal situations. 
The objective of the problem solving system is to find a trajectory between the initial 
and terminal situations using the 'coarsest possible elements and predicates that are 
capable of expressing the rules of action in sufficient detail'. In the domain he studied 
('missionary and cannibal' (NI& C) problems) one size of sets of individ ua.ls (coarse 
grain) is better as a. basic reasoning element than the consideration of individuals as 
elements (i.e. fine grain). 
In the ivi&C problem, Amarel noted that improvements in formulation came from a. 
recognition that one of the conditions was redundant. In the NI&C problem the rules 
of action are highly context dependent. Search graphs and array representations of 
state space facilitate the detection of symmetry . 
... in order to discover useful properties in the N-state space it is very im-
portant to have 'appropriate' representations of that space ... in general 1 
the problem of choosi·ng a representation of N- state space, and of discover-
htg useful regularities of solution trajectories in this representation, require 
rnuc h more study ... the choice of appropriate representations is capable of 
having spectacular effects on problem solving efficiency (pps. 169-170) 
:\ma.rel's heuristics for 1vi&C problems can be summarised as: 
1. choose the appropriate basic elements and attributes for the representation you 
use to represent state-transitions 
"2. choose appropriate representations for the rules of action and for the N--state 
space 
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:J. use the representation to discover useful properties of the problem that permit 
a reel uction in size of the N-state space (e.g. redundant conditions, symmetry, 
critical points) 
11. u t.ilise new knowledge about the problem's properties in formulating better prob-
lem solving procecl ures 
Later chapters will demonstrate that elements of those heuristics are utilised by sub-
jects in their solutions to analytical reasoning problems. 
Representations and psychology, cognitive science 
'This section covers quite a. large volume of material since most research on external 
representations can be found within cognitive science. The field includes. inter alia~ 
human-computer interaction (HCI) (e.g. Green, 1989), a.na.logica.l reasoning (e.g. Gick 
& Holyoak, 198:3), problem solving (e.g. La.rkin & Simon, 1987; Anzai, 1991), syllogistic 
reasoning (Stenning & Oberlander, 199.5), display-based reasoning (La.rkin, 1989) and 
visual cognition (e.g. Humphreys & Bruce, 1989). Some of those studies will be 
reviewed in Chapter 4 under the heading of ·related work' and some will be reviewed 
here. 
Se1nantic properties of ERs Stenning & Oberla.nder (1995) have proposed a the-
ory of specificity of graphical information in which they argue that diagrammatic rep-
resentations compel the representation of certain information whereas non-graphical 
r<')H{'S{'IIt ations ( r:.g. sentences of natural or logical language) permit the expression 
of abst ract.ion or indeterminacy. For example~ a. diagram typically represents a single 
st a 1<' of affairs or single model. and represents at least some aspects of it completely. 
One may say that the spoon is above the plate, and the knife is beside the plate, but a 
diagram of this situation cannot be drawn without showing whether the knife is to the 
right. or t.lw left of the plate. Similarly, the word 'triangle· can be used to refer to any 
kind of triangle, but. a. single diagram must represent only one triangle. As another 
illustration. consider the linguistic proposition that 'All As are Bs'. Two diagrammatic 
models of t.his premiss can be constructed using Etder's circles. The first is the identity 
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diagram (circles representing A and B coincide exactly). A second valid representa-
tion consists of a. small circle A contained within a larger circle B. A comprehensive 
diagrammatic representation therefore requires two models for the representation of 
a. single (linguistic) premiss. Expressing the abstraction therefore requires multi pie 
diagrams. 
Graphical representations are said to possess the property of specificity in that where 
several models are possible, a single graphical representation can usually represent only 
one of them unless special conventions such as shading, annotation or animation are 
Ptnployecl (Stenning & Oberlancler, 1995). It is the weak expressiveness (specificity) 
of graphical representations that makes diagrams so cognitively tractable. Stenning 
le.,_~ Oberlander argue that they share the property of specificity with the internal rep-
resentations that humans use when they reason. They also argue that the weak ex-
pressiveness of graphical representations is more apparent tn users than is the case 
for sentential representations because diagrams 'wear their constraints on their sleeve~. 
Diagrams are 'vivid' representations ( Levesq ue, 1988). ERs capable of expressing in-
determinacy5 can be described as ·pallid' (Holyoak & Spellman, 1993). Stenning & 
Oberlander (1995) argue that reasoning is facilitated by representations whose degree 
of pallidity is well-matched to the indeterminacy of the information in the problem. 
Too much expressivity, however, reduces the cognitive tractability of the formalism. 
Generally, the best representation is one which has sufficient abstraction-expressing 
power for the task, but not any more than is needed. Empirical support for this con-
tention has been provided by Cox, Stenning & Oberlander (1995). 
Spocificity theor~' has important implications for reasoning with ERs. For example. 
\\'it h indeterminate problems (for which more than one model can be constructed). 
an ER in the linguistic modality such as natural language or first-order logic may 
he more efficient than the construction of multiple diagrams. In the case of natural 
language. Stenning & Oberlander argue that discourse conventions limit the range of 
interpretations of natural language and hence natural language is closer to graphical 
representations. in terms of specificity, than formal languages such as first order logic. 
Studies that included both determinate and indeterminate problems are reported in this 
" Indeterminacy is synonymous with the term abstraction. 
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thesis - they were studied in order to examine some of the implications of specificity 
tlteory. 
Cognitive properties of ERs There is a large literature on the cognitive properties 
of ERs. The kinds of properties that are proposed depends upon the proposer's position 
ill the so-called 'imagery debate' (e.g. Paivio, 1986). The debate's central question 
concerns the extent to which, and a.t which level, communication occurs between the 
various perceptual and cognitive subsystems. Is there an interlingua, a kind of internal 
tnentalese, which mediates between linguistic and imagistic internal representations? 
Pylyshyn ( 1973, 1979), for example, argues that there must be an internal propositiona.l 
interlingua in which both verbal and non-verbal processing are carried out. Or is the 
only route between the subsystems via externalisation? wlason (1987), whose work was 
discussed earlier, and Reisberg (1987), whose work is in trod ucecl later, seem to adopt 
the I at ter position. 
Both positions tend to down play the strong possibility that there may be individual 
difrerences in cognitive representational style, which can influence the kinds of repre-
sentations that subjects use internally and externally. Individuals certainly differ in 
their problem solving strategies and representational habits- but whether this reflects 
differently arranged cognitive subsystems or the effects of prior experience upon more-
or-less invariant hardware is beyond the scope of this thesis. The author has no strong 
commitment to either position in the debate, since, in discussions about external repre-
sentations, it is not crucial. As Barwise & Etchemendy (1992) point out in a discussio11 
of I-lyperproof6, there are techniques for transferring information from linguistic forms 
illto graphical forms and vice versa that do not need to appeal to cognitive ·Rosetta 
stones· or internal interlinguas. In analytical reasoning, and reasoning about blocks on 
chessboards 1 the two representational schemes (diagrammatic and linguistic) represent 
the same worlds and cognitive devices exist for moving information between the two 
modalities. In Hyperproof, invoking the sentential APPLY rule permits information to 
c II~·1wrproof is a computer-based program for teaching proof development in first-order logic. It 
adopts a heterogeneous reasoning approach - information is presented and manipulated in both 
diagram mat.ic <u-td sentential modalities. Students reason about situations in a blocks world. Hy-
pcrproof's graphical upper window shows geometric objects arrayed on a chessboard. Sentences of 
first-order logic are entered in a lower window. 
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be applied from sentences to the diagram. Conversely, the use of OBSERVE permits 
the opposite movement. However, a theory about the exact cognitive mechanisms by 
which the analogues of 'apply' and 'observe' function in humans is not crucial for the 
a.rgu men ts advanced in this thesis. 
G ra.phical ERs such as diagrams have received the most attention in the cognition and 
instruction literatures. The cognitive effects of graphical ERs are to reduce search and 
working memory load by organising information by location. Semi-graphical ERs such 
as tables make information explicit and can direct attention to unsolved parts of a 
problem (e.g. empty cells of a tabular representation). 
Graphical representations can also aid problem solving by facilitating perceptual judge-
ments of a. kind which are almost effortless for humans, and can act as aids to re-
trieval (La.rkin & Simon, 1987). Generally, linguistic representations require more 
active search, comprehension and inference than graphical representations. though for 
some tasks such as the comprehension of computer programmes, textual representa-
tions have been shown to be more effective than visual ones, in some respects (Green & 
Pctre, 1992; Petre & Green, 1993). Thus, Larkin & Simon (1987) emphasise the differ-
ence between the informational and the c01nputational equivalence of representations. 
Stenning & Oberlander (1995) use the terms 'expressiveness' and 'facility of infer-
ence' and contrast the logic of a task with its implemerUation. Unlike Lark in & Simon 
(1987), who argue that graphics facilitate perceptual judgements, Stenning & Oberla.n-
der ( 1995) explain the computational efficiency of diagrams in terms of representational 
system semantics. They argue that graphical representations such as diagrams are less 
Pxpressive than sentential representations and that they therefore aid processability. 
T ht•y term that property of graphical representational systems 'specificity ·. i.e . 
.. . the demand by a system of representation that information in some class 
be specified in any interpretable representation (Stenning & Oberlander, 
1995. p.98) 
In other words, graphical representations compel specification of classes of information, 
in contrast to systems that allow arbitrary abstractions. Specificity theory is further 
discussed below in the section on the semantic properties of representations. 
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Graphical representations probably make use of the visual-spatial scratch-pad com-
ponent of working memory (Bacldcley, 1990). Exploiting this modality of working 
memory does not consume resources from phonological encoding via auditory channels 
although there is an attentional overhead. The dimensions of visual and spatial infor-
mation seem to be orthogonal (Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Bryant, 1992). The spatial 
component of visually processed information is probably encoded automatically and 
independently of attention (Ma.ndler, Seegmiller & Day, 1977). In contrast, the en-
coding of visual information is thought to involve attentional switching by the central 
executive (Baddeley, 1990). The encoding of spatial information does not depend upon 
the sensory channel of input. Blind people can use embossed diagrams by touch just 
as sighted people can use diagrams visually. Spatial representations can also be con-
structed in memory from linguistic inputs such as verbal descriptions (Bryant, 1992) 
and are equivalent to those constructed as a result of direct visual observation. 
The construction of internal representations (and probably external ones also) has a. 
major effect upon recall. Kintsch (1989) points out that when internal models (such 
as mental maps) are constructed from problem descriptions, reconstruction of the text 
during recall is based on the model rather than the original stimulus. 
External graphical representations must be both well-constructed and capable of rep-
resenting the in formation in a problem. If both criteria are met, the high- ba.ndwid th, 
rapid processing capabilities of the human visual system are exploited and very easy 
perceptual judgementsi are substituted for more difficult logical ones (Pa.ige & Si-
man, 1966). They argue that the computational efficiency of graphics is clue to the 
congruence between the structure of the data and the program(s) that operates on it. 
l~oed inger & Anderson ( 1990) suggest that the use of ERs can facilitate a. shift of 
rPasoning mode. \V hen used in the development of a geometry proof (ostensibly a. 
deductive reasoning task), accurately drawn and skillfully used diagrammatic repre-
sentations aiel in the generation, by induction, of possible statements that may be 
provable and which may also lie on the path to the problem goal. In other words, 
diagrammatic models, compared to syntactic representations, act to constrain the set 
7 Not. all perceptual judgements are easy - the visual-spatial systems are limited in the judgements 
t.he.v are capable of making. it. is easy to judge which of two circles is larger but in the case of 
complicated shapes the same task can be almost impossible without measurements and calculation. 
C/1APTEH 1. INTRODUCTION 20 
of possibly provable statements and shift the mode of reasoning from deduction to 
i tiel IICtion. 
Constructing an ER is equivalent to building a model of the information in the problem. 
lfowever, semantically equivalent models may not be equally suited for all types of 
problem solving task (Day, 1988). Some representations facilitate the rapid comparison 
of values (e.g. histograms) whereas other representations facilitate read-off of precise 
values (e.g. tables). Hence, effective ER use requires both an adequate representation 
of the information in the problem and a representation suited to the type of task posed 
by the problem. 
Representations also differ in their ability to convey what might be termed 'progress 
through the problem' information. Tables or spreadsheets, for example, are particularly 
good at highlighting (via. empty cells) missing or not-yet-represented information. 
Externalisation and the self-explanation effect The effectiveness of ERs may 
be mediated by mechanisms that parallel the ways in which self-explanations are as-
sociated with successful problem solving - the 'self-explanation' effect (Chi, Bassok, 
Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989). In the Chi et al. (1989) study, subjects studied a 
chapter on Newton's laws from a physics textbook and then studied worked-out solu-
tions to problems. The worked-out examples were illustrated by diagrams. Afterwards, 
they were asked to solve similar problems. Self-explanations (remarks that students 
made as they studied the text and worked-examples) were recorded (Chi & Bassock, 
1989). 
( ;ood st l!d<.'II ts tend to generate self-explanations when learning from worked-out so-
lution <'Xamples. They actively construct an interpretation of the example that they 
an' st ud~~ing. Good students produce more self-explanations than poor learners. The 
nwchanism of self-explanation is believed to be one by which students generate tacit 
knowledge that links pieces of explicitly stated knowledge. In contrast, poor learners 
tend to n'-read and paraphrase parts of the example. Furthermore, good learners are 
a hi<' t.o articulate their comprehension difficulties more clearly than poor learners who 
t C'ncl to in cl icate that they understand the statements given in the worked-out exam pies. 
Cood students refer back to an example for a specific piece of information, whereas 
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poor students refer back in order to search for a solution (Chi et al., 1989). Van-
Lehn, .Jones & Chi (1992) argue that students invent new knowledge during example 
studying and problem solving rather than merely engaging in the recollection and op-
erationalisation of' knowledge acquired from reading text. The most productive source 
of new knowledge, according to VanLehn et al. (1992), is explanation-based learning8 
of correctness (EBLC) in which new domain knowledge is created by specialisation of 
overly general knowledge. 
The self-explanation effect has been replicated in the domains of physics and computer 
science, but the underlying cognitive processes have not been fully explored. ER con-
struction may affect self-explanation but the issue has received little research attention 
to elate. For example 1 the self-explanation effect may operate during translation across 
moclalities (e.g. from verbal to diagrammatic or vice versa.). The modality in which 
an ER is constructed (i.e. linguistic or graphical) may affect the operation of the pro-
cesses underlying the self-explanation effect. In the case of constructing a. diagram for 
example, the semantic properties of graphics may confront the learner with his or her 
poor problem comprehension since, unlike language, graphics force a. determinate rep-
resentation that is severely limited in terms of the amount of abstraction that can be 
expressed (Stenning & Oberlander, 199.5). As Hall, Kibler, \Venger & Truxa.w (1989) 
have observed 1 much of a problem solver's activity is devoted to reaching a.n under-
standing of the problem. VVith language, learners may re-write or translate a. problem 
in somewhat abstract terms and may even conceal from themselves their incomplete 
comprehension. 
As mentioned earlieL Stenning & Oberlander (199.5) suggest that graphica.l represen-
tations compel certain classes of information to be represented and that these repre-
S('!lt at ions are less expressive of abstraction than sententia.l representations. 
lt sPc'ms likely that graphical ERs. b~r their limited ability to express abstraction, may 
provide more salient and vivid feedback to a. comprehension-monitoring, self-explaining 
student than ·self-talk' in the linguistic modality. Specificity theory (Stenning & Ober-
landC'r. 199.1) provides grounds for predicting that the process of translating inform a-
8 Explanation-based learning occurs where there is a single training example together \Vith knowledge 
of the task domain on t.he part of the learner (Wusteman, 1992). 
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tion from a linguistic representation such as natural language or logic to a graphical 
representation might be more effective than translation from one representation to 
another within the same modality. 
Externalisation - turning one's representations into stimuli Reisberg ( 1987) 
sees the process of constructing an ER as a procedure for 'widening the context of 
understanding' and "turning ones representations into stimuli'. ER selection and con-
struction consist of dynamic iterations and interactions between external and mental 
n10dels. Some tasks can be performed with internal representations but are very diffi-
cult. Consider the task reported in a. study by Hinton (1979) who instructed subjects 
to imagine picking up a cube and holding it such that one corner is vertically above 
another. He then asked the subjects about the location of the corners that they weren't 
"holding'. 1viost subjects believe that the corners will form a square along the ·equator' 
of the cube. The middle edges of the cube, in fact, form a. zig zag. Hinton argues 
that most subjects' mental images are not fully elaborated - we mentally reconstruct 
the cube on the basis of an incorrect approximation of the transformations involved. 
\Ve work from some rather poorly elaborated, structural description. Externalising the 
representation - drawing a. diagram of the cube - assists greatly with determining 
the correct arrangement of corners. Graphical ERs force consistency and help to turn 
a.n initial internal representation into an external stimulus which, upon re-processing, 
assists with finding a solution. 
In other words, the process of externalisation helps to disambiguate ambiguous men-
tal images. In a similar way, the process of dra.wing an ER such as a. diagram (i.e. 
Pxternalising a mental model) can facilitate problem solving. In the author's view. 
PXtPrnalisation may also facilitate the transfer of information between cognitive sub-
s.\·stems in ways that are not possible internally according to the dual-coding hypothesis 
(e.g. Paivio, 1986). 
Plan 
In t.he remainder of this thesis, Chapter 2 outlines the domain (analytical reasoning) 
and describes the structural and linguistic characteristics of analytical reasoning prob-
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lems. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the cognitive processes involved when subjects 
solve analytical reasoning problems. The nature and extent of support that might be 
offered to subjects during representation construction is also considered. 
Chapter 4 reviews related research. The review is organised around the issues of: 
• self-selection/construction of external representations versus the use of pre-determined. 
pre-fabricated external representations 
• domain-specific external representational formalisms versus more generic forms 
• instructional intervention in the use of external representations versus unguided, 
spontaneous use 
Chapter 5 presents the first study which examined a large corpus of 'workscra.tchings' 
produced by subjects as they solved paper and pencil-based analytical reasoning prob-
lems under test conditions. The workscra.tchings show great diversity of representation 
use across subjects and permitted a.n examination of the utility of different external 
representations under differing task conditions. 
A second study, presented in Chapter 6, utilised a computer-based system (switch.ERI). 
The system ad ministered analytical reasoning problems and provided a range of ER 
construction environments for the subject to choose and switch between. User-system 
interactions were recorded dynamically during problem solving. This methodology 
permitted micro-analyses of the cognitive events at each stage during the time-course 
of problem solving. switchERI was used to determine some of the circumstances under 
\\' h ich mu It i pie representations enhance performance, to study subjects' behaviour d u r-
iu.e; impasses in reasoning and to identify the important factors surrounding decisions 
to switch representations. The data also suggested the kinds of support that might be 
useful to learners at different stages of reasoning. 
( 'hapter I presents the results of a. stud)'· using a second system, switch.ERII- a.n intelli-
1-!;Pnt learning environment. SwitchERII incorporates a. representation of the semantics 
of Etder's Circles, dynamically parses the user's representation and provides feedback 
a.ncl advice. The switch.ERII study examined the relationship between subjects' prior 
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knowledge and reasoning performance. 'l'he switchERJJ study also investigated the ex-
tent to which subjects' prior misconceptions affected external representation selection, 
construction and use. 
Chapter 8 relates the findings of the 3 studies to the issues raised in earlier chapters. 
The roles of representation switching in the resolution of impasses in reasoning and the 
cognitive effects of externalisation are discussed. The thesis concludes with an argu-
ment in favour of a. domain-independent 'ER curriculum' . It is suggested that direct 
instruction in the use of a range of ERs might equip students with wider representa-
tional repertoires and hence allow them more scope to indulge their representational 
preferences. 
Finally, in Chapter 9, the contributions made by the thesis are summarised and several 
directions for future work are proposed. These include extending the representational 
semantics of switchERJJ, evaluating various types of system feed back and implementing 
a. mechanism for checking for slips during read-off from ERs. 
Chapter 2 
The domain: Analytical 
reasoning problems 
The characteristics of analytical reasoning problen1s 
This chapter describes the linguistic and structural characteristics of analytical rea-
soning (AR) problems since subsequent chapters assumes some familiarity with the 
domain. 
The G RE exam is taken by US u nclergrad uates, and, together with course grades. 
plays a major role in determining entry into US Graduate Schools. In its full form, the 
GRE has sections that test verbal ability (analogies, antonyms, sentence completions~ 
reading comprehension), quantitative ability (arithmetic, algebra, geometry, quanti-
t a.tive eo m parison, discrete quantitative, data interpretation) and analytical ability 
(analytical reasoning, logical reasoning). The analytical ability scale of the G RE was 
introduced into the exam in 1977, in response to the view of graduate school teaching 
:->I an· that the then current exam lacked a test of abstract reasoning ability. :\ bstract 
rPasonin~ was favoured by staff and students as a means of broadening the GRE over 
altPrnativP scales measuring scientific thinking and study style (lvliller & \Vild~ 1979). 
However~ the early GRE Petbal and quantitative subscales did not add a great deal of 
predictive utility to the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), which is taken at secondary 
school four or five years earlier than the GRE. In a sample of 22~923 subjects, the 
GRE verbal scale was observed to correlate highly with SAT verbal scores (r = .858) 
and G RE quantitative also correlates highly with SAT mathematical scores (r = .862) 
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(Angoff & .Johnson, 1990). Hence there was a need for a GRE scale that was designed 
t.o include aspects of reasoning additional to those measured by the SAT. The revised 
GRE is claimed to predict graduate school performance in a wide range of disciplines 
separately from other measures such as domain specific undergracl uate performance. 
Swinton & Powers (1983, p. 104) write that ... 
the (analytical portion of the) test is intended to measure analytical rea-
soning abilities that, like the verbal and quantitative skills measured by the 
test, are assumed to develop over a relatively long period of time. 
The GRE analytical test has two su bscales, termed analytical 1·easoning and logical 
reaso·ning, respectively (Duran, Powers & Swinton, 1987). Logical reasoning items 
take the form of verbal reasoning or argument analysis problems and were not used in 
the studies reported here. Rather, the items used in this research were derived from 
the other su bscale - analytical reasoning. Analytical reasoning problems are usually 
constraint satisfaction puzzles for which diagrams are often useful. 
Analytical reasoning problems1 generally involve constraint satisfaction solution strate-
gies based on an understanding of the relationships between fictitious things, events, 
places or persons described in a narrative passage or problem 'stem 1 • Typically, the 
stem consists of a set of about three to seven related statements about entity relation-
ships followed by three or more questions that test understanding of their structure 
and any implications. Relationships can be orderings, set membership or cause a.nd 
effect. Some of the information is given explicitly but some is implicit and must be 
in f<'rrccl. The given in forma t.ion is followed by a series of questions that require ded uc-
t i \'C rPason ing for their solution. Exam pies of these analytical reasoning puzzles are 
provided in Appendix A. 
lt is claimed that the GRE test does not require specialised domain knowledge and 
1s relat ivcl~r resistant to t.he effects of coaching. However, Swinton & Powers ( 1983) 
showed that. certain types of item in the GRE analytical scale were susceptible to the 
pffects of a. • brief curriculum of special preparation, ( p. 104). Those item types were 
1 Sometimes referred to as 'Who-done-it.?' or '\·Vho owns the zebra?' deduct.i\'e reasoning problems 
( cg. rvlcGuiness, 1986). 
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eliminated from the analytic measure in 1981 (Emmerich, Enright, Rock & Tucker, 
1991). 
An analysis of the content characteristics of analytical reasoning items by Chalifour 
& Powers ( 1989) revealed that the difficulty of analytical reasoning items is predicted 
by a number of factors. Factors that are positively correlated with difficulty include: 
the usefulness of drawing diagrams (the greater the usefulness, the more difficult), the 
number of words in the stimulus, the number of rules and the amount of information 
from the rules or conditions needed for a solution. The number of unvarying assign-
ments of entities to position 2 was negatively correlated with item difficulty; that is, 
the more explicitly given determinate information, the easier the problem. 
Students sitting the analytical reasoning sections of the GRE exam are instructed "In 
answering some of the questions, it may be useful to draw a rough diagram" (Eel u-
cational Testing Service, 1992). The problems used in the studies reported here were 
selected from a GRE exam 'crammer' (Brownstein, Weiner & Green, 1990). Brown-
stein et al. recommend a 'summary chart', a kind of pseudo- set diagram which they 
refer to as a 'circle diagram' and a 'four- by-four grid' (i.e. tabular representation) for 
problems 1 to 3 (Appendix A), respectively. 
Analytical reasoning problems are often best solved by constructing ERs. GRE an-
a.lytical reasoning problems can involve deductive reasoning about seating plans for 
dinner parties, order of speakers at a conference, the assignment of individuals to of-
fices, committee membership etc. This although specialised domain knowledge may 
not be required, problem solvers may need to be familiar with various 'scripts' of every-
da.\· \V0stern cultural experience (Schank & Abelson, 19Ti). Norman (1988) partitions 
·constraint satisfaction' into physicaL semantic and cultural constraints. Physical con-
straints are exemplified, in a common analytical reasoning context, by the fact that 
only one person at a time can sit on a chair and this is assumed knowledge in the 
·seating plan' type of problem. Semantic constraints are illustrated by the tacit as-
sumption in the 'dogs' problem that each dog wins only one prize, has only one owner 
and only one name. Cultural constraints are often represented as scripts, such as 
2 For example, in the office allocation example, statements of the kind 'Ms Green, the senior employee, 
i~ cnt.itlecl to Office 5, which has the largest \vindow.' 
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Schank & Abelson 's restaurant script which constrains the range of culturally accept-
able behaviours at each stage of entering, ordering, eating and leaving. It is therefore 
questionable whether GRE analytical reasoning problems are 'culture fair' for non-US 
and perhaps students of low socio-economic status. 
Attractiveness of the don1ain 
A ualytical reasoning problems were an attractive domain for the study of reasoning 
with ERs because of the a priori evidence that indicates diagrams are often useful in 
finding solutions and that diagram drawing is associated with item difficulty. A range of' 
GRE 'crammers' (e.g. Brownstein et al., 1990) are available and these provide a ready 
source of suitable problems. Also, the crammers frequently recommend particular ER 
forma.lisms for solving particular problem types. The utility of the recommended ERcs 
has not been subjected to empirical scrutiny and so one of the aims of the current work 
was to examine the usefulness of the crammer-recommended ERs. 
Analytical reasoning problems have an additional advantage over many types of stim-
ulus used in cognitive research in that subjects often report that they enjoy solving 
them. This is important from the motivational standpoint. The non-requirement of 
specialised domain knowledge is also an advantage in that they can be administered 
to subjects from a wide variety of backgrounds. In the US, skilled performance on an-
alytical reasoning problems is very important because of their inclusion on the GRE. 
Hence the findings of empirical studies of solution strategies are likely to be received 
with interest. Another further attraction of the domain is that item validity a.nd other 
ps~rchometric data is available. usually from the ET'S. Much of the ET'S research. 
how<'VPL is concerned with comparing the effects of various multiple-choice response 
fonnat.s or the abilit~' of particular problems to discriminate between individuals. The 
ETS research focusses very little upon the kinds of strategies that subjects use in their 
solu t.io ns. 
Final!~·. another important factor in the choice of domain was that a substantial corpus 
of paper and pencil tests was available because analytical reasoning items were used 
in t.he pre and post course assessments of a. graphical approach to teaching logic (Cox~ 
St.<~nning & Oberla.nder, 1994, 1995; Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 199.5; OberlandeL 
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Cox & Stenning, 1995a.,b). 
The linguistic and structural properties of analytical reasoning prob-
lenls. 
The characteristics of analytical reasoning problems stem from both their linguistic 
and structural properties. 
Linguistic characteristics and attributes of AR problems 
1v1a.ny of their linguistic properties have already been discussed and are summarised 
below in list form 
• problems have 'stem' and questions 
• information about entities (people, things, places) and relations between them 
• some information is given negatively 
• a. proportion of the information is usually implicit 
• information presentation violates Grice's 'cooperative principle' of manner (or-
derliness, obscurity of expression). This will be discussed further in Chapter ~3. 
• instructions to subjects 'Each question or group of questions is based on a passage 
or set of conditions. In answering some of the questions~ it may be helpful to 
draw a. rough diagram. For each question, select the best answer choice given.:3 ' 
Structural characteristics and attributes of AR problems 
The structural attributes of a.naJ~:tical reasoning problems are listed below: 
• tht).V are constraint satisfaction deductive reasoning puzzles that involve various 
kinds of relationship bet\\'een entities, such as: 
- attribute assignments 
:>. 'Pract.icing to take t.he GRE General Test Number 9' ETSjvVarner Books, 1992. 
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• the problem questions are heterogeneous in terms of their task requirement 
• the questions can consist of 'what if' (hypothetical cases) e.g. question 4 of the 
'Office' problem; question .5 of the 'Dogs' problem (Appendix A). 'Hypothetical' 
questions affect the number of versions of representations that may be required 
in a subject's solutions, since a new model of the problem information is required 
for each 'what if' scenario. 
• AR problems vary in complexity (number of dimensions, values per 
dimension) 
• AR problems vary Ill their level of determinacy, for example, the 'Office' and 
'Dogs' problems in Appendix A are determinate and the 'Poets' problem is in-
determinate 
• AR test item designers (Eel ucational Testing Service (ETS)) have data on the fac-
tors that are associated with item difficulty (e.g. need for diagrams is associated 
with greater difficulty) 
• coaching texts ('crammers'), especially 3rd party, non-ETS ones, recommend 
particular ERs for solu lions (e.g. Brownstein et al., 1990; Research & Education 
:\ssociation, 1994) 
The effects of linguistic factors and structural characteristics upon comprehension are 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
c; HE analytical reasoning items have an additional advantage for the studies reported 
in this thesis: they are verbal tests posed in English, eliciting selections of verbal 
answers. They present no diagrams and there is no opportunity to present the results 
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of reasoning cl iagram matically. However, there is room on the test questionnaire for 
the construction of external representations and therefore candidates can engage in 
diagrammatic and other representational activity in the course of the test. 
The structural and linguistic characteristics of analytical reasoning problems have pro-
found effects upon comprehension. But comprehension is only the first stage of ana-
lytical reasoning. Subsequent stages involve ER selection decisions, ER construction, 
reading-off information from ERs, building a second ER (i.e. switching ER), select-
ing an answer from the multiple choice array, etc. These are addressed in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Stages in analytical reasoning 
withERs 
Introduction 
This section outlines the cognitive processes involved at each stage of solving analyt-
ical reasoning problems using ERs. The stages loosely follow Polya's (1957) stages: 
understand the problem, devise a plan, carry out the plan, examine and reflect upon 
the solution. The overview will be used to elucidate and highlight important issues 
that will be discussed in more detail in following chapters. 
Five components in reasoning with ERs can be identified: 
1. problem comprehension and interpretation 
2. ER selection 
:3. EH construction 
-1. read-off from the ER or use of ER 
5. responding to (a.ns\\'ering) problem questions 
It should again be emphasised that the components are not linear and fixed. rather 
they are iterative - problem solving evolves as the process of representation proceeds. 
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Interpretation and co1nprehension 
Understanding is a. constructive process, in which a representation is devel-
oped for the object that is understood. The difference between understand-
ing and not understanding is in the nature of the representation. (Greeno, 
1977, p44) 
... word problems ... involve learning to use ordinary language in a. special 
way ... (Kintsch, 1991, p.241) 
Solving AR problems begins with the interpretation and comprehension of the (lin-
guistically) presented information. 
As soon as the question of uncle ·standing is addressed, difficulties emerge with a stage 
conception of reasoning with ERs. One perspective argues that understanding is de-
fined by the process of representation construction (which, in turn, pre-supposes rep-
resentation selection). 
But what is comprehension? In problem solving, Greeno (1977) suggests that a. problem 
solution is a. cognitive product, generated by the problem solver, which can be evaluated 
in terms of the degree of understanding it shows. 
U ndersta.nding requires background knowledge and conceptual knowledge. 
The older tradition of Kohler, Duncker, and \t\Tertheimer emphasised insight- a. sudden 
realisation of critical relations between elements of a problem . .lvlore recently, G reeno 
( 1917) has offered three criteria. for understanding: coherence, correspondence and con-
m•ct <'d ncss. G rceno ( 1911, p.·l5) proposes three criteria for a. theory of understanding: 
• achievement of a coherent representation (i.e. unified at high level~ via. analogy 
for example, or global thematic content) 
• an internal representation that corresponds closely to the object that is under-
stood 
• relating the understood object and its components to the understander's other 
knowledge 
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}\ problem solution possesses coherence if its components are related in a compact 
structure. For some problems, Greeno, maintains, there are alternative solutions which 
differ in coherence. In discussing coherence, Greeno describes how Duncker ( 194.5) 
distinguished between organic proofs (which make higher-order relations between steps 
explicit) and mechanical proofs (which proceed step by step with attention focussed 
on the justification for deriving each step from preceding statements rather than on 
overall plan or proof structure). 
Good understanding is often achieved in solutions involving transforma-
tions of the problem and sensible constructions that preserve the main 
structure of the problem. The undesirable cases involve mechanical appli-
cations of rules that fail to preserve important relational properties needed 
for understanding. ( G reeno, 1977, p.4 7) 
Greeno's second criterion of comprehension, correspondence, refers to the relationship 
between the cognitive representation a.nd the object that is understood. :rvJa.ny failures 
of correspondence are due to slips. Greeno writes: 'persons frequently miscopy some 
information in a problem, or omit some relevant information . .Nla.ny such errors are 
probably best explained as random lapses of attention.' (p.46). The more central type 
of correspondence concerns whether or not the :solution is a natural one in the domain 
of the problem, or whether the problem has been translated in some way that makes 
the solution artificial.' Greeno cites an example from \Vertheimer (19.59) and contrasts 
two methods of finding the area of a parallelogram: a) use of the formula A = b x h 
and b) a. transformation that shows how a parallelogram is related to a rectangle. 
In terms of G reeno 's correspondence criterion, Newel! & Si m on's ( 1972) ·radical' re-
representation of nine-card number scrabble (Chapter 1) would also be classified as an 
artificial solution in Greeno's terms. 
The third criterion concerns the integration of a problem's cognitive representation 
with prior knowledge. Generalisation of a. solution pattern to new situations, and the 
ability to answer interpretive questions, depends upon the extent to which the cognitive 
!'<:'presentation of problem and its solution are connected with other components of the 
person's knowledge. The second and third studies to be reported in Chapters 6 and 
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1 incorporated measures of prior knowledge of ERs in order to assess the extent of its 
effect upon, inleT' alia, representation selection. 
G reeno 's constructivist approach to eo m prehension is rather general. A large number 
of problem characteristics and presentation factors influence subject's proneness to 
'see' solutions to word problems. These factors can be grouped under two headings-
linguistic factors and structural factors. The linguistic and structural factors associated 
with analytical reasoning problems were briefly listed in Chapter 2 - they will now 
be discussed in more detail. 
Effect of linguistic factors upon co1nprehension 
In the mathematical domain, educators have recognized for some time that language 
can impede the understanding of mathematical concepts (Austin & 1-Iowson, 1979; Bell, 
t98:3; Pimm, 1987; Durkin & Shire, 1991). Phenomena which have !)('en discussed are 
mathematical register (Pimm, 1987), lexical ambiguity (Durkin and Shire, (1991), and 
metaphor, (Nolder, 1991). These linguistic factors also affect the interpretation of 
analytical reasoning problems. 
In order for a student to accurately comprehend a. problem, they: 
• need to avoid a. variety of word-problem comprehension errors 
• need to overcome ·uncooperative' aspects of information presentation (i.e. vio-
lations of Gricean maxims of co-operative discourse) 
• ll('<'d to give a precise reading to (apparently) informal language 
• must not be misled by the surface form of a. problem - its ·cover star~~' 
TPst. item designers exploit these factors in order to manipulate the difficulty of the 
problems. 
~I any errors are made at the stage of problem comprehension and this emerges as a. cru-
cial phase of problem solving (Proudfit, 1981; Reed & Ettinger, 1987; Schwartz, 1911: 
Polich & Schwartz, 197 4). Schwa.rtz ( 1971) has shown that the syntactic complexity 
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of a.na.lytica.l reasoning problems a.ft'ects the error rate- negative wording and the use 
of disjunctions are associated with high error rates. In contrast positively expressed 
problems and the use of conjunctions are much easier. Polich & Schwartz (1974) found 
that the representation of information that has to be inferred (i.e. is implicitly given) 
is particularly error-prone. Problem complexity (in terms of the number of dimensions 
and the values along them) is another determining factor (Schwartz, 1971; Polich & 
Schwartz, 1974). 
Information extracted from a problem, and how it is interpreted, influence ER selection. 
There are many sources of errors of interpretation - many errors are clue to the language 
in which the problems are posed in the sense that formal readings of information 
can be contrasted with natural (cooperative) dialogue readings. Other errors result 
from misinterpretation of quantifiers, implicatures etc. The influence of such 'Gricea.n' 
factors is discussed further below. 
The ·cover story~ of a problem radically affects problem difficulty as demonstrated by 
studies that have compared the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) problem with various isomorphs 
such as various 'Monster- Globe' versions (e.g. Lewis & Toth, 1992). Versions in which 
transitions between problem states are difficult to envisage (imagine) are more difficult 
than more salient versions. For example, a monster-globe TOH isomorph, in which 
spheres in the monsters' hands change shape 'magically' 1 was more difficult to solve 
than one in which the monsters passed globes between each other in a more 'naturar 
and more easily imagined fashion i.e. the monsters handed globes to each other in the 
same way that humans might hand things around. 
HC'versa I errors a rP also common correspondence errors (to use Greeno 's ( 1977) term). 
This is a tendency to match the word order in the problem to entity order in the 
probiPm representation - as in the 'students and professors' type of problem. These 
erroneous representations often 'pop' quickly into the solver's mind and, in experts, 
a re actively suppressed via self monitoring and checking. "tvluch of research on errors of 
interpretation and comprehension comes from the word arithmetic and word algebra 
litPratures- however, many of the findings are relevant to analytical reasoning. Trans-
lation errors are frequently studied in those domains- e.g. \\!oilman (1983) reports 
1 An analogue of disk moves between pegs in the Tower of Hanoi. 
(.'HAPTEH :J. STAGES IN ANALYTICAL REASONING \VITH ERS 37 
that one in three college students produce the erroneous algebraic representation 6S=P 
for the sentence 'There are 6 times a.s many students as professors'. Clement, Lochhead 
a.nd 1vlon k ( 1981) found that 37% of engineering students and .57% of non-science st u-
dPnts made this type of error. The reversal error is due to several causes- a tendency 
to match word order in the sentence to the sequence of algebraic symbols, and/or a 
;set match' error where the equals sign is interpreted to represent 'for every'. 
VVollman ( 1983) showed that highly proficient subjects (e.g. mathematical physicists) 
may initially make a reversal error, but self-monitoring processes and checking result 
in the initial equation being corrected. \i\/ith more typical subjects, \i\/ollman (1983) 
has shown that brief (10 mins) training in monitoring, comparing and checking either 
cl uring or following translation produces dramatic improvements in performance- 16 of 
17 students (from a sample of 43) students who made reversal errors initially were able 
to arrive at a correct equation following the intervention. \i\/ollman (1983) characterises 
the intervention as an 'active operation' approach. 
1\:a.put (1987) argues that the high error rate in word-problem-to-algebra translations 
(mostly of the 6S=P variety) is due to natural language overriding the rules of algebraic 
syntax and rules of reference2 • 
Analytical reasoning problems also offer plenty of scope for reversal errors - as in the 
case of the 'Poets' problem used in the investigations to be reported in Chapters 5-73 . 
Grice (197.5) analysed conversational implicatures and has proposed the ·cooperative 
principle'. Several maxims of the cooperative principle assist with understanding 
sources of difficulty in puzzles such as analytical reasoning problems. The coopera-
t i\'(' principle has maxims arranged under four headings: quantity, quality, relation 
and manner. 
l'nclt'r quantity there is the maxim that contributions (in dialogue) should be as 
informative as required for the purposes of the exchange, and that they should not be 
2 Curiously. when Students-Professors types of problems are presented with a schematic diagram in 
addition to the word-problem, the error rate increases dramatically (Sims-Knight & Kaput, 1983). 
This finding might be born in mind by those who advocate heterogeneous reasoning such as Barwise 
,\:. Etchemendy ( 1992 ). Heterogeneous reasoning will be introduced later in this chapter. 
:~ ·All those who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot' is sometimes represented 
in a manner that is commensurate with a reversal error. 
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more informative than necessary. 
The quality of a. contribution is determined by its truthfulness- do not say what you 
believe to be false, do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Grice's heading relation has only one maxim: 'be relevant'. Writing about relation, 
G rice states: 
I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to my immediate needs 
at each stage of the transaction. 
The final category, 1nanner, is perhaps the one of most relevance to the domain of 
analytical reasoning problems. It requires that contributions should avoid obscurity of 
expression, should avoid ambiguity, and that they should be brief and orderly. 
If the sentences in the problem stem of an analytical reasoning puzzle are examined 
(Appendix A), it can be seen that they violate several of the Gricea.n maxims. The 
maxim of quantity is flouted in the sense that the contribution of the problem poser is 
to only provide as much information as is required for a. solution to the problem and 
not to be as informative to the extent of assisting the solution process (i.e. optimally 
informative). Analytical reasoning (AR) puzzles are also obscure since they express 
problem information in natura.! language (e.g. 'Some of those who enjoy the poetry of 
Eliot also enjoy the poetry of A uclen ') but require a formal interpretation of the ( q uan-
tifier information i.e. 'some' must be taken to mean 'at least one and possibly all'. In 
natura.! language, the subject term denotes shared knowledge between communicants, 
and predicates convey information that is being transferred. In the interpretation of 
\\'orcl problems the subject and predicate terms can stand for sets, for exam pie, and 
a tt ri but ion is to be understood as asserting relations between sets. 
In a.naJ~:tical reasoning problems, information is presented in an arbitrarily ordered 
manner, there is no attempt to minimise ambiguity, and information is (deliberately) 
obscurely stated (e.g. '.ivlr G rossman 's clog wins neither first nor second prize'). The 
violations fall mainly under Grice's categories of quantity, manner and relation. 
Analytical reasoning puzzles are, by design, 'uncooperative' in the sense that infor-
mation is dispensed in a manner calculated to complicate the solver's task. That is, 
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information is presented in a. manner that is inappropriate to the reasoner's immediate 
needs. One of the reasons why AR problems are puzzles is because they violate G ricean 
maxims and the cooperative principle. 
A possible benefit of ERs in analytical reasoning is that they assist in overcoming 
violations of Gricean maxims and the tension between natural language and formal 
interpretations of, for example, quantifiers. ERs assist by re-ordering the information 
in ways useful for solutions and by laying out the range of possible models of the 
information, making missing information easy to detect, and by enforcing the explicit 
representation of implicit information. 
In another respect, though, the analytical reasoning problems do cooperate with the 
reasoner- it is common for the entity labels to be abbreviatable to alphabetic sequences. 
In the poets problem, for example, the poets Auden, Browning, Coleridge etc can be 
abbreviated to A,B,C,D ... Another example is the dogs problem - ov:ners Edwarcls, 
Foster, Grossman, Hunt (E,F,G,H) , dog names Jack, Kelly, Lad, Nlax (.J ,K,L,Nl) and 
dog breeds Airdale, Boxer, Collie, Doberman (A,B,C,D). 
Analytical reasoning problems are, then, a curious mixture of cooperatively and un-
cooperatively presented information which makes them differ markedly from normal 
narrative text or everyday dialogue. 
Lewis (1989) provides another example of how the way in which problems posed in 
natural language can be expressed in ways that are fixed against the formal operation 
required for a solution. She argues that the use of terms such as 'more than' agree 
with the arithmetic operation of addition whereas often problem presentation is made 
deliberately inconsistent as in: 
· :\ t :\ RCO gas sells for $ 1.3 a gallon. This is .5c less per gallon than gas at Chevron. 
How much do .) gallons of gas cost at Chevron?~ 
In this case addition is the formal arithmetic operation required for solution but the 
natural language phrasing and syntactic form are inconsistent with priming such an 
opPration because of the use of the phrase "less per gallon'. 
Puzzle solving therefore involves a mind set of linguistic wariness and requires a bag 
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of representational tools for recognising and defusing traps laid by non-cooperative 
modes of expression. This mind-set is akin to Levesque's (1988) 'puzzle mode' of 
problem solving and the need to adopt what ha.c::; been termed an 'extensionalist stance~ 
(SU~nning & Cox, 199.5). 
It also represents what \Vollman (1983) has characterised as an 'active operation' 
approach. Hence an important factor in the interpretation of analytical reasoning 
problems is the need for more-precise-than-usual interpretations. For example, when 
reasoning in puzzle situations, subjects often recast the term 'if' into 'and'. This error 
of interpretation, and others, have received a great deal of attention in the syllogistic 
reasoning literature where they are termed 'belief biases' (e.g. Oakhill & Garnham, 
1993). Kintsch (1991) reports, too, that in his studies of word arithmetic problem 
solving: 
... a fairly small number of linguistic misunderstandings yielded most of the 
typical errors that children made' (p. 241) 
For example, 'Have more than' is interpreted as 'more', 'altogether' as ;and'; 'some~ 
t.rea.ted as an ordinary modifier instead of as a. number. Kintsch (1991) goes so far as 
to state: 
word problems are not suitable to train or test the development of logico-
mathematical skills, but rather involve learning to use ordinary language 
in a special way' (p. 241). 
l~intsch points out that the avoidance of speciaL abstract, language and the embedding 
of t lte problem in a. rich, familiar context has dramatic positive effects upon solution 
frc'quencics. He states that comprehension failures are central to the difficulty of \Vord 
algebra problems. 
I~int.sch ( 1991) reviews Lark in's ( 1 989) work on display-based reasoning. In displa.y-
ba!Sed reasoning, the problem is structured in a way that permits it to be solved via 
procedures immediately available in the world. However, he points out that more 
complex problems require symbolic manipulations in some problem model. Hence 
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there is a differentiation between reasoning in the problem model and reasoning in the 
world. Decontextua.lization (loss of connection between problem model and real world) 
is a major problem in eel ucation - for many students, physics, for example, remains 
as 'book knowledge'. Kintsch (1989; 1991) distinguishes between the textbase and 
situation rn.odel. The textbase is the mental representation of the text that a reader 
constructs from propositions in the process of comprehension. The situation model 
is a mental representation of the situation described by the text. The two menta.! 
representations are not independent of each other - each has its own characteristics 
and supports some types of behaviour but not others (Kintsch, 1989). The formation 
of a situation model does not necessarily depend upon a. full linguistic parse of the 
presented text. \,Yhen the situation is familiar (as is the case for many analytical 
reasoning problems), the situation model can be formed in the absence of a coherent 
a.nd well-organised textbase. Conversely, subjects sometimes construct a good textbase 
without being able to form a. situation model. 
Kintsch (1991) suggests the use of a mediating 'situation' model to map between real 
objects and events and the abstract symbol level. To illustrate, the situation model 
for a typical word algebra. problem might be: 
'a. slow aeroplane leaves first, then, after a while, the second one follows; at 
some point it will overtake the first one' 
In the case of a. typical a.na.lytical reasoning problem, (e.g. Problem 1, Appendix A), 
the situation model corresponding to the text of the problem stem might be: 
·There are 6 workers and 6 offices, everyone must be assigned to an office, 
one person per office, in such a way that everyone is content' 
The use of a situation model prevents students from building formal problem models 
from text simply by: 
'plugging numbers into equations, without explicitly considering the re-
lation of the situation to these equations, and as result misinterpret the 
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problcm'1' l\intsch (1991; p.240). 
Lepik (1990) took a different approach to the study of linguistic factors in word al-
gebra. problems from that of Kintsch. Lepik investigated the effects of the number 
of words, mean word length and similar indexes of cam plexity. Structural variables 
included the number of given quantities in a problem, the number of wanted quanti-
ties, number of equations required for solution, etc. Generally, the linguistic variables 
were not good predictors of performance in terms of correctness of responses. Several, 
however, vvere positively correlated with time spent on the problem. These were the 
number of literals in the problem, the number of letters, words, units and numerals in 
problem and the number of sentences in the problem. Several were negatively corre-
lated with time spent - number and proportion of words in the problem with more 
than 6 letters. Structural variables (e.g. known quantities, wanted quantities, number 
of formulae/equations required for solution, number of relations between quantities) 
predicted both the proportion of correct answers and time spent more extensively than 
linguistic variables. Several structural variables were negatively correlated with correct 
solutions and also positively correlated with problem solving time. The most significant 
of these was a compound variable defined as the total number of formulae, equations, 
and known/unknown quantities in the problem. Lepik 's study shows that for algebraic 
word problems at least, structural variables tend to exert more effect over time and 
correctness of solutions than the linguistic attributes of problem wording. An analysis 
of a.na.l~rtica.l reasoning word-problems using Lepik's approach would be an interesting 
topic for future research. 
Effect of structural factors upon co1nprehension 
ThP effects of structural factors in analytical reasoning problems have been analysed in 
a s('rics of studies by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1971; Schwartz & Fattaleh, 
I D/2: Polich & Sclnvartz, 197 4). They have shown that difficulty is related to the 
number of dimensions in the problem, the number of values along each dimension, 
thP amount of information presented negatively, the number of disjunctions and the 
·l This tendency to use formulaic solutions is similar to Greeno's ( 1977) notion of comprehension errors 
of correspondence. 
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amount of implicit information contained in the problem stem. 
Several more structural factors affect comprehension, though. Problem-solvers do not 
always recognise the well-structureclness of problems. Schoenfeld (1988) points out 
that the nonsense problem: 
There are 26 sheep and 10 goats on a ship. How old is the captain? 
has achieved 'folklore status in European mathematics circles' because, although it is 
clearly absurd, students will try to solve it. French and Swiss research has found that 
three quarters of 4th and .Sth grade students attempt solutions- the most frequently 
given answer being '36'. Like many mathematical phenomena, this one is probably 
not confined to younger students. The failure to recognise such problems, Schoenfielcl 
argues, is often the result of instructional approaches that emphasise cam pu tational 
algorithms at the expense of meaning. Greeno (1977) and Clement (1982) argue that 
if students were instructed in ways that emphasised meaning, they would be better 
equipped to identify 'impossible' problems. 
[n many respects the phrasing of many analytical problems is reminiscent of the 'How 
old is the captain?' example - they often seem to be cleli berately couched and ph rased 
in ways designed to make their degree of well-structuredness difficult to assess. Con-
sider the following 3 sample sentences taken from 11 given in the problem stem of a.n 
analytical reasoning problem used by Schwartz (1971): 
1. The hyena's owner doesn't live in the white, yellow or green house. 
2. Neither the .Japanese, the Indian nor the Englishman lives in the green house. 
:~. Neither the American nor Canadian owns a zebra. 
IVloreover, the instructions that accompany analytical reasoning problems do not indi-
cate that they are well-stuctured: 
[n this part, each question or group of questions is based on a passage or 
set of conditions. In answering some of the questions, it may be useful to 
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draw a. rough diagram. For each question, circle the best answer choice 
given. 
44 
The use of the term 'best' rather than 'correct' in the final sentence is probably delib-
erate. 
It is argued that the difficulty of detecting the well-structuredness of a problem has 
profound implications for ER selection. 
A crucial ER selection decision concerns whether or not the representation needs to 
express indeterminacy (abstraction). Obscuring the problem's degree of structured-
ness can therefore result in two kinds of ER selection error-assigning an abstraction-
expressing (non-weak) representation to a. determinate problem or using a weak (de-
terminate, unique and single model) representation on an indeterminate problem. As 
Cox, Sten ning & 0 berla.nder ( 199.5) have shown, both result in poor performance, 
though much more so in the latter case than the former. 
Contextual factors are also very important in analytical reasoning. Recent work by 
Bernado & Oka.ga.ki (1994) in the domain of 'Students and professors' type problems 
has emphasised the importance of problem information context (PlC). Berna.do & Ok-
a.ga.ki (1994) suggest that in order to arrive at the correct equation subjects must see 
the equation as a. dynamic representation of an operation, rather than as a. static rep-
resentation of verbal information - i.e. to use an operative approach. In a. series of 
experiments, Berna.do & Oka.ga.ki considered two factors they felt were central to an 
operative approach. These were: (a.) knowledge of a.bou t the mea.ni ng of mathema.t-
ic<d s~·m bols and (b) problem information context (PlC) in which this knowledge is 
<llTPssible. In a f1rst experiment, they provided students with a. study sheet containing 
s.vmbolic knowledge5 . This had a. positive effect on performance. They also point out 
that the ·students and professors' equation-writing task lacks a. specified problem goal 
of the form ~how many students are there?' It also lacks information that a. procedure 
\\·ill be needed to reach the goa.l (e.g. 'There are 94 professors'). Together these pro-
duce a lack of problem information context. Bern ado & Okaga.ki predicted that full 
PlC versions of the problems used in the equation-writing task would enable subjects 
" Sample item: 'Placing numbers next to symbols indicates a mathematical operation' 
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t.o a.ccess symbolic knowledge. This prediction wa.s supported by data from two exper-
iments. A third experiment manipulated both the amount of symbolic knowledge and 
the PlC. The results showed that the performance of subjects in 2 groups (knowledge 
only; knowledge plus PlC) did not differ. Bernado & Okagaki interpret this finding as 
'consistent with the hypothesis that having the appropriate problem-information con-
t.cxt helps problem solvers by facilitating their access to all relevant problem-related 
information, including pertinent knowledge about the meaning of mathematical sym-
bols or notations' (p218). 
The Berndado & Okagaki PlC results have a bearing on analytical reasoning problems. 
In analytical reasoning, the information given in the problem stem does not constitute 
the full problem information context. Subjects need to 'look-ahead' to the questions 
associated with the information given in the problem stem. They should not just 
proceeed with their solutions on the basis of information given in the problem stem 
alone. Empirical results to be presented in Chapters 5,6 and 7 will demonstrate that 
attempts to select and build ERs that are made without considering the full PlC often 
end in erroneously constructed representations and poor reasoning performance. 
To conclude, there follows a summary of the main points in relation to problem inter-
pretation and comprehension. In order to reason effectively, subjects: 
• must negotiate complicated syntactic structures and overcome the uncooperative 
aspects of the problem's discourse 
• need to use the full problem information context (PlC) 
• should recognise the number of dimensions (variables) in the problem 
• must accurately discern the number of values along each dimension 
• ncPd to understand that some information is implicitly stated 
• must utilize negatively-stated information 
• should accurately gauge the problem's level of determinacy 
• should detect redundancy, symmetry and critical points in the problem (Ama.rel, 
1968) 
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• should adopt an 'cxtcnsionalist stance' or 'puzzle mode' mind-set 
Following a period of problem interpretation and comprehension, the reason er next 
makes an ER selection decision. 
ER selection 
... the choice of appropriate representations is capable of having spectacular 
effects on problem solving efficiency (Amarel, 1968, p.170) 
In solving analytical reasoning problems, the majority of subjects choose to reason 
with external representations (e.g. Schwartz, 1971; Cox & Brna, 199.5). ER selection 
is a crucial phase of a problem solving, but, to date, there has been much folk wisdom 
and speculation but little empirical work on the issue. :tvlarzano, Brandt, I-1 ughes~ 
.Jones, Presseisen, Rankin & Suhor (1988) suggest that categorical information is best 
represented using a hierarchy, and that event sequences are best represented by links in 
a. chain or a series of boxes. They recommend a. web, or 'spider map' for a. major idea 
or concept. Similarly, the authors of a. popular "crammer' for the GRE (Brownstein 
et al., 1990) ad vi se the use of lists, tables, maps and diagrams in the solution of 
GRE analytical reasoning problems but do not provide many guidelines for which to 
select other than to state that maps or diagrams are 'particularly helpful' for problems 
involving the physical or temporal order of things. 
Schwartz (1971) and Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972) noted considerable diversity in the 
types of ERs that their subjects produced in the course of solving determinate a.na.lyt-
ircd rPa~oning problems. They classified the ERs into .5 types: matrix graphics (e.g. 
tables). informal groupings. graphics, ·sentence re-write~ and miscellaneous. Schwartz 
( 1911) and Srhwa.rt.z & Fattaleh ( 1912) showed that subjects who chose tabular repre-
S<'lltat.ions in their solutions achieved significantly greater success rates than subjects 
\\'ho chose other kinds of ER. Ta.bular representations were not the most frequently 
dw.•:wn type of representation~ however (Schwartz, 1971). 
The EH that a subject chooses will depends. inter alia, upon: 
• interpretation and comprehension of the problem ~s explicit and implicit informa-
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tion 
• interpretation and comprehension of problem solving task posed 
• an ability to recognise the salient features and characteristics of the problem 
• a matching of the problem's salient features to an appropriate ER formalism 
• an appropriate ER formalism being in the subject's repertoire 
• the subjects cognitive style and/ or tendency to use external representations 
As suggested in Chapter 1 in the discussion of the semantic properties of ERs, the 
optimal representation is one which has sufficient expressive power for the task, but not 
any more power than £s needed. For determinate problems, diagrams (weakly expressive 
ERs) are useful because there is a unique model of the problem's information which a. 
diagram can represent. Indeterminate problems require representations whose degree 
of specificity is well matched to the amount of abstraction contained in the problem. 
That type of problem requires the use of an expressive representational system such 
as natural language or logic. Alternatively, graphical abstraction 'tricks' might be 
employed in order that a single representation stands for multiple models. An example 
of such a. graphical trick might be the use of a dotted circle in a. set diagram which 
stands for an expandable/shrinkable set of entitities. Another example is provided by 
Hyperproof's blocks-world. In Hyperproof, a graphical, computer-based, logic teaching 
program, an object shaped like a. crumpled paper bag stands for an object of unknown 
6 shape . 
:\ nalytical reasoning problems are posed verbally, in natural language. Natural lan-
guage is highly expressive and the determinacy level of the problem is one of the goals 
of comprehension. As mentioned earlier, a subject's ability to assess whether or not a 
problem ca.n be modelled with a single, unique model or whether adequate representa-
tion requires multiple models, is a major goal of comprehension and a crucial precursor 
to the selection of an effective ER. 
t; Possible shapes are cube, tetrahedron and dodecahedron. 
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The role of prior knowledge in ER selection 
A subject's knowledge of a domain can be partitioned into several components -
declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, cultural knowledge etc. Another cat-
egory consists of knowledge about the representational formalisms associated with a 
domain. The extent of the subject's representational repertoire for a domain will de-
termine what choices he or she has for solving problems within it. 
Such knowledge has to be learned. As Guri-Rozenblit (1988, p.221) writes, in the case 
of graphical representations: 
The once popular view that graphics are self-explanatory is no longer plau-
sible... visual symbols of any greater complexity than those portraying 
simple objects require knowledge of the symbolic form to be intelligible or 
explained .. .literacy is required for pictorial interpretations as much as for 
textual interpretation ... the learner might encounter difficulties in reading, 
decoding and understanding visual information, not only because he may 
have a 'low' visual aptitude, but rather because he was not trained to do 
it. 
Petre & Green (1993) also emphasise the roles of training and experience in the inter-
pretation of (graphical) representations. Their work will be introduced below in the 
section on reading-off solutions from ERs. 
The stoitch.ER studies to be reported later highlight the importance of prior knowledge 
particularly when indeterminate information has to be represented. Niany of the less 
ubiquitous ER forms require specialised knowledge for effective use. They include the 
types of ER that are useful for solving indeterminate problems (£.e. set diagrams, 
logic). l\,Iost subjects are capable of using tabular representations or plans effectively 
011 less complex problems such as problem 1 in Appendix A. \Vith more complex, 
Illtdti-dimensional problems (such as problem 3), however, not all forms of tabular 
representation are equally effective, as will be shown later. The skill of matching ER 
formal isms to the semantics of a problem is not often the subject of direct instruction 
and a subjecfs repertoire may have been acquired in a relatively ad hoc fashion. 
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For example, students may encounter semantic network diagrams only if they happen 
t.o study food webs in a biology course. Perhaps a domain-independent 'graphics 
curriculum' should be devised and generally taught? This is not the first call for such 
an innovation. In 196.5, for example, Balchin & Coleman wrote: 
It is hoped that the concepts of graphicacy and ingraphicacy will be taken 
up and developed by educationists, to mould the vague idea of visual aids at 
large into a more integrated goal of education, and to carry it down into the 
earliest stages to take its rightful role as one of the essential underpinnings. 
(p. 947) 
The educational gains from such interventions might be considerable. The results of the 
intervention study by Frandsen & Holder (1969) (reviewed in the next section) suggest 
that even one hour of instruction in diagramming techniques produces significant score 
gains. In another intervention study, Lewis (1989) studied 'compare' word problems in 
96 college students. The subjects \Vere selected from a. larger pool of 299 students and 
were those who had manifested reversal errors when problem solving (£.e. who used 
the inverse of the correct arithmetic operator when solving test problems). The Lewis 
study is reviewed in detail in the next chapter, but, in brief, Lewis found that, to be 
effective in her sample of 'buggy' students, training in diagramming techniques needed 
to be combined with training in translating the problem (i.e. developing what Kintsch 
would term a situation model of the problem). Significantly for this discussion, Lewis 
noted that students learned and used the necessary ER skills with very little time and 
dfort. 
Prior knowledge of representational forma.lisms can be independent of the problem 
information context or of a problem solving strategy using the formalism. Novick 
( 1990) has shown that transfer of a. representat£onal strategy (a matrix ER) can occur 
lwtween two problems in the absence of a. shared problem solution strategy between 
t hP t.wo problems. In the Novick study, 7.5% of experimental subjects (who had been 
<·xposecl to matrix ERs in a problem solving context) transferred a. matrix ER to the 
transfer problem compared to 21% of control subjects. The transfer problem was best 
solved using a. matrix representation, but required a. different solution strategy from 
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t.ha.t required on the prior matrix problem. Novick's (1990) results suggest that the 
transfer effect was more than a mere recency phenomenon because the prior matrix 
representation problem wa.c;; the second of three initial problems that experimental 
subjects received prior to the transfer problem. Thus, the prior matrix problem was 
embedded in two other problems requiring (each of which required a different ER) and 
there was a non-matrix problem interposed between the prior matrix problem and the 
target problem. Lindvall et al. (1982) also report good transfer of representational 
skill in primary children from less to more complex word problems. They also report 
that primary children can validly adapt ERs to new problems. 
Individual differences in ER selection - effects of cognitive style upon ER 
selection and the relationship between 1nodes of internal representation and 
ER behaviour 
The results of both the workscratching and switchER studies (to be presented in later 
chapters), show that for any given analytical reasoning problem, there is large variation 
between subjects in the types and modalities of ER that they use in their solutions. 
There is also large variation in the kinds of ER that individual subjects use on different 
problems. One source of the variation is likely to be individual differences in cognitive 
style. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the idea. of cognitive style variation is not new. The mathe-
matician Poincare believed that mathematicians could be divided into 'geometers' (ones 
who think in images) and 'analysts' (conceptual thinkers). This dimension of cognitivP 
style has continued to attract a moderate amount of research attention. For exam pie, 
individual differences along what can very loosely be termed the 'visualiser-verbaliser· 
dilll('llsion have been shown to be important in reasoning with ERs (NlacLeod, Hunt 
and :Ma.t.hews, 1918; rvlatsuno, 1981; Riding & Douglas, 1993; Cox, Stenning & Ober-
lancler, 1994, 199.5; Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 199.5; Oberlander, Cox & Stenning. 
I 9~H, 1995). 
\lac Lead, Hunt and Ivlathews ( 1978) have shown that subjects who differ in spa-
tial ability (but not in verbal ability) differ in their strategies on a sentence-picture 
V('ri fica.tion task. Of a sa m pie of 70 subjects, -!3 subjects used a linguistic strategy 
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a.nd 16 subjects used a pictorial-spatial strategy. Independent psychometric measures 
confirmed a difference between the groups in that the subjects who used the pictorial-
spatial strategy performed significantly higher on a test of spatial ability. Ivlacleod et 
al. (1978) argue that their results severely limit the generalisability of purely linguis-
tic theories of performance. Individuals vary in their sentence-picture verification 
strategies: some subjects recode the pictorial information into verbal form and per-
form a.n internal verbal-verbal comparison. Others recode the verbal information into 
pictorial form and perform an internal comparison of images. Of course, as Roberts, 
\'Vood & Gilmore (1994) are correct to point out, some subjects may vary their strategy 
from trial to trial rather than consistently utilize one recoding route. There may be 
intra-individual variation in strategy as well as inter-individual differences. 
wlore recently, Ford (199.5) analysed the paper-based protocols of people trying to 
solve :3 term syllogistic reasoning problems and who were required to think aloud and 
to explain to another person how they reached their conclusions. Ford's subjects were 
presented with the 27 (out of 64) syllogisms for which valid conclusions can be found. 
from the protocol data, Ford identified two distinctly different strategies. Of 20 sub-
jects in her study, she identified 8 who she termed 'verbal' reasoners and 8 who she 
termed 'spatial' reasonersi. The strategy preferences of the subjects were strong. Ver-
bal reasoners manipulate the verbal form of the syllogism, creating and following rules 
a.nd substituting subject terms from one premise into another. Spatial reasoners reason 
primarily spatially, though they do keep the verbal tag of the premises in mind. 'rhe 
protocols of spatial reasoners show that they used Etders Circle-like representations. 
Ford divided the 27 'valid conclusion' syllogisms into two groups - those that are 
difficult to solve using the verbal strategy and those that are difficult to solve using 
spatial strategies. She found that for the 6 syllogisms where the set boundaries are 
constrained (i.e. one-model cases), spatial reasoners performed at the level of80 to 100 
pPITent correctness, whereas for verbal reasoners the results were not so homogeneous. 
Cox, St.enning & Oberlancler (1994) and Stenning, Cox & Oberlander (199.5) report that 
subjects skilled at reasoning on diagrammatic reasoning problems demonstrated faster 
a.cq uisition of first-order logic from Hyperproof, a corn pu ter-based learning environment 
7 Two subjects used mixed strategies and 2 subjects struggled with the task. 
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that employs both graphical and syntactic modalities (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1994). 
[ n the Hyperproof studies, subjects were classified as diagrammatic reasoners or non-
diagrammatic reasoners on the basis of their perfornum,ces on analytical reasoning 
problems of the diagrammatic type. 
Hyperproof boosts students previously strong on items which benefit from diagram 
use, whereas the syntactic course appears to degrade the same group of students' 
graphical strategies. Cox, Stenning & Oberlander (1995) analysed the students' free 
choices of representation on the pre- and post-course analytical reasoning tests. Hy-
perproof improved representation selection accuracy on analytical reasoning post-text 
items compared to control class subjects. 'Diagrammatic' subjects were less likely than 
;non-diagrammatic' subjects to select weakly expressive representations for problems 
requiring abstraction. That particular error was associated with particularly serious 
detrimental affects upon performance. Thus it seems that the Hyperproof and tradi-
tional logic teaching methods have their differing outcomes at least in part because of 
their effects on representation selection. 
\Vhile different teaching has different effects on students' external representation strate-
gies, it has also been demonstrated that the same teaching to students with different 
pre-course aptitudes results in different proof styles, and that these hinge on the use 
of Hyperproof's semantic devices for expressing abstraction (Oberlander, Cox & Sten-
ning, 1994; Oberlander, Cox & Stenning, 1995). 
Further analyses of subjects' patterns of rule use while using Hyperproof ( 0 berlander, 
Cox, Tvlonaghan, Stenning, & Tobin, 1996) suggest that the nature of the individual 
d i fferpnces may not be quite as si m pie as modality preference for graphical reason-
ing (in the case of ·diagram rnatic · subjects) or linguistically based reasoning ("non-
diagrammatic' subjects). Rather~ non-diagrammatic subjects, who were previously 
lwlicved to be subjects who prefer the linguistic modality, in fact tend to concretise 
R It should be noted, however, that most learning style studies that have investigated the visualiser-
verbaliser distinction have used psychomet1·ic instruments as the basis for classifying subjects. For 
<~xample, the paper-folding test has been used by Mayer and Sims ( 1994) in a recent study of learning 
from computer-generated animation; and by Campagnoni & Ehrlich ( 1989) in a study of individual 
differences in hypertext navigation. lt is currently unclear, however, how strongly internal behaviour 
(as measured by paper-and-pencil psychometric tests) is related to external reasoning performance. 
For this reason, classifying subjects on the basis of performance measures is far less equivocal than 
using psychometric tests. 
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(add dcterminacy to the graphic) to a greater extent than diagrammatic subjects. 
VVhat distinguishes diagrammatic subjects is their greater tendency to ll'anslatc be-
tween graphical and sententia.l modalities in both directions. Multimoda.l reasoners 
inlc1'acl with Hyperproof's graphical situations more than unimodal reasoners- they 
use current graphical situations as input to later stages of their proofs, they manipu-
late the graphical situation to mediate between modalities and make much more use of 
the Hyperproof rules that permit information to be transferred between moda.lities. In 
contrast, unimoda.l reasoners tend to just output graphics, without subsequently using 
them strategically in proof development. 
Riding & Douglas (1993) found that subjects who were classified as 'visualisers' on the 
basis of psychometric tests used more diagrams in their answers to questions about 
the workings of a. car braking system than subjects classified as 'verbalisers' when the 
stimulus information was presented in the form of text and pictures. In a. condition 
where the material was presented in the form of text only, there was no difference 
between the subject groups in the use of drawings. 
Frandsen & Holder {1969) selected subjects who were matched in terms of verbal rea-
soning ability but who differed in terms of their spatia.! visualization ability. They 
used a. psychometric test9 of spatial relations to classify their subjects into high and 
low spatial visualization groups. They provided instruction in the diagrammatic rep-
resentation of verba.! problems10 to half of the high spatia.! visualization subjects and 
half of the low spatia.! visualization subjects. The instruction consisted of explanations. 
step by step demonstrations and guided practice. The diagrammatic techniques taught 
included Venn diagrams, time lines and 'symbolic maps'. High and low spatial visual-
ization control groups received no instruction. Pre and post-instruction tests revealed 
that. cam pared to con trois, low spatia.! visualization subjects benefited from dia.gra.m-
Ill at ic instruction. The scores of subjects high in spatia.! visualization a.bili ty were not 
illl proved by· the instructional intervention (they scored a.t close to ceiling levels on 
both pre and post tests). Those results suggest that this dimension of cognitive style is 
responsive to educational intervention and is not a.n immutable cognitive trait. A fur-
~ Differential Aptitude Test of Spatial Relations. 
10 Syllogisms, t.ime-rate-clist.ance problems and logical-cleduct.ion problems. 
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ther implication is that students of lower spatial-visualization ability should undergo 
a. 'bridging' programme to encourage them in learning to make use of graphical rea-
soning techniques before they are exposed to teaching methods that exploit graphical 
representations. 
1\'ta.tsuno (1987) asked subjects to subjectively report their internal representations 
during a syllogism task in which subjects reasoned about the relationships between 
patterned geometric objects. Subjects reported three kinds of internal representation 
- imagined diagrams, imagined concrete figures and intuitions based on reasoning 
with verbal expressions. Subjects who reported that they imagined internal diagrams 
performed significantly better on 'no valid conclusion' (NVC) syllogisms than subjects 
whose reported internal representations were either concrete figures or sententia.I. The 
results suggest that internal graphical representations have a fa.cilita.tory effect sim-
ilar to that of external graphical representations. However, the use of introspective 
reports from the subjects is problematic and therefore the findings must be interpreted 
with caution. Further work is required in order to elucidate the mechanisms by which 
the facilitation occurs. The use of the single term 'visualiser' to describe subjects 
who habitually use internal graphical imagery may be too simplistic since rvia.tsuno 
( 1987) found that some 'visualiser' subjects reported using graphical internal imagery 
that was pictorial in nature but others reported using graphical internal imagery of 
cl ia.gram ma.tic representations. Thus, psychometricians may need to consider finer cl is-
tinctions when characterising individual differences in mental representation modality 
preference. 
Su perficia.lly. it seems reasonable to assume that an individ ua.l 's location on the V-V 
dimension should predict the kinds of ERs that s/he uses when reasoning. However. 
the relationship between internal (mental) representation and external representations 
is not w0ll understood. l\1uch more research is required. To the a.uthor~s knowledge 
only the Riding & Douglas (199:3) study has shown that subjects classified as "visu-
alisers~ tend to use diagrammatic ERs more than subjects classified as "verbalisers'. 
The Riding & Douglas (199:3) study is interesting in that it is the only one, to the 
author's knowledge, that has demonstrated a. correlation between internal representa-
tional modality preference (cognitive style) and external representational beha.viou r. 
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Even in that study, however, the relationship was far from straightforward since an 
interaction with presentation format was reported. This accords with the findings of 
Guri-Rozenblit (1988), who, in a study of the use of abstract diagrams in social science 
texts, has shown inter alia that the mode of presentation of information was a stronger 
influence on the modality of students' responses than students' initial cognitive style 
as assessed by verbal and visual aptitude aptitude tests. 
An implicit assumption in many studies (e.g. Frandsen & Holder, 1969), is that sub-
jects who score poorly on psychometric tests of spatial visualization therefore prefer 
or tend to use the linguistic modality internally and/or externally when reasoning. 
This assumption is not justified and the relationship between internal cognitive modal-
ity preferences and the use of external representations requires much more research. 
For example, it would be interesting to examine whether subjects classified as highly 
spatial reasoners or diagrammatic modellers respond to efforts to broaden their ER 
repertoire by training in the use of non-graphical external representations. To the 
author's knowledge, this has never been demonstrated. 
Another potentially important individual difference, one that is orthogonal to linguis-
tic/graphical modality preferences, and one that has received no research attention, is 
the extent to which individuals externalise their reasoning. The results of the stud-
ies to be reported in this thesis and those of others (e.g. Schwartz, 1971) show that 
most subjects (usually > 80%) use ERs in their solutions to ER problems. But do 
the ERs serve the same function for all subjects? Subjects differ in the extent of their 
externalisation; some subjects reason with no ER whatsoever, others use 'minimal' ER 
strategies and some use 'full blown' diagrammatic models. As we have seen, subjects 
<"<'rtainl~' differ in the modality of the ERs they use - partly due to cognitive style 
dfects~ partly clue to the representational demands of the problem, and partly due 
to their prior experience and ER repertoire. But even in the case of subjects who 
build ·full blown' ERs, the ER may be more 'central' to the reasoning of some subjects 
than for others. ERs probably serve different functions for different people. Subjects 
probably vary in the way in which they partition their internalised and externalised 
cognition. The proportion of reasoning that is externalised by a particular subject may 
also vary at different stages of reasoning. Some subjects may use an ER to keep track 
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of their progress through the problem, while reasoning internally for the most part. 
Other subjects may exploit the cognitive and semantic properties of the ER fully in 
their reasoning, adopting a model-based mode of reasoning. 
ER construction 
Solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make the solution 
transparent. (Simon, 1981) 
As Barwise & Shimojima ( 199.5) point out, the process of building an ER necessitates 
reasoning about the problem, reasoning about the representation and also reasoning 
a.bout the relationship of the representation to the problem. Compared to reasoning 
without externa.! aids, they write ... 'we seem to replace one problem with three prob-
lems' (p. 9). However, ER construction assists problem solving by re-ordering the 
information in ways useful for solutions and by laying out the range of possible mod-
els of the information, making missing information explicit, and representing implicit 
information explicitly. However, to effectively perform those functions, a.n ER must 
be constructed correctly. Slips and more profound errors can occur at any of several 
points in ER construction. 
The process of ER construction also assists reasoning in another way. Attempting to 
construct a model of the information in a. problem helps the problem solver decide 
whether a. single, unique model adequately expresses the information in the problem 
stem. If not, the user may need to switch to a. more expressive representation in the 
same modality as the first attempt (e.g. from a. tabular representation to a. set diagram) 
or to a different representation in a different modality (e.g. from a. table to first-order 
logic or natural language). 
ER construction, then, is a stage of reasoning in which some or all of the following 
processes may occur: 
• reformulation of sent.entially presented information perhaps by re-ordering sen-
tences given in the problem stem 
• translation of given information e.g. to graphical from linguistic-sentential 
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• radical re-representation (e.g. Peterson, 1994)- very rare 
• heterogeneous reasoning (Barwise, 1993) - concurrent use of ERs from both 
modalities, also referred to as the use of multiple representations by diSessa 
( 1979) 
• heterogeneous reasoning via switching between representations in serial manner 
(Cox & Brna, 1993a,b;1995) 
There is not a great amount of information about ER construction in the literature 
because most studies examine residual workscratchings in which process information 
not captured or preserved. A notable exception is work by Katz & Anzai (1991) 
who used a computer-based logging system to record the ERs produced by a subject. 
Katz & Anzai (1991) studied an undergraduate as she learned to represent and solve 
vector arithmetic problems. She studied a physics textbook which c0nta.ined vector 
diagrams and attempted a set of 16 problems three times. Verbal protocols were 
taken and she used a computer-based system which logged her interactions. Katz & 
Anzai (1991) analysed her written and 'think aloud' protocols. The role played by the 
vector diagrams changed as she became more proficient. Early on, the diagram was a. 
literal translation of the problem and reasoning was strongly diagram-driven. VVhen 
more practiced, she was able to abstract more important elements of the problem 
(i.e. vectors) and solve the problem using domain-specific methods she had learned. 
The acquisition of the domain specific solution strategies seemed to be assisted by 
her diagrams. As the subject's expertise developed, the vector diagrams assisted the 
student to recognise useful calculations that she may not have otherwise discovered 
this is an interesting finding and was discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to the 
sf'!f-Pxplanation effect. 
The use of time-stamped, user-system interaction logs can provide an excellent method 
of gathering timing information, the order in which elements of an ER are constructed, 
\\'hether or not the subject uses a representation subsequent to construction and ho\v 
ERs are used in the resolutions of impasses in reasoning, whether errors in ER con-
struction are made, detected and rectified and so on. Hence the use of the technique in 
the switchER studies (Chapters 6 & 7). Computer logs have several advantages over 
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viclcotapecl protocols in that they can time stamp and capture low level user-system 
interactions such as keystroke sequences and mouse/cursor positions. 
Read-off fron1 ER and responding 
VVhen an accurate ER has been constructed, reading off information requires, in com-
parison to ER construction, far fewer cognitive resources and represents the 'pay off' 
from the effort expended on construction. 
1-Iolyoak & Spellman (1993) point out ... 
Whereas inference rules operate on given premises to yield conclusions, 
read-out procedures operating on a model completely blur the distinction 
between 'premises' and 'conclusions.' 
But this stage of reasoning with ERs has its share of problems. Later, it will be 
demonstrated that subjects' responses are not always commensurate with direct read-
off from their ER. In the case of an accurately constructed ER, non-commensurate 
responding may reflect slips made cl uring read-off. These slips may have catastrophic 
effects for some tasks but may not affect others. 
In the case of an incorrectly constructed ER, read-off slips are compounded with the 
errors already inherent in the model. Additionally, the subject may or may not realise 
that his or her constructed model is inaccurate. If the subject has insight into the fact 
that the ER may be incorrect, s/he may use it selectively - in this case the subject 
ma~' not bother to overtly correct the ER but may overlay 'corrections' via mental 
reprcsen ta tion. 
Another source of error at this stage is due not so much to the ER being incorrect but 
due to the form of its construction. For exam pie, when a table is constructed, decisions 
have to be made about which dimensions to make salient or visible (see Green, 1989; 
Cilmore, 1991). Contingency tables are also very difficult to search for information. 
If the subject has insight into the problem with his or her ER, then s/he may decide 
at this stage to correct the ER. This may prove quite hard to do if the ER is difficult 
to edit and modify i.e. is viscous (Green, 1989). Alternatively, s/he may reconstruct 
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the ER in a more useful form (e.g. recast multiple 2 x 2 contingency matrices into a 
unified JV x /V table. Another option is for the subject to switch to a different type of 
ER. 
Apart from the salience of dimensions in a particular ER type, such as a table, the 
modality and format of ERs is also important. As Larkin & Simon (1987) point out, a. 
diagram can be described sententially in the form of a list of propositions. However, the 
list can be extensive if the description is to be comprehensive and search for information 
is error prone and difficult. 
There is practically no research on subjecfs behaviour at the read-off stage of reasoning 
with self-selected, self-constructed ERs. As in the case of ER construction, very few 
studies examine the time course and process of reasoning with ERs using a methodology 
that permits events a.t each stage to be monitored. 
There is some work on ERs and search, however, but it has all been conducted in 
studies where subjects are presented with pre-fabricated ERs rather than in situations 
where subjects select and construct their own representations (O'Donnell, 1992; Bar-
tram, 1980; Guthrie & :tviosenthal, 1987; Guthrie & Kirsch, 1987; :tvicGuinness, 1986; 
l'v'Ia.yer, 1976; Petre & Green, 1993; Day, 1988). For example, Bartram (1980) compared 
the effectiveness of several representations (conventional and schematic maps, and se-
quential and alphabetical lists) for the task of working out a. bus route between two 
locations and found that the schematic map \Vas the most effective form of represen-
tation for that task in terms of time-to-solution. Lists were affected to a. larger extent 
than maps by changes in task complexity as would be predicted by specificity theory 
(Stenning & Oberlander, 1995), since the cognitive availability of the information ex-
pressed sententia.lly is less than is the case for the equivalently expressive graphical 
representation. 
The computational efficiency of an ER varies with the task requirement (e.g. Larkin 
~1:..;~ Simon, 1987; Vessey, 1991; Day, 1988; Green, Petre & Bellamy, 1991). For example. 
the data in a spreadsheet contains precise values but is difficult to search. A bar 
chart is much more useful for rapid qualitative comparisons between sets of data. One 
representation is suited to one task requirement (read-off of precise values) where as 
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another is suited to a. different task (comparison). 
Day (1988) and Norman (1993) provide numerous examples of how a good fit between 
the task and the representation can facilitate search and read-off. Day ( 1988) provides 
an everyday illustration from the domain of medicine. The information in a medical 
prescription is best laid out, from the pharmacist's point of view, in the form of a list. 
From the patient's point of view, however, a better arrangement is a matrix represen-
tation in which times of day (breakfast, lunch, dinner, bedtime) form the columns and 
drug types (lanoxin, inderal ... etc) form the rows. The tabular configuration facilitates 
accurate read-off and better cam pliance with the therapeutic regime. 
ivlayer ( 1976) studied the effects of several modes of information presentation on a 
large sample of university students. The problem used was one in which various sports 
teams were matched in a tournament. Test questions asked about the outcomes given 
certain conditions. The problem was presented in eight formats. Four were verbal for-
mats ( propositional), namely: 'jump' and 'short-jump' (itemised sentences arranged in 
list format with 'go to' statementsL 'nested' (in form of computer program listing) and 
'exam pie~ (matrix table). The remaining formats were graphical and consisted of flow 
chart analogues of the verbal formats. In answering the test questions, subjects rea-
soned with the presented representational format and did not construct their own ERs. 
The results indicated that the graphical flow chart format produced better reasoning 
performance for the 'jump' and 'nest.' conditions. The verbal (propositional) version of 
the 'exam pie' (matrix) condition was superior to the flowchart version. 1v1 ay er ( 1976) 
concludes that flowcharts are suited to the representation of complexly structured in-
formation whereas verbal formats are optimal for efficiently-structured information. 
In the ~,I ay er ( 1976) study, the ·exam pie· (matrix) format of information was more 
pffective in a verbal format than in a flowchart format - the difference between the 
\'Prbal format of the ·example' stimulus and the other verbal formats studied was that 
the ·example' verbal format minimised the amount of visual search required to read-off 
conclusions. 
0' Don nell ( 1992) investigated the influence of three variables u pan information search. 
The three variables were presentation format ('knowledge maps' versus text.), subject 
characteristics (vocabulary level, prior knowledge of domain) and the nature of the 
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information to be located. Her results showed that all of the variables affected search 
efficacy. Knowledge maps facilitated search for declarative, bottom-up information and 
subjects with higher prior knowledge outperformed those with lower prior knowledge. 
Prior knowledge and expertise has also been shown to be important in studies by 
Petre & Green (1993). They studied expert electronic hardware designers' use of 
circuit diagrams and the relative readability of textual and graphical notations in 
computer program representations. Petre & Green (1993) argue that users of ERs 
learn to read ER formalisms and are active in the process in much the same way 
as skilled readers use typographic and semantic cues in text. Petre & Green (1993) 
compared 4 types of program representation (text-'and/or' notation; text-nested 
conditionals; graphical-nested conditional; graphical-and/or· notation) in tasks that 
required either top-down or bottom-up reasoning. Each subject received top-down 
a.ncl bottom-up questions for each representation type in a within-subjects design. The 
hypothesis was that nested conditionals support working forwards and that 'and/or' 
supports working backwards. The results supported the hypothesis but graphics were 
shown to be slower than text in all conditions for that type of task (program tracing). 
Expert and novice subjects were similar in terms of response latency. Expert subjects, 
however, used graphical representations in qualitatively different ways than novices. 
They used secondary notation cues to greater effect. Petre & Green (199:3) conclude 
that what is salient in a representation largely results from experience- 'what a. reader 
sees is largely a matter of what he or she has learned to look for' (p.69). 
l\'IcGuinness (1986) investigated a. completely different domain. She presented adults 
with information about family relationships between 2 generations of 4 related fa.m-
iliPs. The information was presented in one of two ER forms - a hierarchy (family 
t reP) or a matrix in which birth order in the 2nd generation formed the rows and birth 
order in the 1st generation formed the columns. Each subject learned one representa-
tion to mastery and then used an internal (mental) version of it to answer two kinds 
of questions. These \Vere rule based across-family questions (e.g. which cousins can 
f.!;O on holiday with other cousins according to birth order and sex rules. The second 
set of questions were within-family in herita.nce questions. The results showed that 
holiday questions were easier in the matrix than in the hierarchy condition and that 
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inheritance qtH~stions were equally difficult to answer with both (internalised) repre-
sentations. McGuinness (1986) explains her findings in terms of the number of steps 
each representation requires in the search process. There are many more adjacent el-
ements to search in the hierarchical representation than in the tabular representation 
though IvicGuinness acknowledges that steps vary in their cognitive demands accord-
ing to whether they are rule-relevant or other kinds. In a second experiment, in which 
birth order wa.'3 made the salient variable in the representations (a.5 opposed to gener-
ations as in the first experiment). This reversed mapping produced reversed effects of 
the representations. Despite the rather unusual feature of having subjects memorise 
representations, this study, like those of Day (1988), Norman (1993), Gilmore (1991) 
and Petre & Green (1993), demonstrates the importance of mapping information to 
representations in ways which make salient the aspects of the information required by 
the task. 
Guthrie & Iviosenthal (1987) distinguish between reading goals using different kinds of 
material (prose, forms, tables, schematics, graphs ... ) and the information search goals 
tha.t the user may have (knowledge, specific information, evaluation, construction ... ). 
Their distinction is relevant to the issue of reading-off solutions from ERs in analytical 
reasoning because the task is one of locating information in a text or diagram and not 
solely one of reading for comprehension. Guthrie & Iviosentha.l (1987) discuss what they 
refer to as 'a critically important class of reading tasks termed 'locating information 
in written documents". They argue that 'strategic reading' i.e. searching for specific 
information) is a ubiquitous task a.t home and school, yet most models of reading focus 
on reading prose for comprehension. 
C: 11th rie & ~vlosenthal ( 1987) propose a. .5 stage cognitive model of information search: 
1. form a clear search goal (What is information being sought?) 
2. inspect appropriate categories of information 
:3. sequence the inspection 
·1. extracted details from one or more categories 
5. recycle to obtain solution 
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'fhe Guthrie & Mosenthal (1987) model can be applied to reading off solutions to 
analytical reasoning problems from ERs. The first step is specified by the problem's 
question. The second step, category selection is more or less straightforward depending 
upon the representation. For example, in a representation of the information in problem 
:3 (A), such as that shown in Figure A.l2 of Appendix A, searching for the name of the 
owner of the dog that wins second prize involves identifying the second column from 
the left and the middle row. Next the row must be searched until the cell representing 
the intersection with column two is located and the cell content read-off. 
Sun1n1ary and conclusion 
This chapter has identified 5 stages in the process of analytical reasoning with external 
representations. 
The first stage, problem comprehension, requires background knowledge and concep-
tual knowledge. Slips of omission and commission must be avoided and new information 
must be integrated into existing knowledge through the use of a situation model. 
Obstacles to comprehension include linguistic factors such as syntactic complexity, 
implicitly-given information, and uncooperative discourse structures. The reasoner 
must be wary and adopt a puzzle mode of thinking. The task involves the use of 
ordinary language in a special way. Structural factors also result in obfuscation - the 
reasoner must decide on the well-formedness of the problem, its degree of determinacy, 
the number of dimension (variables) it possesses and the number of entities along the 
dimensions. 
Th<' development of an adequate problem information context (PlC) cannot result from 
only comprehending the problem stem information. The reasoner must also read the 
problem's questions and evaluate the task demands they pose. Results to be presented 
in Chapters 5, 6 & 7 will show that subjects rarely do this, instead they tend to read 
the problem questions for the first time following ER construction. 
The second stage is ER selection. Good ER selection requires important decisions 
by the reasoner which will be influenced by at least 3 factors- problem comprehen-
sion, prior knowledge (i.e. the reason er's ER repertoire) and the reason er ~s cognitive 
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modality preference or cognitive style. An appropriate level of granularity of the rep-
resentation has to be adopted (Amarel, 1968). There is some folk wisdom but very 
little empirically-based guidance available that can be given to subjects to aid them in 
choosing an appropriate ER. One heuristic, however, derived from the work of Stenning 
& Oberla1~der ( 199.5) is that the ER should be capable of expressing the indetermi-
nacy of the problem but not any more than is required. The ability to match ERs to 
problem characteristics requires prior knowledge and experience with a range of ER 
formalisms. Some representations are ubiquitous and generic (e.g. tables and other 
matrix graphics such as bar charts). Others are relatively domain-specific and have 
underlying semantics that have to be learned (e.g. the spatial inclusion metaphor for 
set membership that underlies the semantics of set diagrams such as Euler's Circles). 
Whether or not subjects have representations like set diagrams or semantic networks 
in their repertoires can often be a matter of chance. The ERs in an individual's tool kit 
are often acquired in an ad hoc manner. Representations such as network diagrams 
may be familiar to a subject simply because s/he studied food webs in biology, for 
example. \V hat might loosely be termed 'cognitive modality preference' also plays a. 
role. Individuals differ in their tendencies to use graphical or linguistic representations. 
The representation construction phase provides an opportunity for the problem infor-
mation to be re-ordered, and for it to be re-represented graphically or translated into 
a. different linguistic form such as propositional, first-order logic or an idiosyncratic, 
;restricted', logical form. Slips and errors in ER construction must be avoided. The 
subject may engage in heterogeneous reasoning, using multiple representations either 
concurrently or sequentially (switching). Effort expended during ER construction is 
hi~h -- the cognitive load is great. but it is well-invested since the payoff comes when 
the representation is used to speedily read-off solutions. Often, though, the high cog-
nitive load results in construction errors which may or may not be detected by the 
subject. 
HPacl-off is a relatively easy phase in the cycle but slips are common. Slips and errors 
in rcacli ng-off can be compounded with ER construction errors and result in incorrect 
r<.>~ponses to problem questions. Read-off is essentially a process of search ... a kind 
of reading that is highly goal-directed. The ease of read-off is greatly facilitated by 
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the choice of ER ... compare reading off solutions from Figure A.l2 with read-off from 
Figure A.l5 (Appendix A). 
The cognitive demands of analytical reasoning change with each stage and individuals 
differ in terms of the prior knowledge they bring to problem comprehension and ER 
selection. Evidence that will be presented later shows that individuals also differ in 
terms of the modality that they prefer to reason in. 
It can be seen from this stage-account that analytical reasoning draws upon a wide 
range of cognitive processes and prior knowledge. 
The next chapter presents a structured review of the literature on reasoning with ERs 
in a variety of domains. The review attempts to integrate findings from disparate 
sources. The literature on reasoning with ERs is very distributed- both across subject 
domains (science, maths, logic etc.) and across disciplines (education, pyschology, 




This chapter reviews previous work on reasoning with ERs. It is organised around the 
issues of: 
• self-selection and self-construction of ERs versus using pre-determined, pre-fabricated 
ERs 
• domain-specific ER formalisms versus more generic forms 
• instructional intervention in use of ERs or not 
Several issues emerge from the review - at the most general level, all of the papers 
are concerned with external representations and reasoning. However, in some studies 
subjects construct their own representations and in others pre-drawn (prefabricated) 
representations are used. Some studies have examined what might be called partial 
self-construction in that, for example, an empty matrix graphics (table) or diagram 
template may be filled-in by the reasoner. Problem comprehension emerges as a crucial 
phase of reasoning and several studies investigated transfer of solution strategies or 
types of external representation to other problems. 
Another issue concerns the question of the domain-specificity of ERs. Some domains 
(e.g. syllogistic reasoning) involve the use of highly domain-specific ERs such as Eu-
ler 's circles (graphical) or the use of syllogistic premises (sentential). In contrast, in 
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domains such as cl eel uctive/analytical reasoning, word arithmetic and word algebra, 
problems can be solved effectively with the aid of a wide variety of representational 
forms. Generally, studies that use domain-specific or specialised ERs tend to be the 
ones in which ER instruction is provided to subjects. The studies vary widely in the 
extent of instruction given on the use of ERs in reasoning. Some studies offer coaching 
in the use of ERs whereas other studies allow subjects to spontaneously generate any 
ER they choose in the absence of instructional intervention. 
T\vo distinctions - self-construction versus pre-fabrication and the extent of domain 
specificity - will be used to structure the review. 
ER construction by the subject: studies utilising do1nain-specific ER 
forn1s 
Domain: Mathematics Prouclfit(1981) compared the effect of two treatments (Polya.~s 
problem solving model vs simple practice) upon the mathematical problem solving per-
forma.nce of 24 5th-grade children. Polya's 4-phase method consists of u nderstancl ing 
the problem, devising a plan, carrying out the plan, and reflecting upon the solution. 
In the 'Polya' condition of Prouclfi Vs study, children were q uestionecl about the appro-
priateness of their solutions and were encouraged to discuss their strategies. T'he Polya. 
method produced significant improvements at two of the 4 problem solving phases (de-
vising plan & reflection). Among nine behaviours associated with successful problem 
solving was "clra\ving a diagram". Prouclfit(1981) reports that most errors were clue to 
mistakes made at the comprehension phase of problem solving. 
HC'cd s..~ Ettingcr (1987) also found that problem comprehension difficulties were a ma-
jor source of error. They studied algebra word problems in a sample of .53 college 
students. 'T'he problems were of 2 kinds - 'mixture' problems and 'work~ problems. 
Their research question concerned the usefulness of tables (matrix graphics) for solving 
those kinds of problems. Subjects were not required to construct their ER from scratch. 
i nst.eacl they were provided with table templates which they could fill in with in forma-
t io11 from the problem as an aid to deriving an algebraic expression. Results showed 
that asking students to fill in a table had little effect upon their ability to construct 
0quations. Students often failed to enter the correct values due to problem compre-
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hension difficulties. However, subjects provided with completed tables improved in 
their performance but the effect did not transfer to isomorphic problems where the 
eo m pleted tables weren't provided. 
Lindva.ll, Tamburino & Robinson (1982) gave 23 primary grade children instruction 
in the construction and use of diagrams in the domain of arithmetic word problems 
involving addition and subtraction. The type of diagrams were highly domain specific 
and emphasised groupings and unit correspondence. The subjects were required to 
construct the diagram. A 4-stage general procedure was taught which emphasised 
reading or listening to the 'story', drawing a diagram to represent sets, operations 
or relations in the story, writing a 'number sentence' and solving the problem. The 
instruction was intensive - twenty-two 40' sessions over 40 days. Subjects showed 
significant gains from the instruction on answering, modelling and writing number 
sentences. There \Vas also evidence of transfer of the representation skills to more 
complex problems on a post-test. Lindvall et al. (1982) also report that the students 
validly adapted the taught ER forms to new problems. 
\Vi I lis & Fuson ( 1988) studied 24 2nd grade students of high maths ability a.nd 19 
students of average maths ability on "change' and 'compare' arithmetic word problems 
involving 3-digit numbers. Subjects were taught several categories of domain-specific 
schematic drawings. One type of diagram consisted of a type of tabular representa-
tion with cells for the various subcomponents of put-together (combine) and compare 
problems. The other ER type consisted of two rectangles for the start and end states 
of change-more and change-less problems, linked by an arrow. Above the arrow was 
an ellipse into which the change quantity can be entered. Students were introduced 
to \\'ord problems and taught to identify and label the three important elements in 
the story. They were also taught to make appropriate schematic drawings for each 
category of problem and to enter the identified numeric elements from the problem. 
Students practicecl the procedure on worksheets. Results on pre and post tests showed 
t.hat students in both ability groups mastered the stages of appropriate diagram se-
lection and diagram labelling. There was a strong relation between the correctness of 
diagram selection/labelling and correct solution strategies. Sometimes, the problem 
category would be incorrectly identified -for example, average students substituted 
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'put-together' a.nd 'compare' drawings on about a fifth of each type of problem. Stu-
dents experienced most difficulty with problems which had subtraction as their un-
derlying semantics ('change-get-less' and 'cam pare') but for which the best solution 
stra.tegy is one involving addition. \Villis & Fuson (1988) argue that their results sup-
port the view that teaching students to use different types of diagram, each tailored 
to a. specific category of problem, is more effective than teaching them to use one kind 
of diagram for a range of problem types (e.g. Resnick, 1983). 
A later study (Fuson & vVillis, 1989) showed that, for some problem types, the drawings 
are sometimes used by children to illustrate the solution procedure rather than to 
represent the problem situational structure. They report that future research might 
investigate the relative effectiveness of the two types of diagram and also the 'tension' 
within individual students (and teachers) between the two kinds of classification might 
a.lso be addressed. They conclude that one important function of the drawings is to 
provide the teacher and children with a. common vocabulary with which to discuss 
problems, especially on those problems where the solution procedure and problem 
situation contrast. The facilitation of interaction, rather than the drawing per se, 
might be the more crucial factor, they suggest. 
Lewis (1989) studied 'compare' word problems in 96 college students. The subjects were 
selected from a larger pool of 299 students and were those who had manifested reversal 
errors when problem solving (ie who used the inverse of the correct arithmetic operator 
when solving test problems). Three groups of 32 subjects were compa.red. The diagram 
group were trained in word problem translation and diagramming using a. domain 
specific diagramming procedure. A second group received translation training only 
and the third group was a. control. Translation training consisted of learning about the 
t~·,ws of statements found in arithmetic problems. The diagram plus translation group 
showed significantly greater gains in terms of problem comprehension and problem 
rcpresen ta.tion and also some transfer to more corn plex problems of the same general 
kind. Far-transfer to more general types of problem was not found, hm:vever. It was 
concluded that translation training alone encouraged a. focus on the surface features of 
a problem (eg a. search for key words) at the expense of deeper semantic understanding. 
In fact the a.u thors go so far as to say that no training at all is better than translation 
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training alone. Lewis also noted that students learned and used ER skills with very 
little time and effort. 
Do1nain: Physics As reviewed in Chapter 3, Katz & Anzai (1991) studied an un-
dergraduate as she learned to represent and solve vector arithmetic problems. To 
recapitulate, the role played by the vector diagrams changed as she became more pro-
ficient. Early on, the diagram was a literal translation of the problem and reasoning was 
strongly diagram-driven. \Vhen more practiced, she was able to abstract more impor-
tant elements of the problem (ie vectors) and solve the problem using domain-specific 
methods she had learned. The acquisition of the domain specific solution strategies 
seemed to be assisted by her diagrams. 
Do1nain: Computer progra1n1ning GIL (Reiser, Ranney, Lovett & Kimberg, 
1989; :rvierrill, Reiser, Beekelaar & Hamid, 1992) is a tool with which student program-
mers may construct visual representations of LISP programs. As in many problem 
solving domains ( eg logical proofs, geometry ) and programming languages (Prolog, 
C), a difficulty with LISP is that the syntax of a solution does not reflect the reason-
ing process required to construct it. In GIL, users build a graphical representation of 
a. Lisp program by connecting icons (representing program constructs) in a. directed 
graph. One of the research goals was to overcome the tendency of Lisp syntax to 
conceal programming solution strategies and program structure. 
GIL's program graphs make implicit information visible to the student and vividly 
illustrate (by means of animation) the propagation of cause and effect when the pro-
gram is run. Reiser et al. ( 1989) and :rvierrill et al. ( 1992) have shown that G IL is 
more effective than the traditional textbook and programming environment combina-
tion. Using GIL, students are forced to make every step of their reasoning explicit and 
they can focus, if they wish, on individual solution components. The GIL interface 
also allows the students to mix top-down and bottom-up reasoning strategies more 
flexibly than is possible in traditional Lisp programming environments. The aim is 
t.o ensure that the structure of the graphically depicted solution mirrors the planning 
processes used in reaching it. GIL thus assists students with their understanding of 
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the causal structure of programs and how algorithms work. The data computed by 
the program between initial input and final output are shown explicitly and the path 
of the program's execution is also displayed. Thus students can see and reason about 
internal program states that are usually invisible. The graphical approach also allows 
students to plan in a variety of directions- either from given data towards the goal or 
backwards from the goal to\vards the given data. G IL makes progress forward towards 
a goal and backward reasoning steps salient and provides an example of what Merrill 
et al. ( 1992) have termed a 'reasoning-congruent representation'. 
Domain: Logic-syllogistic reasoning Grossen & Carnine (1990) provided instruc-
tion in the use of Euler's circles and compared a group of students who self-constructed 
their own ERs with a group who used only prefabricated ERs. As far as the author 
is aware, Grossen & Carnine (1990) are the only researchers in the literature to have 
conducted a controlled comparison of diagram self-construction with the use of pre-
fabricated diagrams. They taught 25 high school students to use a method based on 
Euler's circles to reason about the relationships between plant species. A computer-
based tutoring system was employed. One group of students were required to construct 
diagrams before progressing through the resource material whereas the other group 
used only pre-drawn computer-based diagrams. 
Instruction plus self-constructed diagrams was more effective than instruction plus 
diagram selection. Students in the diagram-construction condition scored more highly 
on difficult problem types (without valid conclusions) and demonstrated fewer trials to 
mastery within the course. Gains were retained for at least the duration of a two week 
follow up. Grossen & Carnine (1990) conclude that active drawing produces deeper 
processing than more passive diagram selection. 
ER construction by the subject: studies utilising non do1nain-specific 
ER forn1s 
This section reviews studies in which students were permitted a degree of choice in the 
type of representation that they constructed. This is in contrast to studies reviewed in 
the preceding section where subjects used one particular type of ER (Euler~s circlesl 
C'J-JJ\PTER 4. RELATED 'vVOHK 72 
vector diagrams, directed graphs etc). Those ERs were 'domain-specific' in the sense 
that they are most closely associated with, or have their historical origins in, a par-
ticular subject domain. A clear example is provided by Euler's circles and syllogistic 
reasoning. There needs to be a distinction made, however, between domain specific re-
search and domain specific representations. The studies reviewed in this section were 
all conducted in the context of specific subject domains, but the subjects were not 
constrained to use 'domain-specific' ERs in their reasoning. 
Domain: Class inclusion hierarchies Greene (1989) investigated the ability of 
children between the ages of 7 and 12 years to construct tree-diagram representations 
of passages containing hierarchical information. The passages described sets and sub-
sets of mu tu ally exclusive information. In the first experiment, su b.iects were asked 
to construct their own spontaneous ERs. The results showed that the su bjccts used a. 
variety of ERs to represent the information -written representations (re-writing the 
original information), more structured representations (that showed understanding of 
the hierarchical nature of the information), drawings and tree diagrams. The results 
also showed that there was a decreasing tendency for children to draw pictorial repre-
sentations as age increased, and that older children (4th and 6th grade) tended to use 
more written and structured representations than 2nd grade children. 
An instance of a highly structured ERs was noted in the case of one of the 12 second 
grade children and one of the 12 fourth grade children. Four out of 12 sixth grade 
children used structured (ie hierarchy capturing) ERs. 
Structured ERs were associated with higher representational q ua.lity measured on sev-
<'ral scored dimensions such as redundancy, presence or absence of features and proper 
rPlations between nodes. 
The self-generated ERs were used by the subjects in answering identification and rea-
soning questions. Performance on the question task showed that poor answers \vere 
associated with non-graphical ERs in Grade 2 subjects. Structured ERs produced good 
answers a.t all ages. 
In a second experiment subjects read a. passage and were subsequently presented with 
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a corresponding tree-diagram of the information. They were shown how it related to 
the information in the passage. They then answered a set of question using the tree 
diagram only. Next, a second passage was read and they were asked to construct their 
own tree diagrams. 
F'ou rth and sixth graders constructed perfect tree diagrams and responded to q ues-
tions at near ceiling level of performance. Second grade subjects' tree diagrams and 
responses to questions were less adequate than those of the older children. Second 
graders performed about as well using 'coached' tree diagrams in the second exper-
iment as they did with their own spontaneous ERs in the first experiment. Fourth 
and sixth graders showed slightly more improvement. Most children spent less time 
constructing tree diagrams than their freely chosen ERs. They also tended to perform 
better on the question answerin,~ task when they used the tree diagrams they had been 
coached to produce. Greene's (1989) results show that some children as young as I 
years old can understand tree diagrams and can have a su bstantia.l u ndersta.nding of 
4-level class inclusion hierarchies in terms of subset/superset classification, transitivity 
of information and other measures. 
Do1nain: Mathematics Hall, Kibler, vVenger & Truxaw (1988) collected written 
protocols from 8.5 mathematically competent undergraduates as they solved a range of 
algebra. word story problems. The subjects were instructed to show all their working 
a.nd not to erase after making mistakes. Problem types were motion-opposite direction 
(iVIOD), round trip (i\1RT), work together (\VT) and work competitive (\VC). Analysis 
of the protocols revealed that diagrams were used more on motion problems than on 
work problems. Hall et al. (1988) noted that many subjects construct solutions to 
problt>ms rather than smoothly execute a highly practiced skill and that the construc-
t ions often involve reasoning that is only partly connected with algebraic or arithmetic 
formalisms. Competent reasoners often use problem solving techniques from ·'outside'· 
algebraic formalism. Furthermore, they write that ••conceptual errors of omission or 
commission are both more prevalent and more damaging than manipulative errors 
in algebra or arithmetic" (p.269). They observe that problem comprehension and so-
lution are eo m plementary processes and that integrating d ua.l representations (ie at 
situational and quantitative levels) of a problem is a. key aspect of competence. 
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[n their conclusion they write that "reasoning about the situational context of a prob-
lem can serve as a justification for assembling quantitative constraints that may even-
tually lead to a correct solution. Thus, a substantial portion of a problem solver's 
activity is devoted to reaching an understanding of the problem that is sufficient for 
applying the routine of formal manipulation." (p.269). 
1v!oclel-basecl reasoning techniques such as simulation 1 are often used as a means of 
recovering from impasses reached while using formal reasoning. In discussing the ed-
ucational implications of their work, Hall et al. note that instruction based solely on 
mathematical formalisms may not produce learning outcomes that transfer to non-
routine problems. They note that textbooks often instruct students to translate prob-
lems from words to algebraic forms, sometimes via. the use of graphical ERs such as 
tables. Hall et al. therefore propose that 'combined interactive illustrations' are likely 
to be effective representations for problem solving. 
As mentioned above, the integration of cl ua.l representations of a. problem is a. central 
aspect of competence according to I-Ia.ll et a.l. As an example they present such a dual 
representation for a iviRT problem in which a. 2 dimensional graph is used to represent 
the time by distance relation. The graph is used interactively with a 'quantitative 
network' (Sha.lin & Bee, 198.5) in which arithmetic operational relations ca.n be rep-
resented by a linked network of cells into which intensive and extensive elements can 
be entered. The quantitative network provide a spatial abstraction of variables and 
equivalence relations. The network provides a. visually inspectable representation of 
constraint propagation that is far more salient to students than the traditional alge-
braic operations on linear equations. The quantitative network concept therefore is 
similar in principle to the ·reasoning-congruenf representations of Lisp syntax pro-
posed by Reiser et al. ( 1989). The use of two representational modalities (network 
representation and 2D graph) also provides an exam pie of heterogeneous reasoning (to 
be discussed further in a. later section). 
Van Essen & J-la.maker ( 1990) in t\vo controlled intervention experimentsl studied self-
gPnerated drawings as heuristic strategy for the solution of arithmetic word problem 
1 In which students enter a value on one dimension then 'runs' the model, repeating the process with 
systematically incremented values. 
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solving. They studied 1st and 2nd grade children (Experiment 1) and Sth grade chil-
dren (Experiment 2) as they attempted 'combine', 'change' and 'compare' problems. 
Subjects were trained for 60 to 90 minutes over 3 sessions during which time the exper-
imenter read aloud word problems and the children were instructed to make drawings 
depicting what was happening in the story. They were told that drawing is often a use-
ful technique for understanding word problems. The experimenter generated drawings 
in order to illustrate how a drawing might look but they were not prescriptive and were 
not presented as models to be emulated by the students. Van Essen & Hamaker ( 1990) 
wished to avoid teaching specific drawings for different categories of problem since they 
felt this may encourage superficial problem analysis strategies such as key-word match-
ing. In the results, the authors report that 'First and second graders normally do not 
make drawings of word problems in order to facilitate problem solutions' (p.:305). This 
statement, however, contradicts the results of studies by Greene (1989) and Fuson & 
\t\lillis (1989) who found that the tendency to make drawings decr·eases with age. First 
and second grade subjects in the experimental group did not produce significantly 
more drawings than the control group. However, of those that did, the experimen-
tal subjects' ERs were of higher quality in terms of accuracy and completeness. Van 
Essen & Hamaker (1990) classified the solutions into 5 types - category 1 drawings 
"acleq uately mirrored the structure of a word problem' i.e. expressed sets and relations 
were depicted correctly; category 2 drav .. rings depicted sets but not relations; category 
:3 drawings depicted the answer but not the solution strategy; category 4 were incor-
rect cl rawings e.g. only one of the 2 sets depicted or relation was incorrectly depicted; 
category 5 was no drawing. Three of the intervention lessons described above were 
~i veu over -t weeks. Compared to controls~ cxpcrimen tal groups subjects prod ucPcl 
more drawings at post test and, importantly, more category 1 drawings. 
:\ sPcond experiment examined the effect of the intervention on .5th graders. A 'difficult-
t.o-visua.lisc~ category of problem was added for the 5th graders. Intervention resulted 
in improved performance (answer correctness) on problems similar to those used d u r-
i n~ practice and also on near- transfer problems. The performance gains were confined 
to the easy-to-visualise problems however. The number of drawings on all problem 
types increased significantly following the intervention, even the difficult-to-visualise 
ones. Van Essen & Hamaker ( 1990) analysed the relationship between ER quality and 
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problem-solving performance. \"'ith the .5th graders, drawings were used :39CX:) of the 
time in experimental (intervention) subjects, compared to .5% for control subjects. Of 
the :39(Yo of ERs, 22% were associated with correct answers and 17% with incorrect 
answers. Correct answers were usually accompanied by correct drawings and, con-
versely, incorrect answers were accompanied by incorrect drawings. In 10% of the .5th 
graders' solutions, the drawn ER helped the child find the correct answer. However, 
Van Essen & I-lamaker (1990) point out that drawing is an heuristic strategy which 
does not guarantee finding a. correct answer- 17% of .5th graders' ERs reflected inter-
pretational errors. The a.u thors conclude that .5th graders are capable of appreciating 
the usefulness of self-generated drawings in solving word problems and can work out 
\Vhich problems to use the technique with (as evidenced by fewer ERs constructed on 
the difficult-to-visualise problems. Van Essen & Hamaker (1990) demonstrated that 
genera.! instructions and modelling in the use of ERs in reasoning can have a. significant 
effect upon problem solving outcomes. It is interesting to note also that in the Van 
Essen & I-lamaker study, training was not given in the use of a domain-specific type of 
ER. 
Koedinger & Taba.chnek (1994) took written and "think aloud" protocols from 12 
undergraduate students as they solved 2 word algebra problems. Subjects were sim-
ply asked to solve the problems and were not directed to use a particular method. 
Protocol analysis revealed the use of four strategies: algebra (forma.!), model-based 
reasoning (informal-guess and test), verba.! arithmetic (informal) and diagrammatic 
(semi-formal). Students who used multiple strategies in the course of their solutions 
generally seemed to perform better. \"'hen a problem solving impasse occurred, approx-
imately· half were responded to with a. strategy switch. Changes were from schooled to 
unschoolcd strategies and also vice versa.. Koedinger & Ta.bachnek ( 1994) suggest that 
t h<-'re is a trade-off between the benefits of schooled and unschooled strategies. Schooled 
strategies offer efficient ca.lcula.tion at the cost of error-prone comprehension and trans-
lation. In contrast, unschooled strategies tend to support comprehension but at the 
cost of efficient ca.lcula.tion. Evidence from Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994) suggests 
that multiple strategy users \Vho change strategy during problem solving are generally 
more successful than single strategy users. Koedinger & Ta.bachnek (1994) studied 
four kinds of solution strategy (two of which did not involve ERs). Also, Schwa.rtz & 
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Fa.ttaleh (1972) showed that a third of the subjects in their experiment switched ERs 
from that used to present the problem to another kind when solving the problem. In 
contrast to the studies of Koedinger & Tabechnek (1994) and Schwartz & Fattaleh 
(1972), here the concern is with ER switching of a different kind -switching during 
the problem solving process - that is, in situations where, during problem solution. 
the subject constructs a representation in one modality but subsequently switches and 
builds a second, different ER. 
Domain: Analytical/deductive reasoning Schwartz (1971) examined the writ-
ten protocols ('workscratchings') of 30 university students who were given analytical 
reasoning problems. All the problems employed by Schwartz were determinate in that 
it is possible to build complete, single model representation of the information. 
Subjects in the Schwartz (1971) study were free to construct any type of ER and 
were encouraged to 'show all work'. The problems varied in difficulty. Some problems 
presented information positively and some problems contained negatively-phrased in-
formation. A second dimension of difficulty was the number of variables - some 
problems had 3 dimensions and some had 4 dimensions. 
The ERs used by subjects in their written solutions were classified into 5 moda.lities: 
matrix graphics (eg tables) , informal groupings, graphics, sentence re-write a.nd mis-
cellaneous. In terms of solution success, affirmatively (positively) worded problems 
were easier than negatively worded ones. The most successful ER modality was that 
of matrix representations (tables). This was superior to all other ER types as an aid 
to fi ncling solutions. However~ tables were not used successfully on negatively worded 
problems because information was often erroneously represented. 
In a second study, Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972) manipulated the modality in which the 
ciPductivc reasoning problems were presented. As in the first study, subjects were able 
to self-construct any ER in their solutions. A third of the subjects were presented 
with the problems in matrix format, a. third received them in sentence format and a 
third received the problems in the form of a. network diagram. No effect for the mode 
of presentation was found. As in the Schwartz ( 1971) study, a.ffirmati vely ph rased 
problems were found to be easier than negatively phrased problems. Also problems 
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involving disjunction (or) were found to be more difficult than those involving conjunc-
tion (and). Dealing with disjunction requires a strategy of 'breaking into cases' and 
the use of multiple diagrams or the use of a representation that is capable of expressing 
indeterminacy i.e. provides a means of abstracting over a range of cases (Stenning & 
Oberlander, 199.5). 
In terms of the ERs constructed by subjects in the course of their solutions, almost 
half of the subjects actually switched from the modality that the problem was pre-
sented in. The presentation modality most frequently changed-from was the network 
diagram (74% of subjects switched). The least commonly changed-from presentation 
modality was the matrix format ( 17%) with sentence format in between (57%). The 
most commonly switched-to ER was the matrix. Of the subjects presented with sen-
tence problems, .59% of the switchers chose the matrix representation. For network 
formatted problems, 68% of subjects switched to a matrix representation in their so-
lutions. Schwartz & Fattaleh conclude that subjects recognise the appropriateness of 
the matrix representation for these problems by not switching from it when problems 
are presented in that form and by often switching to it when the problems are not pre-
sented in matrix form. It was also noted that subjects often changed negatively phrased 
information into positive phrasing and disjunctive information into conjunctive. 
In a third study, Polich & Schwartz (1974) replicated the matrix superiority findings 
and also discovered that the representation of implicit information (ie inferred from 
problem statement) was the greatest source of error. This source of error was minimised 
by the use of the matrix however, compared to other representations. Errors of omission 
exceeded errors of commission by three to four times. 
Do1nain: Biology Schwartz ( 199:3) analysed the written protocols of Grade 7 to 
10 children in standard and advanced biology classes who attempted to solve biology 
problems about food webs~ disease transmission etc. The hypothesis was that advanced 
~tudents would tend to use path diagrams (directed graphs) to represent the problem 
information whereas less advanced students would use functional diagrams. Subjects 
\\'Pre randomly assigned to work alone or with a partner. They were told that good 
representations would help them solve the problems and that different questions re-
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quired different representations. The results confirmed the hypothesis in that more 
of the advanced biology students used a path diagram representation in their solu-
tions. Students showed 'extreme ingenuity' in their ER construction and used directed 
graphs, tree diagrams, pictorial representations and various text-based forms. The 
advanced biology students had more experience with path diagrams as the result of 
having been taught about food webs and were capable of transferring the ER strat-
egy to a novel problem. Seventh graders showed evidence of being able to modify a 
previously encountered ER form for use on a new problem. 
Studies in which subjects used prefabricated ERs 
This section reviews educational studies in which the modality of information presen-
tation was manipulated. 
Domain: Analogical reasoning Beveridge & Parkins (1987) studied large sam-
ples of 10-11 year olds and university students. They found that overlayed transparent 
coloured strips provided an effective visual analogue of the solution to Dunckers 'radia-
tion' problem. Demonstrated to the subjects before the target problem was presented, 
the coloured-strips ER neatly showed the summation of several weak X-ra.y beams at 
the central crossing point in a highly salient manner. That ER, they argue, represented 
the appropriate features of the problem and manifested 'structural correspondence' in 
terms of the X-rays' direction, intensity and summation. The ER was imageable, and 
acted a cue for visual recall, 'freeing' pertinent information from the story context in 
which it was presented. The ER facilitated the solution of a problem analogue in both 
t hP adults and children and was superior to a drawn diagrammatic analogue which 
required for its interpretation graphical knowledge of arrows and shading conventions. 
The coloured strips analogue was also superior to both a story analogue of the target 
problem and a less vivid type of diagram such as the type used in an earlier experi-
lllent by Gick & Holyoak (1983). Beveridge & Parkins ( 1987) showed that the failure of 
Gick & Holyoak (1983) to find that graphical representations were effective was due to 
the type of diagram that they used. Beveridge & Parkins ( 1987) study demonstrates 
the importance of selecting the right ER in order to facilitate effective read-off and 
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inference. 
Domain: Mathe1natics Singley, Anderson, Gevins & Hoffman (1989) evaluated 
a.n intelligent learning environment (Algebra \iVord Problem Tutor) using 4 ~beginning 
algebra.' students aged 13 years. The system is described as a model-tracing tutor and 
is designed to facilitate the writing of algebraic expressions. The system~ however, does 
not solve equations. Model tracing consists of learning-by-doing in conjunction with a 
cognitive process model that allows for fine grained diagnosis and remediation. 
The system provides support by assisting with problem representation and supporting 
2 strategies - means-end analysis and a diagram strategy. 
At the first stage (problem definition), the user is offered a range of u nla.belled, q ua.l-
itative diagrams- only one of which is correct. If the wrong diagram is chosen, the 
system offers remediation based on the qualitative relationship violated in the erroneous 
representation. Singley et al.( 1989) acknowledge that 'One drawback ... is that (diagram 
selection) is recognition-based and does not require students to build the diagrams for 
themselves'. Having selected the correct ER, the subject then maps quantitative in-
formation from the problem statement onto the diagram. Next, the user generates 
constraints and is assisted by the tutor in different ways depending upon the strategy 
being pursued. Constraints are combined in a. final equation. 
Four evaluation subjects were pre and post tested on a paper and pencil test of the 8 
problem types supported by the system. Singley et a.l report that the tutor had little 
effect on the correctness of problem answers but had a significant and positive effect 
on students ability to write a solvable equation. 
The Singlcy et al. ( 1989) study is problematic, however, in several respects. It was 
an uncontrolled and small scale evaluation. Assessing the contribution of diagram 
selection is also impossible since the diagram selection facility was not implemented at 
the time of the evaluation (presumably the subjects were provided with a single correct 
diagram to la.bel). The \Vorcl Algebra Tutor is, nevertheless, one of the few systems in 
\\·hich reasoning with (graphical) ERs is central - a point which is discussed further 
below. 
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Do1nain: Co1nputer programming As reviewed in Chapter :3, Mayer ( 1976) stud-
ied the effects of several modes of information presentation on a large sample of univer-
sity students. The problem used was one in which various sports teams were matched 
in a tournament. 'Test questions asked about the outcomes given certain conditions. 
The problem was presented in eight formats, four were verbal and four were graphical. 
.lVlayer ( 1976) concludes that flowcharts are suited to the representation of complexly 
structured information whereas verbal formats are optimal for efficiently-structured 
in formation. 
Domain: Logic-syllogistic reasoning Newstead (1989), in two experiments, pre-
sented undergraduates with categorical syllogism premises in two modalities - graph-
ical (Eulers circles) and sentertial. The design of the 2nd experiment was within-
subject, so that all students received both conditions (order was randomised across 
subjects). In the graphical condition, students were required to indicate which conclu-
sion validly follows from a given premise by selecting the appropriate diagram(s) from 
five characteristic Eulers circle diagrams. In the sentential condition subjects indicated 
against each of a range of possible conclusions which were true or false given a single 
premise. The results showed that subjects make different patterns of errors depending 
upon whether the task is performed in the graphical or linguistic modes. In general, 
Euler's circles were associated with more errors of a Gricean nature - i.e. based on 
a. natural, 'everyday' language interpretation of quantifiers such as 'some' excluding 
the possibility of 'all' and upon the assumption that the information provider is being 
maximally cooperative. The Gricean effect was observed at a highly significant level in 
t hP Euler·s circle task despite explicit instruction to the effect that 'some' meant "'at 
ll'a~t one, and possibly all''. In contrast, on the sentential version of the task, subjects 
\H're more likely to 'convert' (i.e. assume that All Bs are As, given All As are Bs) than 
on the graphical version. Newstea.d ( 1989) interprets his results as providing support 
for both the phenomena of Gricean errors and conversion. 
Do1nain: Biology Hesse, Tiberghien, Baker, Picard & Reinhard (199.5) compared 
'manipulable' graphics with 'static' graphics. The graphics were structure diagrams of 
a. complex dynamic system (a model from the domain of population biology). 
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Su bjccts learned about population models from a computer- ba.c::;ed instructional hyper-
text. They su bseq uen tly were required to correct corn pu ter-ba.c::;ed structure diagrams 
as a learning test. The relations shown in the diagram had to be judged as correct or 
not in written form, and the changes necessary for correction had to be described and 
justified. I-I esse et al. write ... 
Under the condition "manipulable graphics" in addition to the written 
description and justification, necessary changes were to be carried out by 
manipulating the graphics that were shown. Under the condition ;.static 
graphics" working on the tasks consisted only in the written description 
and justification of necessary changes. 
Performance was significantly better for subjects in the manipulable graphics condition 
for both individual problem solvers and for subjects who worked in collaborative pairs, 
though the effect of manipulation was larger for individual subjects than for collabo-
rating dyads. Interestingly, in the collaborating pairs condition, the effect sizes of the 
manipulation factor and collaboration factor were equal but did not add together in 
terms of the interact effect. They write that 'it can be supposed that the complex-
ity of the tasks was not high enough for manipulable graphics to cause any further 
improvement in addition to the advantage already given by cooperation.' 
Review conclusions 
Several conclusions emerge from the revie\v. Instruction in the use of ERs is effective 
in a \\·ide variety of domains - both in those requiring specialised ER forms such 
as syllogistic reasoning~ mathematics and physics and also in domains where a range 
of more general ER types can effectively be employed such as analytical/deductive 
reasoning. Results from Lewis (1989) and Lindvall et al. (1982) suggest that subjects 
can learn to use ERs with comparatively little time and effort. Furthermore, students 
can often select and use appropriate ERs in the absence of instruction (e.g. Schwa.rtz: 
1911) 2 • \,Yillis & Fuson ( 1988) emphasise the need to tea.ch a range of ERs rather 
2 But they must be familiar with the ERs semantics prior to their attempt to use it in reasoning (Cox 
& Brna, 1993a,b). 
CHAPTER 4. HELATED vVORI\ 83 
than a single type. Lewis ( 1989) expresses concern that instruction in the use of 
Ells ('translation training') may lead to superficial key-word spotting approaches to 
problem reading on the part of learners. To avoid a merely superficial analysis of the 
problem, an interactive learning environment could require the subject to indicate an 
adequate level of problem comprehension before ER construction begins. This could 
be implemented by requiring the subject to enter problem information into a 'problem 
summary' window. This issue will be explored further in the discussion. 
Grossen & Carnine ( 1990) have shown that instruction with self-constructed ERs is 
more effective than instruction with prefabricated ERs. I-I esse et al. ( 1995) demon-
strated improved performance under conditions where subjects can manipulate graph-
ics compared to conditions where subjects merely observe static representations. Van 
Essen & Hamaker ( 1990) emphasise the need for instructors to both instruct and 
model the use of ERs. Evidence from the literature on syllogistic reasoning points 
to the importance of a. externalising a representation and b. the need to construct 
that external representation rather than merely use one that has been prefabricated. 
Tvlatsuno ( 1987) analysed the responses of subjects who were asked to subjectively re-
port their internal representations during a syllogism task in which subjects reasoned 
about the relationships between patterned geometric objects. Subjects reported three 
kinds of internal representation - imagined diagrams, imagined concrete figures and 
intuitions based on reasoning with verbal expressions. Subjects who imagined internal 
diagrams performed significantly worse only on 'no valid conclusion' (NVC) syllogisms 
than subjects whose internal representations were either concrete figures or sentential. 
This result is interesting because unpublished data from a. study by Stenning & Cox3 
ha~ sho\\'n that the use of external diagrams (Euler's circles) is associated w·ith better 
pPrformance on NVC problems than sentential representation. For example, if given 
·Some As are not Bs' the correct response to 6 of the 8 possible con cl usions4 is 'can't 
tPI!" (CT). :38% of subjects who drew Euler's circle type workscratchings on their test 
papers produced a valid (3 diagram) model. In contrast, only 6% of subjects who re-
sponded sententially gave correct answers. Furthermore, the study reviewed above by 
3 A replication of the study by Newstead ( 1989). 
·l 'All As are Bs', 'No As are Bs', 'Some As are Bs', 'Some As are not Bs', 'All Bs are As', 'NoBs are 
As', 'Some Bs are As', 'Some Bs are not As'. 
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Grossen a.nd Carnine (1990) points up the need for active construction of ER..;; rather 
than the passive use of prefabricated ones. Taken together, these three lines of evi-
dence tend to suggest that representations need to both externalised and constructed 
for them to be maximally effective in problem solving. There are, however, degrees 
of construction - the subject may cl raw an entire diagram or merely be allowed to 
modify or tinker with an extensively pre-constructed representation. In the case of 
matrix graphics such as spreadsheets, the distinction is probably less crucial than in 
the case of say using Euler's circles to reason about what conclusion may validly follow 
from syllogisms. 
Another interesting issue that emerges from the review is that of switching. Evidence 
from Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994) suggests that multiple strategy users who change 
strategy during problem solving are generally more successful than single strategy 
users. Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994) studied four kinds of solution strategy (two of 
which did not involve ER..;;). Also, Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972) showed that a. third of 
the subjects in their experiment switched ERs from that used to present the problem 
to another kind when solving the problem. In contrast to the studies of Koedinger 
& Tabechnek (1994) and Schwartz & Fa.ttaleh (1972), in this study we are concerned 
with ER switching of a different kind - we are concerned with switching during the 
problem solving process - that is, in situations where, during problem solution, the 
subject constructs a representation in one modality but subsequently switches and 
builds a second, different ER. 
The review provides good evidence for the transfer of ER skills. Schwartz ( 1993) 
showed transfer of the use of path diagrams in the biology domain. Novick ( 1990) has 
shown that transfer of a representational strategy (a matrix ER) can occur between 
two problems in the absence of a shared problem solution strategy between the two 
problems. In the Novick study, 7.5o/c~ of experimental subjects (who had been exposed 
to matrix ERs in a problem solving context) transferred a matrix ER to the transfer 
problem compared to 21% of control subjects. The transfer problem was best solved 
using a. matrix representation, but required a different solution strategy from that re-
quired on the prior matrix problem. Novick's (1990) results suggest that the transfer 
dfect was more than a. mere recency phenomenon because the prior matrix represen-
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tation problem was the second of three initial problems that experimental subjects 
received prior to the transfer problem. Thus, the prior matrix problem was embedded 
in two other problems requiring (each of which required a different ER) and there was 
a. non-matrix problem interposed between the prior matrix problem and the target 
problem. 
Lindva.ll et al. (1982) also report good transfer of representational skill in primary 
children from less to more complex word problems. They also report that primary 
children can validly adapt ERs to new problems. 
Iviany errors are made at the stage of problem comprehension and this emerges as a cru-
cial phase of problem solving (Proudfit, 1981; Reed & Ettinger, 1987; Schwartz, 1971; 
Polich & Schwartz, 1974). Schwartz (1971) has shown that the syntactic complexity of 
word problems affects the error rate - negative wording and the use of disjunctions 
are associated with high error rates. In contrast positively expressed problems and the 
use of conjunctions are much easier. Polich & Schwartz (1974) found that the repre-
sentation of information that has to be inferred (ie is implicitly given) is error-prone. 
Problem complexity (in terms of the number of dimensions and the values along them) 
is another determining factor (Schwartz, 1971; Polich & Schwartz, 1974). 
There seems to be contradictory evidence on whether graphical representation (draw-
ing) increase or decreases with age in the primary grades. Greene (1989) and Fuson &. 
VVillis (1989) found a decreasing tendency for primary children to draw pictorial rep-
resentations as age increased. However, in the domain of arithmetic word problems, 
Van Essen & Hamaker (1990) report that first and second graders produced fewer self-
const ruct.ccl ERs in response to instruction than fifth graders. The explanation of this 
sPcming contradiction almost certainly lies in the nature of the drawings, specifically in 
the difference between pictorial representations (literal depictions) and ERs specifically 
generated as aids to reasoning. 
One study provides evidence for different error patterns associated with graphical and 
linguistic modalities ( Newstead. 1989). This is an interesting issue and there are im-
portant questions that it raises. For example, do subjects who construct their ERs 
manifest greater or smaller modality effects in terms of error-patterns? 
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Several interactive learning environments (ILEs) have employed graphics or graphical 
interfaces. Some systems, such as BRIDGE (Bonar & Cunningham,1988), GEOJviE-
TRY (13oyle & Anderson, 1984) and GJL (:lvlerrill et al., 1992), have exploited proof-tree 
type graphics in the design of their interfaces, often as a means of making planning pro-
cesses more salient. Other systems utilise diagrammatic representations of geometry 
and optical problems (GEOJviETRY; REFRACT- Reimann, 1991). Hall (1989) stud-
ied ER'3 as intermediate steps en route to representing algebra word problems in terms 
of equations. Only four systems, though - HYPERPROOF (Barwise & Etchemendy, 
1994); ALGEBRA (WORD PROBLEM TUTOR- Singley et al., 1989), GIL (Merrill 
et al., 1992) and ANJ:NIATE (Kintsch, 1991)- are centrally concerned with graphics 
a.nd reasoning. 
Unlike primary grade level word arithmetic problems, college level word algebra prob-
lems require world and language knowledge that is too rich to simulate and hence to 
incorporate into intelligent tutoring systems. For that domain, Kintsch (1991) ad-
vocates the development of unintelligent tutoring environments that can assist with 
graphical representation of the problem and which can animate the problem model. 
Such systems assist with the construction of useful, mediating situation models a.nd 
intervene in Vygotsky's 'zone of proximal development' for many students. Kintsch 
describes ANUviATE - a system that helps the student to graphically represent the 
relevant features of the algebraic problem model, resulting in a conceptual model. AN-
Il\1ATE uses the conceptual model to produce an animation the purpose of which is 
to make explicit the link between the problem model and the situation model. 
The author is not aware of any system, to date, that has attempted to offer learner sup-
port in the selection, construction and use of a range of graphical (and non-graphical) 
representations cl uring reasoning. Those processes are central concerns of this the-
sis. l\1lany of the studies listed in the preceding sections have been concerned with 
how subjects use prefabricated ERs such as textbook illustrations or partially prefab-
ricated diagrams. Other studies have examined subjects as they construct ERs as aids 
to reasoning, but none (except Katz & Anzai, 1991) have done so in the context of 
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computer-based systems or intelligent learning environments. This thesis is also con-
cerned with the spontaneous representations that individuals construct 'from scratch' 
during problem solving. 'I'he focus is upon providing an account of the processes of 
problem comprehension, ER selection, construction and use with a view to determining 
the degree of computer-based support actually needed. Moreover, in practically all the 
studies of reasoning with ERs reviewed above, subjects were instructed to "show their 
working' - this may well have influenced subjects to produce ERs for an 'audience' 
rather than as purely private a£des me moire. 
To date, in the vast majority of empirical studies of ERs, subjects have been specifically 
instructed to 'draw diagrams' or 'show their working'. Where those instructions are 
not given, subjects are aware that their responses will be examined in detail at a later 
time. Often, too, the experimenter is present as an onlooker. One or more of those 
con cl itions applied in studies by Proudfi t ( 1981), Reed & Ettinger ( 1987) ~ Lind va.ll et 
a.l.(1982), Lewis, (1989), Katz & Anzai (1991), Schwartz (1971), Polich & Schwartz 
(1974), Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972), Schwartz (1993), Hall et al. (1989), Van Essen 
& I-Iamaker (1990), Novick (1990), Biron & Bednarz (1989), Greene (1989), Carroll et 
al. (1980) and Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994). Under those circumstances, subjects 
produce qualitatively different ERs - ones modified for an audience and therefore not 
produced solely as private, externalised, cognition. Students are likely to omit material 
that may be embarrassing, as Hall et al. (1989) concede. However, students sitting 
analytical reasoning problems assume that the only performance measure of interest 
to the examiner are their multiple-choice responses. They would therefore not be 
so likely to modify their representations in any way. On the other hand, students 
m a~· produce more explicit trails of their reasoning and richer protocols if they are 
specifically instructed to do so- this is an interesting empirical question that perhaps 
d0scrves study in its o\vn right. Responses to the analytical reasoning test~ like all the 
G RE su btcsts, are machine scored via pencil marked multiple choice response cards. 
:\ny residual workscra.tchings on the test booklet have not been produced in response 
to instructions to ·show your working· or with the assumption that they \vill perused 
by an examiner at a. later time. 
Subjects in the first study of this thesis (Chapter 5) were not instructed to show their 
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working, neither did they have any cause to suspect that anyone would see their private 
workscra.tchings at a later time. This increases the validity of the data as records of 
cognitive processes compared to previous work on reasoning with ERs. 
Thesis argun1ents expounded in detail 
ER selection 
1vlost work on ERs and reasoning, to date, has analysed the residual workscra.tchings of 
subjects, or has studied how students use prepared diagrams and illustrations (i.e. not 
ERs that they themselves choose and build). There have been very few studies that 
have analysed the processes of problem comprehension, ER selection, ER construction 
and the use of ERs for reading-off solutions. Hence, a dynamic, constructivist, approach 
to studying reasoning with ERs is necessary in order to address a. range of important 
issues at each stage. 
First, there are good reasons for believing that ER use is not 'all or none'. There 
is a spectrum of use that ranges from reasoning exclusively internally (no ER), using 
a' minimal' ER to full, externalised, model-based reasoning with (usually·) graphical 
ERs or, alternatively, reformulation/re-translation via linguistic ERs. 
Representation selection follows comprehension. Good comprehension is associated 
with the development of a situation model (Kintsch, 1991) or coherent representation 
unified at a high level by analogy (Greeno, 1977). 'Uncooperative' (Grice, 1975) as-
pects of information presentation must also be overcome. The full problem information 
contPxt ( l3ernado & OkagakL 1994) must be exploited. A 'puzzle mode' (Levesq ue~ 
19X~) or ·cxtensionalist stance~ (Stenning & Cox, 199.5) must be adopted by the rea-
saner. Natural language interpretation conventions need to be suspended in favour of 
more formal readings. 
The subject needs to recognise the complexity of the problem by discerning number of 
dimensions, its level of determina.cy, and the presence and proportion of negative and 
implicitly presented information. One of the objectives of the process analysis based 
a.pproa.ch of the switchER studies (chapters 6 & 7) was to determine how well subjects 
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are able to do those things and to find out what aspects of the problem pose most 
difficulty. 
fn the analytical reasoning and study skills literatures, it is possible to find several 
general and domain-specific sources of ER selection advice. An important question 
concerns the utility of such recommended ('off the shelf') representations. It is argued 
that they are only useful to the extent that they happen to be commensurate with the 
ERs that the subject would have chosen had s/he had free choice. 
For a given set of analytical reasoning problems, how wide is the range of ERs chosen 
and used - are the recommended ones the most effective? 
\,Yhat is the role of prior knowledge and a subject's ER 'repertoire'. According to the 
test developers, analytical reasoning problems do not require domain knowledge. How-
ever, knowledge of some representational formalisms and problem solving strategies is 
required. \tVhat happens when a subject lacks knowledge of an appropriate represen-
tational formalism such as a diagrammatic method for representing indeterminacy, for 
example? 
The questions associated with analytical reasoning problems can be very heterogeneous 
in their task requirements and in the extent to which solutions to the questions that 
they pose are 'ER dependent'. 
To what extent, therefore, is a single ER useful across a set of (typically) il or 5 ques-
tions? For example, in order to overcome the specificity of a particular diagrammatic 
ER, do skilled reasoners use more than one ER- i.e. reason heterogeneously? 
Finall.v~ how extensive are individual differences in ER selection? 
Constructivisn1 
a constructivist theory of knowledge ... is generally shared by all researchers 
in the domain of representation. (Janvier, 1987) 
It is argued, from a constructivist perspective, that individual differences in prior 
knowledge must be recognised. For that reason, and because of a general paucity of 
research in the area., it is impossible to issue general guidelines for choosing a 'correcf 
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n_'presenta.tion for a given task. 
There are strong reasons to believe that subjects reason better with representations 
that they construct than with provided, 'prefabricated', ERs. However, there is a 
need for explanations that go beyond merely attributing the superiority of 'a required 
diagram-drawing response' to 'deeper processing' (Grossen & Carnine, 1990, pp. 179-
180). The adoption of a process-based approach to the study of reasoning with ERs 
can be expected to shed light on the cognitive effects of externalisation. 
In the syllogistic reasoning domain, the process of constructing an external represen-
tation (Euler's circles) has been shown to result in richer learning outcomes than the 
use of pre-fabricated diagrams ( Grossen & Carnine, 1990). However, the range of rep-
resentations that are useful for syllogistic reasoning is relatively narrow and, in that 
study, Etder's circles were the only representations available to the subjects. How do 
subjects approach such problems when they lack knowledge of Etder's Circles? 
The effectiveness of a representation depends on how well suited it is to the task at 
hand. For example some tasks require qualitative comparisons, others require precise 
numerical read-off or fast searches. Representations may be internal or external, graph-
ical or linguistic and the form of representation chosen can greatly affect performance. 
How successful are subjects at discerning the nature of the task(s) posed by a. problem 
and how well do they match their representations to those demands? 
Switching 
Heterogeneous reasoning either with linguistic/diagrammatic mixtures of ERs or with 
intra-modal ERs (e.g. multi pie diagrams) is effective because the expressive proper-
ties of several representations can be exploited. Heterogeneous reasoning is encour-
aged by Hyperproof, a 1vlacintosh program for teaching first- order logic (Barwise & 
Etchemendy, 1994). There are not many evaluative studies of heterogeneous reason-
ing. However, the use of Hyperproof in 'real' logic teaching contexts has been shown 
t.o be at least as effective as traditional approaches for most students and particularly 
{'ffectivc for graphically inclined students (Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 199.5). Also, 
~vlolitor, Ballstaedt & Ivlandl (1989) review a well-controlled study by Stone & Glock 
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(1981) in which it was shown that the combined presentations of text and pictures 
produced superior performance in a model assembly task than the presentation of one 
modality alone. 
Selecting and constructing multiple ERs, however, is a challenging task that requires 
sensible allocation of information to modalities and skilled division of cognitive ef-
fort across the stages of problem solving. In some systems (e.g. Hyperproof) ERs 
are prefabricated or partially formed and no ER selection decision is required of the 
user (the graphics and sentences are a fait accompli). Furthermore, the subject does 
not construct the representation from scratch but modifies and extends the existing 
ones. Under these circumstances the two modalities are used concurrently, side-by-
side. In contrast, where a subject reasons heterogeneously with self-selected and self-
constructed ERs, the cognitive load is high and only one representation at a time can 
be constructed. It is argued, therefore, that switching between representations aids 
the distribution of cognitive effort. Switching is often a process of translation - ini-
tially the problem may be re-cast or translated from the presented (sentential) form 
to another, perhaps abbreviated sentential form or notation. This might be deemed a 
direct translation. Subsequently the subject might build a diagrammatic model. T'his 
represents two kinds of shift - a shift of modality (sentence to diagram) and a shift 
of strategy (direct translation to model-based reasoning). 
Switching might be triggered when the subject reaches an impasse in reasoning or where 
an initial representation has failed to assist with the problem solution. Alternatively, it 
may result from a recognised problem with the existing representation, such as an error 
in construction or as a result of dissatisfaction with a (sub-optimal) representation. 
Switching between some modalities and/or representational formalisms may be easier 
than switching between others. Lesh, Behr & Post (1987) examined 4th to 8th graders' 
rPsponses to a paper and pencil test of rational number and proportional reasoning 
(mathematical) problems. They characterised each type of item in their tests according 
to t.h0 cognitive operations required by each. These consisted of translations from: 
• symbols to written language 
• written language to symbols 
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• pictures to pictures 
• written language to pictures 
• pictures to written language 
• symbols to pictures 
• pictures to symbols 
They concluded that the order of increasing difficulty was that in which the translations 
are ordered in the list above, with pictures to symbols being most difficult. They write: 
In general, if other factors are held constant: (a) Translations to pictures 
is easier than translations from pictures; (b) translations involving written 
language (e.g. three-fourths) are easier than translations involving written 
symbols (e.g. ~);and (c) the easiest translations are those that only require 
a. student to 'read' a fraction or ratio in two written forms. (p.48). 
Note that there are important differences between the Lesh et al. study and the work 
to be reported here. The Lesh et al. test items required translations from one type 
of presented representation to another kind of presented representation. No active ER 
construction was required by the subject. The age of the subjects and the domain 
(mathematics) were also different. Despite those caveats, the Lesh et a.!. result is 
interesting because it shows that, when all other factors are held constant, between-
modality (e.g. symbols to pictures) translations are more difficult than within modality 
( r.g. written language to symbols) translations. Lesh, Post & Behr (1987) state: 
Part of what we mean when we say that student 'understands' an idea. ... is 
that: ( 1) he or she can recognize the idea embedded in a variety of q uali ta-
tively different representational systems, (2) he or she can flexibly manip-
ulate the idea within given representational systems and (3) he or she can 
accurately translate the idea. from one system to another. (p.36). 
~vlulti pie representations em played in problem presentations have been shown to fa.cil-
it.a.te finding solutions under some circumstances. Stone & Glock (1981) showed that, 
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in an a.sscmbly task, directions presented both diagrammatically and propositionally 
resulted in fewer assembly errors than directions presented only propositionally. How-
ever, there was no significant difference between the diagram-only and diagram-plus-
text conditions. The diagram-only condition produced fewer errors of parts-orientation 
than text only, however. \iVhen learning material is presented via multiple representa-
tions, how well can students integrate the information into a coherent whole? Recent 
work by Schwarz & Dreyfus ( 1993) has identified some of the conditions necessary -
they stress that it is crucial to monitor and measure the degree to which students are 
able to integrate information since there are few guarantees that students can do this 
despite the provision of appropriate learning environments and tasks. 
Empirical evidence for the effectiveness of multiple representations is thin on the ground 
and the circumstances under which reasoning with multiple representations improves 
performance are unclear. For example, should subjects shift or switch from one repre-
sentation to another during the course of reasoning? Another important issue concerns 
the redundancy of information presented in the two modalities- for example in the 
Stone & Glock (1981) study, the information in the two modalities was redundant5 In 
1-Iyperproof, information presented diagrammatically and sententially is far less red un-
dant. 
The next chapter of the thesis presents the first empirical study - in it, some of the 
issues raised by the literature review are addressed. The aims of the first study are 
summarised below. 
Sun1n1ary of ain1s of first study 
The aims of the first empirical study were to examine: 
1. the variety of ERs selected and constructed by subjects across a range of analyt-
icaJ reasoning problems 
~. The same information was represented in each modality. The level of redundancy (whether same or 
different information is represented in the two modalities) is an important factor in heterogeneous 
reasoning research. 
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2. the effect of problem determinacy level upon representation selection and perfor-
mance 
a. the relationship between ER type/modality and performance 
4. slips and errors in ER construction and their effects upon performance 
5. the utility of particular ER~ across a range of task demands 
6. subjects' use of multiple representations and the effects of multiple representation 
use upon performance 
Chapter 5 
An investigation of ER use in 
• reasoning. 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of a study in which a large corpus of workscratchings 
were collected and analysed. The workscratchings were spontaneously produced by 
subjects in the course of solving a range of paper and pencil-based analytical reason-
ing problems that were administered under test conditions. There were several airns. 
One (broad) aim was to investigate the variety and types of ERs spontaneously used 
by subjects across a range of different problems. Another aim was to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different ERs and to test predictions, derived from specificity theory 
(Stenning & Oberlander, 199.5), regarding the relationship between ER modality and 
the degree of determinacy possessed by the problem. 
Since each problem has 4 or .5 associated questions, and since the questions differ 
markedly in their task demands, it was also of interest to study, for each problem, 
the effectiveness of a particular ER formalism across the range of questions. It was 
hypothesised that subjects might respond to changing task demands by switching rep-
rcsentations or producing additional representations. 
Also of interest was the relationship between the accuracy and form of the ERs and 
performance (question scores). 
A final, and more minor, aim was to investigate the effectiveness of the ERs recom-
9.5 
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mended by the GRE crammcrs from which the problems were taken. 
Issues of validity 
Analytical reasoning test items arc posed as pencil-marked multiple choice items. 
Hence, any residual workscratchings on the test booklet have not been produced in 
response to instructions to 'show your working' or with the assumption that they will 
perused by an examiner at a later time. For that reason, the workscratchings may be 
considered to be relatively valid indexes of externalised cognition. Almost every preced-
ing study that has analysed external representations has either specifically instructed 
subjects to 'draw diagrams' or 'show their working'. Even where those instructions are 
not given, subjects in many studies are aware that their responses will be examined in 
detail a later time. Often, toe. the experimenter is present as an onlooker. In those 
situations, subjects probably produce qualitatively different ERs - ones intended for 
an audience and not solely as private, externalised cognitive activity. Subjects in the 
study reported here were advised that 'it may be useful to draw a rough diagram~ 
but were not compelled to use an ER. Hence the ERs produced by subjects can be 
considered to have been produced spontaneously. In this respect, the methodology of 
the investigation reported here yielded ERs of greater validity (as examples of exter-
nalised cognition) than most previous work on ERs and reasoning since, in much of 
the previous work, subjects were instructed to use particular ER formalisms. 
Problen1 selection 
Three problems were selected for detailed analysis (Appendix A). They were taken 
rrom a GRE test 'crammer' (Brownstein 1 VVeiner & Green, 1990). All three problems 
contain implicit information which the solver must infer from the information given in 
t.lw problem stem. The problems were 'model' problems. 11Iodel problems are defined 
here as those for which external representations are useful in finding solutions1 • 
Two of the problems were determinate in that a single, unique model of the information 
given may be constructed. ERs such as diagrams, tables, maps etc therefore facilitate 
1 A stricter definition of model-based reasoning does not necessarily require the use of external rep-
resentations - analogies are a rich source of models for example (Fischbein, 1987). 
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finding the solution. One problem (problem two) was indeterminate and requires the 
modelling of quantifier information. Problems 1, 2 and 3 required rcspouses to sets 
of 4, 4 and 5 associated questions, respectively (see Appendix A). 
Individual questions within the sets associated with each problem vary quite widely 
in terms of task requirement. For example, in problem 3 subjects can answer the first 
two questions via relatively straightforward read-off from their external representations. 
Question 3 is more complex and requires an ordering of three entities. If the subject's 
ER has not efficiently represented 'prize order' information then reading-off the answer 
to this question will become much more difficult. Question 4 is similar to questions 1 
and 2. Question .5 is substantially different in that it asks the subject to re-solve the 
problem on the assumption that 3 of the 7 original statements in the problem are no 
longer available. This renders the subject's original ER obsolete and the results of the 
studies reported here indicate that it is more effective to construct a new representation 
than to attempt to modify the original ER. 
The three problems selected were chosen in order to examine the effects of two fac-
tors upon problem solving with ERs. The first factor was problem difficulty level. 
Problems 1 and :3 differ in terms of their level of complexity. Problem 1 is relatively 
easy and involves the assignment of 6 individuals to offices under various constraining 
conditions. Problem 3 has more dimensions than problem 1 and some information 
is presented negatively (e.g. 'Nlr Grossmans clog wins neither first nor second prize'). 
The four dimensions of problem 3 (prize won, dog name, dog breed, owner) each have .:1 
values. Problem 1, in contrast, is essentially a one-dimensional array of 6 values. 
ThP second factor was level of determinacy. One aim of the study was to investigate the 
pfr('cts of problem determina.cy level upon reasoning with ERs in terms of ER selection, 
construction and use. Another aim was to examine the prediction~ derived from speci-
ficity theory (Stenning & Oberlander~ 1995), that effective reasoning on indeterminate 
problems requires the subject to use ERs capable of expressing abstraction. 
Problem 2 was therefore included in order to examine the kinds of ERs that subjects 
used to represent quantifier information in a problem solving context. 'I'he range of 
representations that are capable of representing quantifier information consists of first-
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order logic, natural language and set diagrams. Stenning & Oberlander argue that 
natural language is closer to graphical representations in terms of specificity since in 
ordinary expository discourse, constraints on interpretation are usually present in order 
to reduce the range of interpretations that can be placed on utterances - these con-
straints render natural language less useful in some problem solving contexts than more 
formal languages such as logic. Set diagrams and logical formalisms require specialised 
knowledge if they are to be used effectively and so it was hypothesised that prior expe-
rience with these formalisms would be an important prerequisite for their effective use. 
It was predicted that the indeterminate problem would pose considerable difficulties 
for subjects who were unfamiliar with appropriate representational formal isms. 
Subjects 
Subjects consisted of first-year Philosophy undergraduates. The number of subjects 
responding to the three problems were 77, 91 and 51 for problems 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively. 
The three problems selected for analysis in this investigation were included, along 
with other analytical reasoning and verbal reasoning items, in several versions of tests 
developed for use in a longitudinal evaluation of a logic teaching course (Cox, Stenning 
& Oberlander, 1994, 1995; Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995: Oberlander, Cox & 
Stenning, 1995a,b; Oberlander, Cox, Nionaghan, Stenning & Tobin, 1996). The number 
of subjects responding to each of the three questions therefore varies for this reason. 
Forty subjects completed all 3 problems, 29 completed the 'office' and 'poets' problem, 
s s11bjects completed the 'poets~ and 'dogs' problems. Eight subjects responded to the 
·office' problem only, 3 to the ·dogs' problem only and 14 to the 'poets' problem only. 
Procedure 
GRE-like tests of analytical and verbal reasoning were administered, under test condi-
tions, to four classes of students as part of an investigation into logic teaching. Before 
answering the analytical reasoning problems, subjects were instructed: 
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NONE= no ER used 
OT = ordered textjlists/proto-tables 















Table .5.2: Problem 2 'POETS' (indeterminate) 
Question DG 
1 0.75 0.61 0.73 0.57 0.50 
2 1.0 0.96 0.92 1.0 1.0 
3 0.25 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.0 
4 0.62 0.81 0.73 0.71 0.50 
X 0.65 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.50 
n 8 26 26 7 2 
DG = directed graphs (lines/arrows connecting ER elements) 
LOG= logic 
SET = set diagrams 
TABL= tables 








In this part, each question or group of questions is based on a passage or 
set of conditions. In answering some of the questions, it may be useful to 
draw a rough diagram. For each question, circle the best answer choice 
given. 
Results and Discussion - Workscratching Corpus 
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Tables 5.1, .5.2 & .5.3 summarise the ER behaviour on the three problems. They 
show the proportion of subjects using a particular ER who responded correctly to each 
question. 
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Table .5.3: Problem 3 'DOG show prizes' (determinate) 
Question CTAB TTAB 
1 0.29 0.83 0.93 
2 0.14 0.50 1.0 1.0 1.0 
3 0.14 0.50 0.75 0.83 0.93 
4 0.14 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.93 
5 0.14 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.43 
X 0.17 0.45 0.55 0.80 0.84 
n 7 4 4 6 30 
CTAB= contingency tables 
LETL= lines connecting letters 
NTAB= non target (ie prize) ordered tables 
TTAB= target ordered tables 
Tables 1 to 3 show that the majority of subjects used some form of ER - 91% on 
problem 1, 71% on problem 2 and 92% on problem 3. What is also striking is the 
variety of ER forms used- examples are provided in Appendix A. Subjects used a very 
wide range of ERs, not just the ones recommended by GRE crammers. Furthermore, 
subjects often used 'wrong' representations quite successfully. 
\rVhen subjects are given free choice in ER selection as they were here, the range of 
different and effective ERs is quite broad, especially on the more complex problems (2 
and 3). 
Problem 1 
Problem 1 is relatively easy to solve and most subjects selected similar ER.c;. Thirty-
four subjects constructed ERs of spatially arranged text (ordered text). Twenty-four 
of these were arrayed horizontally with office 1 to the left. Ten subjects arrayed the 
text vertically with office 1 at the top in all but one case. Thirty-six subjects produced 
homomorphic graphical representations (plans) in which rectangles or lines represented 
offices - see Figures A.2, A.3, A.4, Appendix A. These graphical ERs were more 
varied than the ordered-text ERs such as Figure A.5, Appendix A. :r..1ost subjects 
produced either a single large rectangle inside which 5 shared walls divided the offices 
or, alternatively, drew six discrete rectangles, one per office. Five subjects produced 
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vertically arrayed plans (e.g. Figure A.4, Appendix A). Three subjects drew 'minimal' 
plans consisting of horizontally arrayed vertical lines that represented office partitions 
(Figure A.3, Appendix A). Three subjects drew 'cubicles' - i.e. 3-sided offices with 
an open wall - an example is shown in Figure A.1, Appendix A. 
Niost subjects chose to explicitly number the offices in their ERs - this was evident 
in 72% of the ordered-text ERs and 61% of the plans. 
In terms of correct responses, plans were marginally superior to ordered text (Ta-
ble .5.1) arguably because they provided clearer read-off of information during question 
answering. 
It is interesting to consider why 'no ER' was seemingly more effective for answering 
question 4 than tables or plans (Table .5.1). Question 4 requires the subject to assess 
the impact of hypothetical changes to the originally given information: 
\Vhich of the following events, occurring one month after the assignment 
of offices, would be most likely to lead to a request for a change in office 
assignment by one or more employees? 1. Nis Braun deciding that she 
needs silence in the office(s) next to her own, 2 ... 
The task requirement is not one that is facilitated by straightforward read-off from an 
ER - there is a need to reason internally about the chain of events that follow and 
the number of individuals affected. 
It is possible that the process of cam paring the relative effects of the various scenarios is 
best done internally. Constructing a graphical external representation may constrain 
t hP evaluation of the scenarios due to limitations of graphics to express abstraction 
(i.e. their specificity - Sten n ing & 0 berlander, 199.5). This is an issue that warrants 
fu rthcr research. 
Of the 77 subjects, 53 (69%) constructed correct ERs, 18 (23%) constructed erroneous 
EHs and 6 subjects (8o/c1) showed no trace of having used an ER at all in their solu-
tions. Of the eighteen incorrect ERs, one error pattern accounted for a third. That 
error pattern involved a. reversal of the office positions of two of the 3 office workers 
described as smokers (i.e. 'Alien, Parker, \Vhite' in offices 1,2 & 3, instead of 'Parker, 
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Alien, White'). An example of this error is provided in Figure A.3, Appendix A. Be-
cause of the particular questions posed, however, only one of the four questions wa.c:; 
a.fi'ccted by that particular ER error. In other words, the questions vary in the extent to 
which they 'depend' upon fully correct ER construction. This is illustrated by the fact 
that, of the 18 incorrect ERs detected in the sample, only three were associated with 
scores of zero i.e. incorrect answers to all four questions. In general, most responses 
to questions (whether correct or incorrect) tended to be consistent with the ERs that 
the respondents had constructed. However, considering the 18 subjects who produced 
erroneous ERs, only 7 subjects gave question responses that were fully consistent with 
their (wrong) ERs. The remaining 11 subjects seemed to be selective about which 
parts of their ER they 'believed' in. In other words, one interpretation is that those 
subjects showed some awareness of their ER's inadequacy. An interesting and seem-
ingly paradoxical finding emerged from the analysis in relation to this point. Subjects 
who answered the questions in a manner that was consistent with their (wrong) ERs 
tended to score better than those whose answers were inconsistent with their (wrong) 
ERs. This may suggest that even if a learner suspects that his or her ER is incorrect, a 
tutor or an intelligent interactive learning environment should encourage ER-congruent 
responding rather than the use of less systematic strategies such as trial and error or 
guessing. 
Problem 2 
Problem 2 (the indeterminate, 'poets' problem) involves reasoning with several quan-
tifiers and produced, across subjects, the greatest variety of ERs. On the other hand, 
a higher proportion of subjects chose not to use an ER on problem 2 than the other 
two problems (Table 5.2) - it is arguable that those subjects were not familiar with 
representations capable of expressing the necessary abstractions (i.e. quantifier rela-
tions). 
The actual behaviour of subjects on problem 2 may be contrasted with the recom-
mended solution strategy for that item. Brownstein 1 Weiner & Green ( 1990) rec-
ommend a. kind of set diagram referred to as 'circle diagram'. The Brownstein et 
al. solution is shown in Figure A.21, Appendix A. The recommended ER is actually 
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semantically incoherent, this will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
It is interesting to note that set diagrams were not the most frequently selected ER in 
the samples that we studied. Set diagrams were reasonably successful for the subjects 
that used them, however. Natural language (text) and tabular representations were 
less successful than other ERs on problem 2 (Table .5.2). 
In terms of general performance across the four questions, logic was the most generally 
effective ER for the 26 subjects that chose to use it. An example is shown in Figure A.7, 
Appendix A. Specificity theory (Stenning & Oberlander, 199.5) predicts the utility of 
logic as an ER modality for expressing indeterminate information. The semantics of 
first-order logic can be used to readily represent quantifier information and· permit 
useful inferences. 
All of the set-diagram using subjects in the current study built single models of the 
premises - characteristic2 diagrams (e.g. Newstead, 1989; Stenning & Oberlander, 
1995) were more popular single models (e.g. use of A within B diagram to represent 
the premise 'All A's are B's' than the identity diagram- see Figures A.9, A.10, A.ll 
in Appendix A and Figure A.17 in Appendix A. Three of the 7 subjects who used set-
diagrams responded incorrectly to problem 2 possibly because they constructed only 
one of many possible diagrammatic models of the information (see Figures A.9, A.11 
in Appendix A and Figure A.l7, Appendix A). 
The superiority of set diagrams and logic on problem 2 is not surprising since these 
representations are conventionally used for representing set membership and quantifier 
information. The result provides some empirical support, though, for the prediction 
(by specificity theor~') that ERs capable of expressing indeterminacy either weakly (in 
the case of set diagrams) or strongly (as in the case of first-order logic) will be the 
most effective representations for solving indeterminate problems. 
As on problem 1, there was also evidence on problem 2 for the superiority of reading off 
auswcrs from an incorrect ER (ER congruent responding) over complete abandonment 
2 The characteristic diagram is the diagram that represents the maximmn number of types of indi-
vidual consistent with the premise. The characteristic diagram for 'All A are I3', for example, is 
the diagram in which a smaller circle 'A' is inside a larger circle 'B' and is not. the identity relation 
diagram in which a circle 'A' totally overlaps circle 'B'. 
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of the representation. Consider set diagram notation - one subject (Figure A.10, 
Appendix A) consistently drew a small circle 'E' within a larger circle 'B' to represent 
the first premise of problem 2 ('All those who enjoy ... Browning also enjoy ... Eiiot'). The 
misconception resulted in that subject erroneously representing 3 of the 7 premises. 
Despite this, the subject answered two of four questions correctly. It is difficult to know 
whether this was an error of interpretation or one of representation but the point is that 
flawed ERs are not totally useless . .rvioreover, reasoning with external representations 
is not necessarily totally external. Subjects \vho suspect that their representation is 
incorrect may shift their cognitive resources and rely more on internal representations 
as a compensatory strategy. 
As in Problem 1, the second problem's questions vary widely in terms of task re-
quirement. Hence a single ER type is not likely to be uniformly useful across all the 
questions in a set. Again, the data. support this view. A higher proportion of subjects 
using directed graphs (e.g. Figure A.6, Appendix A) or no ER responded correctly 
to question 1 of problem 2 than their counterparts who chose other ER forms. On 
the other hand, if overall performance on this problem is considered, logic should be 
the best choice if one had to choose a. single representation for use in answering all 4 
questions. The data in table 5.2 suggest that for subjects who lack knowledge of logic 
(and for whom logic is therefore not an option), directed graphs are optimally useful 
for answering questions 1 & 2 and set diagrams are optimal for a.nsweri ng questions 3 
& 4. 
Eighteen of the :20 subjects who used text to re-represent the problem information 
in problem 2 (e.g. Figure A.S, Appendix A) ans\vered the second question of that 
problem correctly. In fact question 2 was relatively easy. The answer can be inferred 
from only 2 of the 7 premises in the problem. Given 'All those who like Browning also 
like Eliot" (premise 1) and 'Those who enjoy Eliot despise Coleridge' (premise 2) it is 
straightforward to conclude that Browning-likers also despise Coleridge (by transitiv-
i t~r). Here an external representation of any kind is not really required and so the rate 
or correct response is more or less ER independent. 
However, the data. suggest that the differing task requirements of each question within 
problem 2 interact with the expressive properties of different representations. It is 
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likely (on the basis of studies of individual differences to be discussed below) that the 
subjects in the current study differed in their ER modality preferences - hence it 
is unclear whether the effects of constraining them to use particular representations 
would be beneficial. It is also unclear that prescriptive ER advice based on group 
data is necessarily beneficial for inclivid ual subjects, due to wide variations in prior 
knowledge and cognitive style. 
Problem 3 
The third problem was a determinate problem like problem 1, but was more difficult. 
Problem 3 contained 4 dimensions (prize order, clog owner, clog name, breed) with 4 
va.lues along each. As reviewed earlier, studies by Schwartz and others (1971;1972) 
have shown that tabular representations are associated with greater success rates than 
other kinds of ER. Examples of tabular representations from Experiment 1 are shown 
in Figures A.13, A.14,and Figure A.1.5 in Appendix A. In contrast to the study by 
Schwartz ( 1971), in this study tables were the most frequently chosen ER (Table .5.3). 
There were, however, important differences between the types of tables used. Con-
tingency tables were associated with poor performance because they are difficult to 
search. Contingency tables are matrix representations in which separate two dimen-
sional tables are constructed for each possible pairing of variables in the problem. An 
example can be seen in Figure A.l.S, Appendix A. Two of sixteen subjects in the 
first stoitchER study (to be described in Chapter 6) also produced contingency tables. 
Contingency tables are difficult to read-off conclusions from - information has to be 
sparchecl for in more than a single location and then resolved or unified mentally. 
The most effective tabular ER form was a target-ordered table with either the first 
column or row of the table representing prize order. Target-ordering means that the 
ER is constructed with a view to its utility at the read-offstage. An example is provided 
by Figure A.12 in Appendix A. In contrast, discourse ordered ER construction means 
that elements of the ER are produced in the order that they are listed in the problem. 
·Prize' ordering of the information during ER construction requires more effort during 
construction but facilitates read-off compared with less systematically tabulated infor-
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mation. Non-prize ordered tables are usually constructed according to the order that 
the information is listed in the problem (i.e. discourse ordered) -see Figure A.l3, 
Appendix A. Having the columns or rows disordered with respect to prizes appears 
to make the representation more prone to search errors at the read-off stage. The 
reason for this is that the salient dimension from the point of view of responding to 
the questions is prize order. An interesting paper by Gilmore (1991), using the river 
pollution task3 has shown that salience (factory ordered versus pollutant ordered) and 
type of representation (list versus table) interact. Gilmore (1991) partitions Green's 
(1989) cognitive dimension of 'visibility' into accessibility, salience and congruence. 
Accessibility and salience are static properties of the representation but congruence is 
dynamic and varies depending upon the extent to which the salient structure in the 
representation is relevant to the use being made of the representation at a. particular 
moment. 
Another example of discourse ordering is illustrated by the unusual semi-tabular 'letters 
& lines' representation shown in Figure A.l6, Appendix A. The problem information 
\Vas first discourse-ordered in adjacent columns of a. table and subsequently re-ordered 
by means of directed lines connecting elements of the table. 
Table 5.3 shows that contingency tables were pathological in that they require as much 
effort to construct as 'unified' target or discourse ordered tables but are extremely diffi-
cult to read information from when answering questions (Appendix A shows examples 
of contingency tables (Figure A.l.5) and unified tables (Figures A.l2 & A.l4)). 
On the whole, there were very few incorrectly constructed ERs on problem 3. Six 
subjects produced incomplete ERs- the most common omissions being of'Lad' (name 
of clog winning 4th prize - 6 instances), 'boxer' (breed of dog winning 2nd prize - .5 
instances) and 'Edwards' (name of owner of dog winning 2nd prize - .5 instances). 
Information about those three entities are merely implied in the problem and are not 
Pxplicitly stated. Deductive reasoning is thus required in order to infer the relationships 
between them. 
Only 4 of the .51 subjects actually built ERs in which the relationships between the 
3 Berry & Broadbent ( 1989) -the objective is to detect which of 8 factories is responsible for polluting 
a river via strategically testing river water samples. 
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Pntities of the problem were actually wrong (as opposed to incomplete). The scores 
for those ~u bjects were either zero (2 cases) or 1 out of .5 (2 cases). Both of the latter 
~u b jects responded correctly to question 2. That question was relatively easy and can 
be answered without an ER because all but two response options can be eliminated 
directly from information explicitly stated in the problem stem, resulting in a .50% 
possibility of guessing the correct answer. 
Multiple representations 
In a significant proportion of solutions (17% averaged across three problems), more 
than one representation was evident, suggesting the use of multiple ERs. Ivfultiple 
ER use was associated with good performance and suggested that those subjects were 
skilled at matching ER properties to task requirements. Heterogeneous reasoning was 
associated more often with correct responding4 to items than incorrect responding5 • 
The ratios were 13:1 (problem 1), 1:1 (problem 2) and 3.25:1 (problem 3). For subjects 
who used single ERs, the comparable ratios were 4.12:1, 1.83:1 and 2.3:1 for the three 
questions, respectively. Thus for problems one and three, the use of heterogeneous 
representations was associated with higher proportions of correct item responses. On 
problem two, selecting an ER capable of representing quantifier information was the 
important factor. Two examples of heterogeneous ER use are provided by Figures A.l9 
and A.20 in Appendix A - the first shows the use of a restricted logic notation 
together with a plan representation on problem 1 and the second shows a subject's 
representation for problem 3 in which both textual notes and a. tabular representation 
are used. 
Tlwse fi nclings are consistent with the observations of Lesh and his colleagues in the con-
tPxt of mathematical problem solving. They studied primary and secondary students~ 
use of written symbols, diagrams, manipulative models and language. For example. 
LPsh, Post and Beh r ( 1987) write: 
the act. of representation tends to be pl-ural! unstable, and evolving ... 
we have found that students seldom work through solutions in a single 
4 Defined as correct answers to at least three-quarters of a problem ,s questions. 
r, Correct responses to less than three-quarters of a problem's questions. 
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representational mode ... Instead, students frequently use several repre-
sentational systems, in series and/or in parallel, with each depicting only a 
portion of the given situation (p.37). 
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Furthermore, cliSessa ( 1979), in a paper on learnable representations of knowledge, has 
written that: 
The fundamental assumption behind ... (the) ... idea of multiple repre-
sentations is that rich, overlapping collection of different views and consid-
erations is much more a characteristic of preciseness in human knowledge 
than a small, tight system. In terms of problem solving the claim is that 
the parity of restatement or translation is as or more important to problem 
solving itself than the hierarchy of deduction (p.2.50). 
ivlore recently, the use of multiple ERs has been described as 'heterogeneous reasoning'. 
Barwise & Etchemendy (1992) have recently recommended the use of such reasoning 
with both sentential and graphical representation in their approach to teaching logic 
- it is embodied in their programme for teaching first-order predicate calculus 'Hy-
perproof'6. 
However, empirical evidence for the effectiveness of multiple representations is thin on 
the ground and the circumstances under which reasoning with multiple representations 
improves performance are unclear. For example, should subjects shift or switch from 
one representation to another during the course of reasoning? 
If IParning material is presented via multiple representations, ho\v \veil can students 
intPgrate the information into a coherent whole'? Recent work by Schwarz & Dreyfus 
( 199:3) has id en tifiecl some of the conditions necessary - they stress, however, that 
it is crucial to monitor and measure the degree to which students are able to inte-
~ra.te information since there are few guarantees that students can do this despite the 
provision of appropriate learning environments and tasks. 
c Barwise & Et.chemendy's ( 1994) system, Hyperproof. presents information graphically and senten-
t ially. Subjects develop logical proofs by entering sentences of first-order logic into a text window 
and making small modifications to a pre-fabricated diagram - this can be contrasted \Vit.h reasoning 
in situations where subjects select and construct ERs 'from scratch'. 
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Sun11nary and Conclusions - Workscratching Data 
In brief, the findings of study l can be summarised a.c;_;: 
• Subjects use a wide range of ERs 
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• A single ER is usually not equally effective for every question in a problem's set 
• Subjects can use incorrectly constructed ERs successfully (to the extent that they 
perform better using the incorrect ER than they do if they abandon it) 
• There is evidence that using a partially incorrect ER results in better performance 
than abandoning it completely 
• Subjects sometimes use ER formalisms that they do not fully understand 
• Consistency of answers with ERs is associated with correct responding 
• Contingency tables yield uniformly poor performance 
• Subjects sometimes use more than one representation 
• 1vlultiple ERs are effective 
• There is support for specificity theory- when the expressivity of an ER is matched 
to the determinacy level of the problem, better performance results 
The empirical support for these general conclusions will now be discussed. 
As shown by the examples in Appendix A 1 for a given problem there is considerable 
inter-subject heterogeneity in ER selection. This may reflect, inter alia, preferences in 
cognitive reasoning modality (e.g. graphical versus sentential). 
Support for specificity theory (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995) was provided by the 
results for problem 2 (indeterminate problem). Set diagrams and logic were the most 
effective ERs for that problem. Both ERs are capable of expressing the indeterminacy 
introduced by that problem's quantifier information. Those two ER formalisms differ 
in their modality, however since set diagrams are graphical and logic is sentential. For 
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the two determinate problems ( 1 and 3), weakly expressive representations such as 
plans or tables were optimal. 
Another general conclusion seems to be that subjects sometimes attempt to use an 
ER formalism that they clearly do not fully understand. Often this results in errors 
of interpretation such as that shown in Figure A.10, Appendix A in which a single set 
diagram model for each premise ER was constructed. The first premise ("All those 
who enjoy Browning also enjoy Eliot") is represented (erroneously) by a small circle 
"EL" inside large circle "BR"). 
A further conclusion is that, often, a single ER type is not uniformly useful across a 
series of questions or tasks relating to a problem. The requirements of the task are 
an important factor. For an ER to be effective, it must (at least): 1.) be capable of 
expressing any indeterminacy in the problem, 2.) be useful computationa.lly (La.rkin 
& Simon, 1987) and 3.) be appropriate for meeting the task demands of the problem 
question (Day, 1 988). 
A single ER type ma.y be best suited to requirement 1 but less useful for require-
ment 2. In some circumstances the subject could construct and use different ER.s for 
each question. In the case of problem 2 for example, the data. in Table 5.2 suggest that, 
on average, a directed graph (or no ER) is useful for question 1; any or no represen-
tation is adequate for question 2; logic, no ER or set diagrams are most appropriate 
for questions 3 and 4. In fact there was frequently evidence in the workscra.tchings of 
subjects having constructed and used more than one ER- i.e. heterogeneous reason-
ing in which complementary but different ERs were used in problem solving. Fourteen 
~u bjects used heterogeneous reasoning on problem 1, 2 subjects did so on problem 2 
and 11 did so on problem 3. 
In solving analytical reasoning problems, the processes of problem comprehension, 
rPpresentation selection and multiple representation construction from scratch by the 
student place very high cognitive loads upon the learner. However, information about 
~u bjects' interactions with their ERs and the time-course of those interactions is not 
preserved in paper and pencil workscratching records. A range of empirical questions 
could be addressed through the use of a. methodology that permits the dynamic nature 
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of reasoning with ERs to be studied. For example, to what extent do subjects erase 
and redraw elements of their representations? In what order do subjects construct the 
elements of their representation? How long do subjects spend at each of the stages of 
reasoning? Does the time spent at each stage provide a useful index of how cognitive 
effort is partitioned? To what extent do subjects construct multiple representions? 
How are multiple representations used? In what respects does the behaviour of subjects 
who choose not use ERs differ from those subjects who do use ERs? ,etc. 
To address those questions, a second study was conducted, using a computer-based 
system (switchERI), and in which the dynamic, second-by-second events during each 
stage of reasoning with ERs were recorded. The switchERI study will now be presented 
in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 
SwitchERI - an ILE for 
analytical reasoning. 
Introduction 
An obvious disadvantage of residual workscratchings and written protocols is the fact 
that timing information is lost and the transitions between problem solving episodes 
are impossible to detect. 
Study 2 was conducted, therefore, in order to examine the time-course of reasoning with 
ERs, to identify the major stages, to study the dynamic relationships between them 
and to investigate the role of prior knowledge of ER formalisms upon problem solving 
performance. The second experiment therefore utilised a computer-based system which 
provided a problem-solving environment and which dynamically logged user/system 
interactions. 
The use of time-stamped, user-system interaction logs provides a method of collecting 
information about timing, transitions between problem solving stages, the order in 
which elements of an ER are constructed, whether or not the subject uses a represen-
tation subsequent to construction and how ERs are used in the resolutions of impasses 
in reasoning, whether errors in ER construction are made, detected and rectified and 
so on. The approach also allows comparisons to be made between various kinds of ER 
in terms of construction time, efficiency in read-off solutions etc .. 
This study also investigated the relationship between subjects prior knowledge of ERs 
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and the selection, construction and use of ER.c:; (again) in the domain of analytical 
reasoning. The main motivation was a series of questions regarding the potential 
of representation switching as an effective reasoning strategy. The term ·switching~ 
means being able to swap between informationally equivalent (or non-equivalent) rep-
resentations that differ in their modality e.g. logicalfsententia.l versus circle diagrams. 
Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994) suggests that multiple strategy users who change strat-
egy during problem solving are generally more successful than single strategy users. 
Koedinger & Tabachnek (1994) studied four kinds of solution strategy (two of which did 
not involve ERs). Also, Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972) showed that a third of the subjects 
in their experiment switched ERs from that used to present the problem to another 
kind when solving the problem. In contrast to the studies of Koedinger & Tabech-
nek (1994) and Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972), in this study we are concerned with ER 
switching of a different kind - we are concerned with switching during the problem 
solving process - that is, in situations where, during problem solution, the subject 
constructs a representation in one modality but subsequently switches and builds a 
second, different ER. To address the switching issue, a prototype of an exploratory 
environment ( switchERI) was designed and implemented. 
Prior knowledge 
In order to assess subjects' prior knowledge of ER types and its effects upon ER selec-
tion, an ER classification task similar to that of Lohse, Walker, Biolsi & Rueter (1991) 
and Lohse, Biolsi, vValker & Rueter (1994) was devised. However, the classification 
task used in the current study employed a. broad range of ERs, including natural and 
logical language fragments, ordered texts, tabular forms, set diagrams and other tasks 
that were not included in the Lohse et al. corpora. 
Another reason for devising the ER classification task was to permit cluster analyses 
on the data from all subjects. This technique, used by Lohse et al. (1991; 1994), 
.ViPlds a taxonomy of ERs based on the combined subjective categories assigned to 
t.he corpus of ER stimuli. Unlike the Lohse et al., (1991; 1994) studies, however, 
the taxonomy used included ERs associated with reasoning tasks rather than solei}· 
with data visualisation. The ER classification task was administered as a pre-test. 
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Subsequently, the subjects used the switchERI system to solve analytical reasoning 
problems. Subjects' interactions with switchERI were dynamically recorded. This 
permitted subjects' perceptions and conceptualisations of ER forms to be related to 
both their subsequent behaviour during the processes of ER selection, construction and 
use as \veil as to the usual performance measures of accuracy and speed of solution on 
the analytical reasoning tasks. It was hypothesised that when solving the analytical 
reasoning problems, subjects would effectively utilise only the types of ER that they 
had a.) perceptually discriminated and b.) precisely labelled on the taxonomy pre-
task. A further hypothesis was that subjects whose taxonomies demonstrate richness 
and 'deep' structure 1 would demonstrate greater ER selection accuracy and score 
higher in terms of correct responses to questions than 'surface' sorters. 
Finally, another aim of the switchERI study was to acquire information 111 order to 
inform the design of a. second system switchERII capable of providing intelligent user 
support. 
Method and Procedure 
Subjects 
Two groups of subjects solved the three problems using the switchERI system. One 
group consisted of subjects with strong formal backgrounds in numerate disciplines 
such as computer science and mathematics (subjects S1 to SS). The second group 
(subjects S9 to S16) consisted of visual communication (art) students. There were 5 
fpmale and 3 male subjects in group 1 and 4 female and 4 male subjects in group 2. 
The subjects' ages ranged from 20 to 29 years. All the subjects used in the study were 
familiar with the Apple ~1a.cintosh graphical user interface. 
Taxono1ny task 
Subjects' prior knowledge about a. wide range of ERs was assessed by means of a ER-
taxonomy (card sort) task administered before they attempted the reasoning problems. 
1 That is, not based just on perceived similarity of surface characteristics of ERs but displaying an 
appreciation of dimensions such as causality, set membership, and hierarchy, for example. 
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The taxonomy pre-test was developed using 87 items taken from wide variety of sources 
such as texts on graphics, physics textbooks, fragments of computer programs, formu-
lae, instructions, charts, plans, schematic sketches, maps, tables, music, childrens' 
drawings, circle diagrams, illustrations, cartoons, X-Y graphs, logic, directed graphs, 
maps, tables, tree diagrams, bar charts and circuit diagrams. Each representation was 
photocopied and mounted on 8 X .5" white index cards which were numbered on the 
reverse. Twenty one of the items consisted of hand-produced examples of diagrams, 
graphs and tables taken from paper and pencil tests of analytical reasoning in the 
course of.an earlier, unpublished study that utilised different subjects from those in 
this investigation. The other items were professionally produced graphical or type-set 
items. The 87 stimulus items are shown in Figures A.22 & A.23 in Appendix A. 
Subjects were given 87 numbered cards together with a pen and a pad of 'post-it' 
notes. Each card showed an example of one type of representation. 
The following instructions were read: 
''Here is a stack of representations that are used in a variety of problem solving tasks. 
I would like you to sort them into heaps. You may decide what kind and how many 
categories to use. I would like you to label your categories when you have finished." 
Subjects completed the task in their own time. Each card was numbered and the 
subjects category names and the numbers of the cards placed in each category were 
noted. The card stack was shuffled thoroughly between subjects. 
switchERI 
The :::;witchERI system consists of a ~vla.cintosh Hypercard program that provided a 
range of simple corn pu ter- based support tools for the selection and construction of 
representations. The subject was able to select environments that supported the con-
struction of diagrams, logical representations, textual representations or tabular rep-
resentations. The system logged and time-stamped all subject/system interactions. 
The system was designed to be both easy to use and to provide a sufficient number of 
ER tools with which the user may construct a wide range of representations. The user 
was permitted to change ERs during the course of reasoning (ER switching). 
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Subjects were given a practice question (Figure 6.1) which the experimenter used to 
illustrate the system's features. They then solved the practice problem, taking as much 
time as they wished. When they were ready, the subjects then attempted the three 
experimental problems. No time limit was imposed. 
Figure 6.2 shows a switchERI screen display as subject 1 used the sw£tchERI diagram 
tool to construct a set diagram ER in the course of solving problem 2. Figures 6.3, 
6.4 and 6 . .5 show the other switchERI ER construction environments in use. 
Subjects' interactions with the system were dynamically recorded using Farallon Inc.'s 
'ScreenRecorder' utility 2 for later protocol analysis. The screen recordings were re-
played to the subjects at the end of the session and they were encouraged to verbally 
describe their actions and decisions at each stage of reasoning on the three problems. 
Also, the subjects were either videotaped or audiotaped during problem solving and 
the replay of the screen recordings. 
Using this methodological approach, it was possible to chart the time-course of the 
stages of problem comprehension, ER selection, ER construction and ER use (read-
off). A range of significant ER events and issues were identified following systematic 
analyses of the replayed recordings. 
Results 
Taxonomy task 
The taxonomy pre-test data was subjected to two distinctly separate analyses. First, 
a cluster analysis was performed in order to compare a taxonomy of representations 
derived from this study with those of previous researchers. This can be considered to be 
a. task validation exercise and is reported in the next section. Secondly, the taxonomy 
pre-test data were used as means of determining whether each subject understood (i.e. 
precisely identified) a particular representational formalism in order to related prior 
knowledge to subsequent analytical reasoning performance. The second analysis is 
reported later in the chapter in a section on the relationship between prior knowledge 
2 Part of Farallon Inc.'s 'MediaTracks' package. 
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Figure 6.1: Practice problem used in the switchERI study 
and reasoning performance. 
Cluster analysis The number of categories that subjects used in their sorts varied 
from five to twenty. The mean number was 11.9 (median 11) with a standard deviation 
of 4.6 categories. 
Each subject's card sort was represented in an 87 by 87 matrix (there were 87 stimulus 
items in the corpus). Each cell of the matrix coded the relationship between one 
distinct pair of items. Considering any two items, the subject either placed them in 
the same pile or not. For example, if the subject sorted card 3 and card 46 into the 
same pile, then a one was coded at the cell corresponding to the intersection of row 3 
with column 46. Thus if items eo-occurred within a pile then a one was coded in the 
cell, else a zero. A matrix of ones and zeros was constructed for each subject. There 
were 3741 possible pairwise similarity comparisons among the 87 items. The sixteen 
individual subject matrices were added to form a group matrix in which the value of 
any one cell ranged from 0 to 16 (there were 16 subjects). The value of any one cell 
represented the number of subjects who put those two particular items in the same 
group. 
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Figure 6.2: Subject 1 uses the switch ER! diagram environment to construct a set 
diagram on problem 2. 
The group matrix formed the input to SPSS 3 PROXIMITIES procedure. Since the 
data was of an interval scale of measurement, a Euclidean distance measure was em-
ployccl (Lorr, 1983). The PROXI11ITIES procedure output a similarity matrix. The 
similarity matrix formed the input to the SPSS CLUSTER procedure which was used 
to eo m pu te a m ul tilevel, agglomerative, hierarchical cluster analysis (e.g. Aldender-
fcr & I3lashfield, 1984; Johnson, 1967). Hierarchical cluster analysis organises a set 
of entities into homogeneous units (Lohse et al., 1991; 1994). The item clusters are 
arranged hierarchically with individual items at the leaves and single cluster at the 
root. The branching factor determines the model's "bushiness" and is dependent upon 
the cluster method used. Single linkage methods cluster according to the rule that 
3 Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences 
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Figure 6.3: Subject 6 uses the switchERI logic symbol palette to represent the infor-
mation in problem 2. 
cases will be joined to existing clusters if at least one of the members of the existing 
cluster is of the same level of similarity as the case under consideration for inclusion. 
In the case of complete linkage, a candidate under consideration for inclusion must be 
within a. certain level of similarity to all members of that cluster (Aldenderfer & Blash-
fielcl, 1984). Lohse et al. (1991;1994) used complete linkage in their cluster analysis. 
Complete linkage techniques can produce high degrees of bra.nchiness and small, tight 
clusters. Average linkage techniques were developed for use in hierarchical agglomera-
tive cluster analysis in order avoid the extreme outcomes of either single or complete 
linkage methods (Lorr, 1983). Average linkage was therefore used in the analysis. 
CHAPTEH 6. SWITCHERI -AN ILE FOR ANALYTICAL HEASONING. 120 
r ; File Edit Go Tools Objects Font Style 
;o RepSupportProb3S4 
la tb ynh x ..... u~oo ....... 
I.AaAlrcblo,a \our, a coW. n.l.a r>o\r,..awiathorto. 1-,..V:colatl.c Jloow. TMirowun.,. Hr.Uwv-IJ,Hr. lottcr,Hr. 
c;..o, .... •""' ~·. x ... loy, ~t wrunrily la tllat orlrr. Tl.clr ..,,, ...... , .,. Ju~. Kolly,l.ahM Hu, aot wuJJarily la ti\Ot orlrr. 
2. Hr ~roJJaa .. • 4oc vial W>IMr lint aor Jtcow ,..V:r. 
~. n. toW. wiu lint ,.Ut. 
4.Huw~at ... o""',..V:•. Hide questions 
s. n. Alrcbl< iJ J .. k. 
6. Hr. lo•tto'• 4oc,tl.c l>o'knua,wlal lowti.,..V:t. 
7. H1. Xralloy'• 4oc u Kolly. 
--- -~- ---· ·------. ------- ·- -------·-----·---- ··----------
~o.Jlit..~J ...... UQ.I..im~~~--HQ.VQ.~~.I.'.L®.I_nmJj~]L _________ ====== 
.~-~ .. ~--~QI . .K!:9~}_:~ __ .l!.Q..T.J.9..~ .. !(~_JiQ.TllJID9!l.Y.'..LJ~-~-~-·-----------· 
»>YJs .. ~-~~-~-QI~ .. H.? .. JiQI.~nm~.Y.'..~J:!QT.Jo.~ . l~(LI:IQ.T~~-~...Qm~..".; ______ _ 
:~~~:.;~~~i!9i;i=~======~~==========--=== 
·------------ I. lint ,.Ut 11 wo .. \y ... Ufru.nrl'J 4oc UH•I•atl<ys 4oc UH•r UJack U !.M 
·--·--·--·-·---------·----- 2.11r~ro .. aau4oc0uthoreo11W Outl.c\our @.ttl.c/Uroblo [}iat2""',..V:• 
·-.. ---·---.. ·--·--·--·---- 0 iJ Kolly ~" 
·-------------.. ----·---- ~. Wl.ic!.Jtllt .... corrrctlylilt• tl.c 4oc• i&MJ~orlcrol tl.cir,..V:u! 
·---·--------··--------- I.Kolly;tl.cAlrc&al<;11r.U.VU4oc ~loo.ly Onoo.ly 
·------------ n.n.\our;Hr.<;ro, ......... ,;Jack moo.ly D•""'Moo.ly 
·----------- m. Hr. :Uwwl'• 4oc;thorAinblc; l.al lla""'moo.ly 
·----------- 4.1.al ..... B·!Jowwl\yHr.loJtcr Ou...,...l\yHr.E-..... Outl.c\our 
·-·-·--.. ------------ .. tl.c coW. on... IJ.H,..V:• 
·-------------------- S. Oatl.c \uil ol Jtatt~Uals 1,3,4,5 aw6 oo.ly, wt.XI.olthor lol.loW'i&c aayk &.ucel~ 
1.11ar iJ thor\oxcr 11. n.l>oH....aiJ KollyorLIK m.Jackwlal tl.lrl,..V:t 
:---·--·------·-~·----.:c laMIIoo.ly o~a""'moo.ly on • ..amoo.ly Ol,ll•""'m 0Ntkl.crl,llaorm 
Figure 6.4: Subject 4 uses the switchERI text environment in her solution to problem 3. 
Eighteen principle clusters emerged from the average linkage solution. They are repre-
sPnted in dendrogram or two-dimensional tree-diagram in Figure 6.6. The highest level 
distinction was between maps and non-maps. The large non-map category consisted 
of 15 sub-divisions: 
• set diagrams, circle diagrams 
• list; ordered text; tables 
• xjy graphs 
• tree diagram 
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Figure 6.5: Subject uses the switchERI table environment in his solution to problem 3. 
• node and arc diagrams (concept maps) 
• plans 
• logic/mathematical formulae 
• text (includes computer program listings) 
• music 
• depictive illustrations (pictures) 
• abstract geometric forms 
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• puzzles 
• scientific illustrations 
• chessboards, objects on matrices 
• instructional sequences, cartoon strips 
In the case of set diagrams, tables and logical/mathematical formulae, subjects dis-
tinguished between hand-produced and printed items ('h' or 'p' in Figure 6.6). The 
numbers at the 'leaves' of the Figure 6.6 dendrogram correspond to the items in Ap-
pendix A. 
The results were compared to those of previous researchers who have attempted to 
classify representations (reviewed in Chapter 1). Maps, network diagrams, music, tree 
diagrams, tables, lists and pictorial sequences were categories that Twyman (1979) 
also identified in his schema of graphical language. Lohse, Biolsi, Walker & Reuter 
( 1994) developed a classification of visual representations based on cluster analyses of 
subjects' subjective ratings of graphics along 10 dimensions. They identified eleven 
basic categories of graphics: graphs, tables, graphical tables, time charts, networks, 
structure diagrams, process diagrams, maps, cartograms, icons and pictures. The 
results of the present study were comparable to those of Lohse et al., allowing for 
differences in the corpora of stimuli -for example, Lohse et al. included icons in their 
corpus whereas they were not included in the corpus used in the current study. The 
task can therefore be considered to be a reasonable one for assessing the extent of 
sn bjects prior knowledge of a broad range of ERs. 
:\s mentioned earlier, the taxonomy data was also used in a second way. The labels 
that subjects applied to their sorted categories were also analysed - they were used 
as a means of assessing prior knowledge. For example, if a subject discriminated 
set diagrams from other circular ERs (e.g. pie charts) and labelled them precisely 
(i.e. using terms such as 'set diagram', 'Euler's circles', 'Venn diagrams', etc.), then 
this provided a reasonable indication of good comprehension of the formalism. The 
relationship between prior knowledge and reasoning performance is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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Figure 6.6: Dendrogram - note that numbers at leaves of tree correspond to item 
numbers of stimuli shown in Appendix 7 
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Table 6.1: Results 
Problem 1 'Office allocation', determinate, recommended ER == map or plan 
Problem 2 'Some/ All Poets', indeterminate, recommended ER== circle/set diagram 
Problem 3 'Dogs, owners & prizes',determinate,recommended ER== table 
Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3 
s Rep. Used #corr. Time Rep. Used #corr. Time Rep. Used #corr. 
/4 /4 
1 table* ( 1x6) 4 631" set diag.* 4 378" table* (3x4) 4 
2 none 3 370" none 4 828" table* (4x4) 5 
3 table* ( 6x5) 4 858" set diag.* 4 1263" ordered text* 5 
4 table ( 1x6) 3 1048" table (4x3) 2 926" ordered text 5 
5 table* ( 1x6) 3 342" table* (3x2) 2 402" table* ( 4x4) 4 
6 table* ( 1x6) 3 572" restrict .logic* 3 586" table* ( 4x3) 5 
7 table* ( 6x4) 2 1438" set diag. 2 747" table* ( 4x4) 4 
8 table (6x1) 4 877" list* 4 976" ord. text* 4 
9 table* (6x3) 4 598" set diag. * 3 709" table* ( 4x3) 4 
10 table* (6x1) 4 561" text* 3 884" table* (4x4) 0 
11 plan diag. 4 721" pseudo set diag. 2 1096" table (6x4) 5 
12 table (6x1) 0 1203" none 0 953" table (4x4) 2 
13 plan* 4 1077" tree diag.* 3 986" ord. text 1 
14 table (6x2) 4 1675" pseudo set diag.* 2 2439" 
15 table (6x1) 4 741" list 1 981" table ( 4x4) 4 
16 table* ( 6x1) 3 761" table (6x3) 2 1486" text 2 
NB Numbers in brackets alongside tables indicate number of cells (X by Y). An asterix indicates 
that the subject accurately and precisely identified that ER type on the taxonomy pre-task. 
'Set' diagram refers to a representation of circles or rectangles where spatial inclusion is used 
as an analogy for set membership. Ord.text refers to ordered text. Note that subject 14 did 
not attempt problem 3. 
switchERI study 
Statistical tests revealed that the two subject groups ('formal' and 'art' students) 
differed significantly from each other in terms of total time-to-solve on problem 2. 
"Formal' students' solutions tended to be faster (t == -1.93, df == 14,p < .05). The two 
groups also differed in terms of total score on problem 3. 'Formal' students tended to 
score higher than 'art' students on that problem (11a.nn-Whitney 'U', z == -1.99, p < 
.05- see Table 6.1). No other significant differences between the groups were found 
either in terms of score or times4 • Since the group differences were not extensive, it 
was decided to pool the data. into a single group of sixteen subjects. 
4 Total time spent on solution, time spent on problem comprehension, time to construct the ER, use 
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The swilchERI system logs permitted analyses of the process and time-course of prob-
lem solving. The presentation of the results will therefore be organised on the basis of 
problem solving stages rather than in the problem by problem format used in reporting 
the 'workscratching' results of the first experiment. 
Problem Reading and Comprehension 
T'he screen recordings were analysed in detail using Mediatracks5. Media tracks is soft-
ware for editing the digital screen recording made with ScreenRecorder. It allows the 
cl uration of screen recording segments to be accurately measured and also permits anno-
tations and notes to be added to the screenrecordings. It also permits screenrecordings 
to be replayed at slower-than-real-time or faster-than-real-time rates. External repre-
sentation 'events' \vere coded, counted and recorded using that software. 
Problem comprehension time was defined as the time from initial presentation of the 
problem to the point at which the subject selected a representation environment by 
clicking on one of the button icons (as shown in Figure 6.1). 
The time-course analysis of the current study revealed that students typically spent 
only 10% of the total time on problem reading and ER selection. Also, subjects often 
read only the problem 'stem' but not the questions. Hence they rush into ER construc-
tion, often demonstrating what Green (1989) has termed 'premature commitment~ to 
an unsuitable ER form or modality. 
A range of obstacles to comprehension were outlined in Chapter 3- problem solvers 
must, at the problem cam prehension stage: 
• negotiate complicated syntactic structures and overcome the uncooperative as-
pects of the problem ~s discourse 
• use the full problem information context (PlC) 
• recognise the number of dimensions (variables) in the problem 
• accurately discern the number of values along each dimension 
5 Fc1.rallon Computing Inc., 2000 Powell St, Emeryville, CA 94608, USA. 
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• understand that some information is implicitly stated 
• utilize negatively-stated information 
• accurately gauge the problem's level of determinacy 
• detect redundancy, symmetry and critical points in the problem (Amarel, 1968) 
• adopt an 'extensionalist stance' or 'puzzle mode' mind-set 
It is surprising that subjects do not spend longer on this phase of problem solving, 
but seemingly rush headlong into an ER selection decision. Of course, subjects could 
re-read the problem information following ER selection and through ER construction 
and question answering, but it is, nevertheless, interesting that they do not reflect for 
longer at this point. 
Even highly proficient subjects make comprehension errors. Wollman (1983) has shown 
that even mathematical physicists may initially make a reversal error in their algebraic 
representation of 'students and professors' problems. However, in those subjects, self-
monitoring and checking result in the initial incorrect equation being corrected. For 
more typical subjects, Wollman (1983) has shown that even brief training in monitor-
ing, comparing and checking (he calls this an 'active operation' approach) produces 
dramatic improvements in performance. It would be relatively straightforward to ar-
range for an intelligent learning environment to support 'active operations' on the part 
of the student and this is an interesting topic for future research. 
ER selection 
During the ER selection phase, subjects are confronted with the task of deciding which 
subset of the information given in the problem stem actually contributes to the con-
clusions that they wish to draw. Only some of the given information may need to be 
represented in the ER in order for the questions associated with the problem to be 
answered. 
There are 2 major selection issues: dimensionality and abstraction. 
Errors of dimensionality are those in which subjects choose ERs that are unsuited for 
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the task. Good ER selection requires comprehension of the deep structure of a problem 
and knowledge of the range of ERs available in both the sentential modality (logical 
and natural languages) and in the graphical modality (set diagrams, semantic networks, 
conceptual graphs, directed graphs, tables, plans, maps etc) as well as comprehending 
the nature of the relationship between the problem's entities - i.e. one of group 
membership or causal, temporal, hierarchical, spatial etc. 
For example, expressing quantifier information such as 'Some of those who enjoy the 
poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot' in a graphical ER is often difficult 
because of the specificity of the graphical modality (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
Subjects have to be familiar with relatively domain-specific ER forms such as Euler's 
circles or Venn diagrams and must have suitable strategies for their use in order to do 
this successfully. Even then, they often readily build one model of the information but 
rarely build alternative, but equally valid, models. Set diagrams and logic are both 
capable of expressing quantifier relations but require specialised knowledge for their 
effective use. Easier-to-use and more ubiquitous ERs such as tabular representations 
are much less useful. :Niany subjects seem to suspect that set diagrams, for example, 
are a useful formalism but do not fully understand the metaphor or conventions of the 
representation. This is not surprising in the case of set diagrams, since the strategies 
needed are rather complicated. The switchERI data shows that the use of idiosyncratic 
annotations such as lines connecting circles of set diagrams, boundaries of overlapping 
circles erased and other idiosyncratic annotations (Figure A.18, Appendix A, Subject 
S11) is associated with lower efficiency in terms of score per unit time (Table 6.1, 
Problem 2, subjects 11 and 14). 
The 'pseudo set-diagram' representation for problem 2 recommended by the "cram-
mer' from which it was taken (Brownstein et al., 1990) is shown in Figure A.21 in 
Appendix A. 
The cram mer tried to invent a dotted-circle notation as augmentation for set diagrams 
to allow the requisite abstractions to be expressed. As Cox, Stenning & Oberlander 
( 1995) have observed, this augmentation is semantically incoherent. However, set dia-
grams are far from useless for problem 2. Subjects who demonstrated on the taxonomy 
pre-test that they understood set-diagram semantics scored well using them (Subjects 
CHAPTER 6. SV//TCHERI- AN /LE FOR ANALYTICAL REASONING. 128 
Sl, S3 and S9, Table 6.1. Set diagrams can be used to identify pairs of premises (from 
the total of 8 premises) which form the syllogisms that, when solved, provide the an-
swers. Indeed, these syllogisms can themselves be solved using set-diagrams with some 
abstraction tricks. What set diagrams cannot do is to provide a representation of all 
eight premises, even using dotted circles, which is what the crammer recommends. 
ER Construction 
Several issues were observed at the ER construction stage. On problem 1, all of the 
subjects (except S2 who didn't build an ER) began by representing the 'anchor' premise 
that explicitly gives the location of 'Ms Green' in the 'office 5', the 'room with the large 
window'. This is a sensible strategy because the search space is pruned by early use of 
that heuristic. Early use of de1 ~rminate information speeds the recognition of crucial 
problem characteristics such as whether a single unique model ran be built for the 
information. If not, then a change or switch of representation might be called for. 
As in the first (workscratching) study, discourse ordering of ER construction was as-
sociated with lower scores than target ordering and was a contributory factor towards 
poor performance. 
The user/system interaction logs revealed that switching occurred quite commonly 
during the ER construction phase of problem solving. Two of the sixteen subjects 
(S7,S14) switched on problem 1, three subjects (S14,S15,S16) switched on problem 2 
and five subjects (S2,S3,S4,S12,S16) switched on problem 3. Switching represents a. 
strategic decision by the subject to abandon the current ER and construct a new one. 
Switching is more costly in terms of time than of score. On problem 1 switching 
subjects took an average of 1.556" to solve the problem whereas non-switchers took a 
mean time of only 7 40". In terms of answer correctness, switchers scored an average of 
:3(1 answers correct whereas non-switchers scored 3.4/4 correct. For problem 2 these 
figures were 163.5" (switchers) and 826" ( non-switchers) and 1.7/4 correct (switchers) 
versus 2.7/4 (non-switchers). On problem 3 switchers took a.n average of 1391" and 
scored a. mean of 3.8/.S whereas non-switchers took 831" and scored 3.9/.5. 
The frequency with which subjects switched increased as a function of problem diffi-
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culty. Problems 1 to 3 increase in difficulty from a fully determinate, one dimensional 
array (problem 1), the need to reason with several quantifiers (problem 2) and multi-
climensionality (4 dimensions) plus implicit information (problem 3). Schwartz (1971), 
Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972) and Polich & Schwartz (1974) have shown that more di-
mensions and the presence of implicit information increases the difficulty of this type of 
problem. There is therefore a suggestion that subjects switch as part of their strategy 
for resolving impasses in reasoning. In this view, ER switching indicates an adaptive 
response since switchers show an awareness of poor initial ER selection and attempt 
to remediate the situation via rebuilding either the same ER or a different one. Some 
evidence in support of this contention is provided by the fact that the majority (six) 
of the ten switching subjects did not accurately identify the representation that they 
switched from on the taxonomy pre-task. The re-representation of previous informa-
tion is time-consuming - for each of the 3 problems the problem solving times for 
switchers are approximately twice those of non-switchers which indicates that the re-
representation of information in the new ER is as time consuming 'second time around' 
as it was in the first ER. On problem 3, the only problem where the numbers of switch-
ers (5) and non-switchers (10) were large enough to permit a statistical comparison, 
the time difference was significant (t = 3.06, df = 13, p < .01). 
Like the workscratching data, the switchERI results provide support for those of 
Schwartz ( 1971) who found that tabular (matrix) representations were the most suc-
cessful for determinate problems such as problems 1 and 3 in this study (which we 
characterise as 'determinate'). On problems 1 and 3, all of the switching subjects 
(except S16) switched, to tabular (or closely related 'ordered-text'/proto-tabular) ERs 
from some other kind of representation. This suggests a self-mediated improvement in 
ER selection strategy on the part of switching subjects, at least on the two determinate 
problems. 
This finding is consistent with results reported by Schwartz & Fattaleh (1972). Those 
authors manipulated the modality in which the deductive reasoning problems were 
presented. A third of the subjects were presented with the problems in matrix format, 
a. third received them in sentence format and a third received the problems in the 
form of a network diagram. No effect for the mode of presentation was found. When 
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constructing ERs in their solutions, almost half of the subjects actually switched from 
the modality that the problem was presented in. The presentation modality most fre-
quently changed-from was the network diagram (74% of subjects switched). The least 
commonly changed-from presentation modality was the matrix format (17%) with sen-
tence format in between (57%). The most commonly switched-to ER was the matrix. 
Of the subjects presented with sentence problems, 59% of the switchers chose the ma-
trix representation. For network formatted problems, 68% of subjects switched to a 
matrix representation in their solutions. Schwartz & Fattaleh conclude that subjects 
recognise the appropriateness of the matrix representation for these problems by not 
switching from it when problems are presented in that form and by often switching to 
it when the problems are not presented in matrix form. 
On the indeterminate problem (problem 2), switching did not seem to be as effective in 
resolving reasoning impasses. The switched-to ERs for subjects S14, S15 and S16, were 
a. pseudo set-diagram, list structure and a tabular representation, respectively. None 
of those ERs were capable of representing the level of abstraction necessary to solve 
the problem. Although S15 used a kind of set diagram, he seemed to have only a hazy 
notion of how set diagrams represent conjunctive and disjunctive information - his 
'set diagram' used lines to interconnect circle segments and thereby represent relations 
such as 'likes' and 'dislikes' in a manner that betrayed a poor understanding of the 
usual spatial-inclusion-by-overlapping-circles metaphor (Figure A.18, Appendix A). 
Subjects S2 and S12 both switched ERs on problem 3- S2 attempted problems 1 and 2 
without using an ER and S12 did not use an ER on problem 2. Hence subjects who are 
somewhat ambivalent about using ERs may be more prone to switch and prevaricate 
over which type of ER to use. The computer trace revealed that S2 actually did 
use a subtle kind of ER on problem 2 - he used the multiple choice 'check' boxes 
as an elimination array - placing crosses in all of them and then unchecking them 
systematically as he mentally eliminated response options. This strategy was also 
occasionally used as a supplement to the constructed ER - some subjects check off 
boxes as they reject response options, other subjects first check all the response boxes 
a.nd uncheck them as they eliminate response options. The check-box technique does 
not represent the domain information in the same way as, for example, a table or set 
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diagram. Rather, it can be seen as a minimal aide rnemoire on progress through the 
problem. 
Read-off from the ER and question answering stages 
Some subjects attempted to begin answering questions while still engaged in ER con-
struction- in the switchERI data, 'mixing' was observed in two subjects on problem 1, 
in four subjects on problem 2 and in three subjects on problem 3. In seven of those 
nine cases, subjects constructed target ordered ERs. While reading the questions and 
constructing target-ordered ERs is a good strategy, the cognitive load of answering 
questions in addition to constructing an ER is very high and performance may be 
compromised. 
The relationship between prior knowledge and reasoning performance 
An important source of between subject variation is prior knowledge. The switchERI 
study highlights the importance of this factor particularly when indeterminate infor-
mation has to be represented. Figure A.18 in Appendix A shows that when the subject 
(subject 11, problem 2, see Table 6.1) does not fully understand the representational 
formalism, unconventional annotations- various types of arrow - are invented 'on-
the-fly'. ERs marked with an asterix in Table 6.1 indicate that the subject used an 
ER formalism that they identified accurately in the taxonomy task in terms of pre-
cisely categorising and labelling the representational formalism. The absence of an 
asterix indicates that they did not show evidence of comprehending the formalism on 
the taxonomy task. 
Lack of prior knowledge of ER formalisms tended to result in poorer scores6 . The 
<'ffect is particularly pronounced for the indeterminate problem for which the range of 
useful, abstraction-expressing ERs is more restricted than for determinate problems. 
The mean scores on problem 2 (excluding the 2 subjects who used no ER) were 3.11 
for ER users with prior knowledge and 1.8 for ER users who lacked prior knowledge. 
c This finding is commensurate with that of Schwartz ( 1993) who found that students \Vho had prior 
experience of directed graphs (in the context of learning about food webs) were able to use them 
effectively on new problems. 
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This difference is statistically significant (t = 3.41, df = 13, p < .005). There was no 
significant difference in terms of time to solve the problem, however. As in Experi-
ment 1, the highest scores on the indeterminate problem tend to be associated with 
abstraction-expressive ERs such as those based on natural language, formal languages 
(logic) or graphical ERs that can represent set conjunctions and disjunctions (set di-
agrams). This result therefore provides some empirical support for specificity theory 
(Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
~~Iany of the less ubiquitous ER forms require specialised knowledge for effective use. 
They include the types of ER that are useful for solving indeterminate problems (i.e. 
set diagrams, logic). Most subjects are capable of using tabular representations or 
plans effectively on less complex problems such as problem 1. With more complex, 
multi-dimensional problems (such as problem 3), however, not all tabular representa-
tions were equally effective. The skill of matching ER formalisms to the semantics of 
a problem is not often the subject of direct instruction and a subject's repertoire may 
have been acquired in a relatively ad hoc fashion. For example, students may encounter 
semantic network diagrams only if they happen to study food webs in a biology course. 
Perhaps a domain-independent 'graphics curriculum' should be devised and generally 
taught? Subjects who habitually reason either internally or externally in the senten-
tial modality may be amenable to training in the use of graphical representations. The 
results of the intervention study by Frandsen & Holder (1969) (reviewed in section 2) 
suggest that even one hour of instruction in diagramming techniques produces signifi-
cant score gains in subjects classified as low in spatial visualization 7 and it may be the 
case that diagrammatic modellers respond to efforts to broaden their ER repertoire by 
the addition of sentential representations, though this remains to be demonstrated. On 
the other hand, individual differences in cognitive modality preferences may militate 
against prescriptive advice and the development of a general 'ER curriculum' as the 
basis for instructional interventions. This issue warrants further investigation. 
7 It. should be noted, though, that subjects who score poorly on psychometric tests of spatial visualiza-
tion may not necessarily use the linguistic modality either internally or externally when reasoning. 
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Task Variables 
The analytical reasoning tasks posed by the constraint satisfaction puzzles vary be-
tween problems and within problems. The three problems differ in terms of level of 
determinacy and degree of complexity. Some, such as problem 2 in the current study, 
are concerned with categorical reasoning and require an ability to represent and rea-
son with several quantifiers. The variety of ERs used on the indeterminate problem 
was greater than the range used on the determinate problems. This may suggest that 
subjects were uncertain about which type of ER to select. The results indicated that 
logic and set diagrams were slightly more effective, across the range of questions, than 
directed graphs, tabular representations or text. This finding is commensurate with 
specificity theory. Subjects sometimes choose ERs that cannot easily express cru-
cial aspects of the problem, as shown by several subjects' attempts to use a tabular 
representation for problem 2. Subjects also select ERs that repref.~nt the information 
adequately but which are computationally intractable. This is exemplified by attempts 
to use contingency tables on problem 3. Other kinds of problems are determinate, con-
straint satisfaction puzzles such as the office allocation problem (problem 1) and the 
more complex dog-show prizes problem (problem 3). Further common types of ana-
lytical reasoning item include family relationship (genealogical) problems that require 
hierarchical representations such as tree diagrams and verbal reasoning problems that 
require the analysis of arguments. Analytical reasoning problems thus vary in terms 
of their semantics, complexity, determina.cy and in the extent to which particular Ells 
are useful in finding solutions. Skilled reasoners therefore require a. large repertoire of 
representations, an ability to discern the 'deep' features of a. particular problem and 
the skill to choose a.n appropriately expressive ER. 
\Vithin each problem the set of questions are heterogeneous with respect to their task 
demands- some require straightforward read-off from ERs, some don't require the use 
of an ER and some require the re-construction of an ER. The computational efficiency 
of an ER varies with the task requirement (e.g. La.rkin & Simon, 1987; Vessey, 1991; 
Day, 1988; Green, Petre & Bella.my, 1991). For example, the data. in a. sprea.dsheet 
contains precise values but is difficult to search. A bar chart generated from the 
spreadsheet is much more useful for comparing sets of data. because our perceptual 
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subsystems make visual comparison seem effortless. One representation is suited to 
one task requirement (read-off of precise values) whereas another is suited to a different 
task (comparison). There is evidence in the workscratching data that some subjects 
used two ERs in their solutions (heterogeneous representations), possibly capitalising 
on the expressive strengths of each. In the analytical reasoning domain, a system that 
assists in providing alternative representations should facilitate problem solving by 
allowing the user to select the most appropriate ER for a particular task on a question 
by question basis. 
Questions also differ in terms of their 'ER dependency' - data from problem 1, for 
example, indicate that common ER errors have a greater effect on some questions than 
others. Incorrect ERs, therefore, are not necessarily useless and we present suggestive 
evidence that subjects in some circumstances may be better off using their incorrect 
ER than guessing, if switching ERs or ER reconstruction is not an option. Ideally, 
subjects need to be able to switch from one ER to another as their attention turns 
from question to question within the problem. Switching is also to be encouraged as 
an adaptive response to impasses in reasoning. 
Sum1nary and Conclusions - switchERI study 
The findings of the switchERI study can be summarised as: 
• Subjects seem, often, to allocate too few resources to problem comprehension 
• ER switching is relatively common during ER construction 
• Switching is positively related to problem difficulty 
• Switching extends solution time 
• Switching occurs at an impasse 
• Tabular (matrix) representations are best for determinate problems 
• Target oriented ER construction is superior to discourse-ordered construction 
• Idiosyncratic representations are associated with poor performance 
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• Prior knowledge can be assessed using a taxonomy task 
• Students do better if they fully comprehend the semantics of the ER formalism 
that they attempt to use in their solutions 
ln1plications for the Design of an Interactive Learning Environment 
(ILE) 
The empirical results from both the 'workscratching' corpus data and the switchERI 
study strongly suggest that flexible environments are needed for supporting analytical 
reas?ning with ERs. The switchERI and 'workscratchings' data suggest a range of 
ways in which support could be given to someone reasoning with ERs. However, 
subject and task variables interact in subtle ways to make prescriptive interventions 
impossible. Moreover, the type of support needed varies with the stage of reasoning. 
Using ERs is a multi-staged process that involves problem comprehension, an ER selec-
tion decision, ER construction and then problem solving via reading-off solutions from 
the ER. The distribution of cognitive effort over the stages is far from even. Compared 
to the stages of ER selection and using the ER, the stage of ER construction requires 
high levels of cognitive effort. There is a trade off between cognitive load expended 
upon ER construction and ease of subsequent use of the ER for reading-off problem 
solutions. Therefore support at the construction stage is particularly valuable. This 
phase of reasoning could be supported in an ILE via two mechanisms: ER switching 
and ER eo-construction. 
A range of ER 'issues' that an intelligent computer-based support environment might 
detect and use in coaching interventions were identified, though the focus here is not 
upon the criteria under which interventions should occur. Other studies (e.g. Burton 
& Brown, 1982; Breuker, 1988) have elucidated principles and criteria for intervention. 
Rather, the data yield a range of suggestions for the kinds of knowledge that a coaching 
system might draw upon. Some of the findings were incorporated into the switchERII 
system to be described in Chapter 7. The second version of the system was capable of 
delivering limited user-support. 
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Support at the Problem Comprehension Stage 
One method for facilitating greater attention and diligence at the comprehension stage 
is to provide a 'problem summary' window into which the subject has to post informa-
tion such as the number and labels of problem dimensions (e.g. 'dog names', 'breeds', 
'owner names', 'prizes') and values along those dimensions (e.g. 'Lad', 'Iabrador', 
'Smith', '2nd'). This would serve to inform the system about the user's comprehen-
sion, encourage the user to spend more time on problem comprehension and also, 
arguably, facilitate self-explanation on the part of the user if comprehension is incom-
plete. For the learner, abstracting elements of the problem into the summary window 
might function to increase the extent to which s/he reflects upon the problem resulting 
in improved comprehension and preventing premature commitment to inappropriate 
ERs. 
A facility to support the re-ordering of problem premises may also aid comprehension 
by permitting related information to be juxtaposed. As an example, in the second 
problem, premise re-organisation would make transitivities much more salient. For 
example premise 4 "All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry 
of Don ne'' could be placed immediately adjacent to premise 7 "All those who enjoy the 
poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Frost" to make more salient the transitive 
conclusion that 'All Coleridge lovers enjoy Frost'. 
Support at the Representation Selection Stage 
A major finding was that subjects need to look ahead at task demands of the problem's 
questions before and during ER construction a.nd not simply represent the information 
in the problem stem. In other words, ER planning is required. 
Vessey (1991) coined the term 'cognitive fit' to describe congruence between the prob-
lem solving task, the external representation and the mental representation. However, 
cognitive fit is difficult to achieve- it requires, inter alia, that the subject accurately 
discerns the semantics of the problem, that the subject has acquired the appropriate 
ER formalism and that the modality of the ER is commensurate with the subject's 
cognitive modality preference. Vessey (1991), however, does not include individual 
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differences in mental representation in her model. For a subject with a marked men-
tal representation modality preference, there may be a good semantic fit between the 
external and mental representations of the problem but poor fit between the mental 
representation and the subject's preferred mode of internal representation. 
Subjects permitted to choose their own ERs often select poorly in that the ERs they 
choose cannot easily express important aspects of the problem. This can be due either 
to the semantic properties of the ER (e.g. graphical specificities), to lack of prior 
knowledge, or due to ER selection errors of 'dimensionality'. As mentioned earlier, 
common dimensions are set membership, causality, hierarchy, temporal relations and 
spatial relations. It would be very difficult to develop an algorithm that could determine 
the ER best suited to a particular problem, task and individual, since individuals differ 
in terms of their prior experience and cognitive modality preferences. 
Subjects should be permitted to make poor ER choices but not he ensnared by them 
indefinitely - a limited amount of 'productive thrashing' (Foss, 1987) can result in 
rich learning outcomes. There is a fine line, however, between intervening immedi-
ately prior to the moment of self-discovery (robbing the learner of the experience) and 
allowing the learner to flounder and become frustrated by repeated failure. The learn-
ing outcomes from self-directed learning are much richer and more valuable in the long 
term than from approaches that foster efficient acquisition, lengthy retention and other 
performance based indices of learning. 
The effective guidance of ER selection hinges upon what constitutes a 'good' repre-
sentation. The results of the studies reported here, and elsewhere (e.g. Cox, Stenning 
8.: 0 bcrlander 1 199.5) 1 suggest that the answer depends heavily on the attributes of 
the problem. For determinate problems, a range of ER forms 'work' in the sense that 
subjects achieve correct answers with them. Ordered texts (proto-tables) and tables 
were associated with respectable scores on the determinate problems. On the indeter-
minate problem, tables clearly were less useful- the highest scores on that item were 
associated with set diagrams, logic or, in one case, no representation. Indeterminate 
information requires ERs that are capable of expressing abstraction- usually through 
the use of special conventions for overcoming the specificities inherent in the case of 
graphical ERs. Non-graphical ERs such as language (natural or formal e.g. logics) are 
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rnore often used to express disjunction and other abstractions (Stenning & Oberlan-
cler, 199.5). A general principle for which there is empirical and theoretical support 
consists of 'Choose a representation with sufficient expressive power to represent the 
indeterminacy in the problem, but which does not have more expressive power than 
required.' (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
Unfortunately, though, there are few such principled sources of instruction available 
to students who wish to improve their skills at matching appropriate ER.s to problem 
characteristics. For example, as described in Chapter 2, students sitting the analyt-
ical reasoning sections of the GRE exam are instructed "In answering some of the 
questions, it may be useful to draw a rough diagram" (Educational Testing Service, 
1992). To date, however, there has been much folk wisdom and speculation but little 
empirical work on the issue of representation selection. To assist with ER selection, 
an intelligent and flexible educational environment could maintain a database of those 
representational forms that have been empirically associated with successful solutions 
to each problem. This domain model can then be used to determine whether there 
might be a need for intervention if an unwise choice is made. An alternative strategy 
would be to adapt the ER selection suggestions of the 'crammer' and GRE practice 
texts and incorporate them into the system, though the basis upon which these are 
chosen seems somewhat arbitrary. Further work is required on this important question. 
This point is explored further in Chapter 8 in relation to a proposed 'ER curriculum'. 
In the current studies the worst scores were associated with ER selection errors of di-
mensionality. Appropriate ER selection can be considered a two-stage process. First, 
an accurate assessment of the relationships (dimensions) between entities must be 
made. Accuracy at this stage depends heavily on question comprehension. The most 
common dimensions for word problems are set membership (ER's = natural lan-
guage, logic, set diagrams); causality (natural language, logic, directed graphs); hi-
erarchy (natural language, tree diagrams); temporal relations (natural language, 
table, 1 or 2 dimensional diagrams, graphs) and spatial representations (natural 
language, ordered texts/tables, plans/maps). 
Secondly, an optimal ER from the range available within a dimension must be selected. 
Failures of the first kind (e.g. when S4 and S5 chose tables to solve problem 2) are costly 
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and more so if the problem contains uncertainty (indeterminacy). Cox, Stenning & 
Oberla.nder (199.5) also examined ER selection errors. They have shown that subjects 
who use a. determinate ER (e.g. a. table) in their solutions to an indeterminate problem 
results in worse performance than the converse i.e. using abstraction-expressive ERs 
on determinate problems. 
Supporting ER Construction 
A facility for highlighting the problem premise being represented during a. particular 
phase of ER construction may help to reduce the user's cognitive load. Mechanisms 
for re-casting negatively phrased statements, and increasing the salience of 'signal' 
words8 might also assist ER construction. The system could ensure that explicitly 
given informa.tion9 is represented early in ER construction and before inferences are 
made on the basis of implicit information. 
Where a. subject is using a. specialised ER such as set diagrams or fragments of first-
order logic, perhaps it is important to establish that s/he understands the semantics of 
the representation, especially where problems involve quantifier reasoning? This may 
be difficult to establish indirectly, so a. straightforward query to the user may the most 
practical way to inform the system. 
If the subject attempts to build a table for problems that involve quantifier reasoning 
(such as problem 2 in the current study), then this should be discouraged and a. switch 
to a. more appropriate ER recommended. The use of contingency tables should always 
be discouraged. The results suggest that target-ordered ER construction is associated 
with efficient problem solving. An intelligent system can detect ER construction se-
quences that reflect the order in which information is presented in the problem (i.e. 
cliscou rse ordering). The detection of discourse ordering could trigger a guiding sugges-
tion to the user that the questions as well as the problem information should be read 
closely before proceeding. One option for facilitating target-ordered ER construction 
would be to require the subject to actively make visible each question via a mouse 
R vVorcls such as 'always', 'some', 'all', 'not necessarily' that indicate constraints or which flag temporal, 
causal or spatial relations between entities. 
~ cg 'Ms Green, the senior employee, is entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window.' 
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click, thus informing the system that the problem questions have been consulted. 
If the subject's ER is incomplete, and the missing information is implicitly given m 
the problem, then the subject should be encouraged to engage in deductive reasoning 
in order to complete the representation. If the un-represented information is explicitly 
given in the problem, draw the user's attention to it overtly by highlighting relevant 
regions of the interface. 
Events such as repeated re-readings of the problem, multiple deletions of elements of 
the ER, long periods of inactivity, erroneous responses to questions should signal to 
the system that the user has reached an impasse. At this point a representation switch 
could be suggested as one of a small number of sensible options. 
~1any of the design ideas that emerged from the switchERI data were incorporated 
into the design of a second system, switchER/1 which will be described in the next 
chapter. 
ER Switching Two kinds of switching were apparent from the sw£tchERI study 
data- task requirement driven versus impasse driven. The former is opportunistic 
and takes place when the subject judiciously switches ER because the task requirement 
changes and the previous ER is now computationally inefficient compared to some alter-
native. The latter, less adaptive, kind of switching might be termed 4impasse-driven '. 
This type of switching occurs as a response to uncertainty about how to proceed 
Cthrashing'). In the case of impasse driven switching10 , a frequent response was for 
subjects to switch ERs. There is much scope for debate about the merits of switching. 
Switching should be encouraged if it is principled and exploits the complementary ex-
pressive strengths of ERs from both modalities (i.e. heterogeneous reasoning as, for 
example, in the case of graphical and sentential reasoning). However, it can be argued 
that encouraging a. subject to switch might lead to unproductive "thrashing'. There 
may be no reason to suspect that the subject's performance will improve through using 
a second ER if they failed to use the original ER effectively. On the other hand, we 
observed that subjects do switch. ~1oreover, from a constructionist standpoint (e.g. 
10 Identified in the switchERI recordings as episodes where the subject failed to progress with ER 
construction, re-read question and erased all or part of the current ER. 
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Foss, 1987) a limited form of thrashing can be productive. Therefore the proposal is 
to encourage ER switching with support to help the student avoid the more damaging 
aspects of thrashing. 
Switching is an adaptive response to the resolution of an impasse in problem solving 
a.nd should be encouraged and supported. 
Supported switching (i.e. switching with ER eo-construction) offers support to the 
subject cl uring the extremely demanding activity of ER construction. It has been 
demonstrated that unsupported switching is time consuming- reconstruction doubles 
the time to respond to the problem questions. 
ER eo-construction The data show that switching was costly in terms of time and it 
\Vould be desirable to reduce the overhead. One method of providing support would be 
to implement ER eo-construction. An intelligent version of the SlvitchERI system that 
was capable of eo-constructing the user's ER in a different modality would eliminate the 
severe time cost of ER switching. For example, if the user was attempting to represent 
(on problem 2) ·All those who like Donne also like Coleridge' by constructing a diagram 
in which a small circle labelled 'Donne' is contained within a larger circle labelled 
'Coleridge', the system could list (in another, unseen, ER construction environment) 
sentences of either na.tura.llangua.ge or first-order logic corresponding to 'Some of those 
who like Donne also like Coleridge' and 'All those who like Donne also like Coleridge'. 
An intelligent learning environment could enable ER construction efforts to be re-cycled 
by intelligently incorporating aspects of the original ER into subsequent ones (with in-
tPlligent error-spotting). \iVhether this is desirable is a. contentious issue. Perhaps 
automated construction would render the subject's role too passive- the construc-
tionist view would favour active construction on the part of the subject. 
On the other hand, however, the cognitive load of constructing even a. single ER is 
very high. Perhaps it would be very reasonable to offer eo-construction as a. selectable 
option for the user? 
Or it could also be argued that making partially constructed ERs available for switching-
to by the subject might cause them to lose track of the relationship between the ele-
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ments in the original ER and lead to confusion about the mappings from one ER to 
the other. It is also possible though that establishing the mappings is itself an ac-
tivity that benefits the subject by encouraging reflection. This issue warrants further 
empirical work and will be the focus of a study utilising a new version of sw£tchERI 
( switchER If). 
Supporting the Use of the ER in Question Answering 
It is desirable and feasible that an ILE perform some checks on the consistency of the 
subject's responses (answers) with read-off from his/her ER. If the answer is incorrect 
arul inconsistent with the subject's ER then a switch of representation could be sug-
gested. If the subject chooses not to switch, then s/he should be warned that the ER 
is incorrect. 
If the subject uses the response check boxes as a secondary, 'elimination array' ER 
then the system should ensure that the subject's ER actually provides a basis for the 
valid rejection of response options. Sometimes subjects use the response boxes in this 
manner by first checking all of them and then unchecking options as they a.re rejected 
or, conversely, by checking each eliminated option until only one blank remains and 
then reversing the check marks. 
\V hen the subject attempts a 'what if' question (e.g. question 4 of problem 1 and 
question 5 of problem 3) s/he should be encouraged to construct a. new ER from 
scratch (reconstruct) rather than attempting to modify the existing ER. 
Another potentially useful support feature would be to provide the subject with the 
opportunity to verify the accuracy of his or her ER by permitting read-off conclusions 
to be validated against the system ~s representation of the problem. This could take 
t. he form of a query to a simple 'expert' system 11 . 
Ideally, the system should be able to check whether the user's answers to the problem 
questions are consistent with his or her ER. The results show that even in the case 
of a. wrong ER, subjects should be encouraged to use it in their answers rather than 
11 Not so expert: the system would be able to solve the problem but not explain how it went about 
choosing its own representation! 
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abandon it completely in favour of guessing. To implement such a capability would 
require accurate parsing of the subject's ER- this is a difficult AI problem but one 
which it is possible to address, at least to a limited extent. 
Conclusion 
It is argued, on the basis of empirical evidence derived from two sources of data that 
l 
an adaptive ILE must be flexible if it is to provide useful support to users. 
The system must be sensitive to user differences. Subjects differ greatly in the size 
and sophistication of their ER repertoires, often as the result of ad hoc educational 
experiences. They also differ in terms of their position along the 'visualiser-verbaliser' 
dimension of cognitive style and therefore in their predilection for graphical or sen-
tential ER formalisms. Hence subjects, when reasoning, must be free to choose their 
preferred representational formalism and must not be constrained to use particular 
ERs that may be incompatible with their prior knowledge and cognitive style. 
ER selection emerges as a crucial phase of reasoning - selecting an appropriate ER 
is often very difficult because the requirements of tasks vary considerably between 
and within problems. The expressive properties of the chosen ER must be capable of 
representing the semantics of the problem. Thus the subject must accurately discern 
problem characteristics such as dimensionality and level of determinacy and then select 
an appropriate representational formalism from his or her ER repertoire. 
A significant proportion of the information in analytical reasoning problems is given 
implicitly and therefore must be inferred before it can be represented. An important 
function of ERs is to guide the search for implicit information. However, the combina-
tion of inference plus ER construction places a heavy cognitive burden on the subject 
which intelligent support can help to alleviate. 
In summary, the results of the sw£tchERI study were used to inform the design of a 
second system s'l.udchER/1. In developing the swdchER/1 system, a major aim was to 
provide a degree of support and feed back to the subject at the stages of ER selection 
a.nd construction. Other objectives were to a.) further investigate the r~lationships 
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between prior knowledge of ERs and reasoning with ER.s and b.) to empirically evaluate 
the effectiveness of the switchERII system. 
Chapter 7 
SwitchERII - an intelligent ILE. 
switchERII development 
In developing the second system ( switchERII), the aims were: 
• to extend switchERI and to design an ILE capable of providing support and 
guidance to subjects in the selection and construction of ERs and to evaluate the 
efficacy of the system's feed back and interventions 
• to use the system to further investigate the relationship between subjects' prior 
knowledge of ER formalisms and their performance in reasoning, with special 
reference to the case of set-diagrams 
• to further investigate the issue of ER switching as a means of resolving reasoning 
impasses 
• to further investigate stages in the process and time-course of reasoning with ERs 
• to incorporate design features derived from the workscratching and switchERI 
studies. Some features were implemented via interface facilities and some via 
knowledge representation in the system (e.g. real-time diagram parsing during 
ER construction 
• to use an interactive learning environment to study ER use in a quasi-naturalistic 
setting (as discussed in Chapter 1) 
145 
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The general approach adopted in study 3 was to focus upon analysing, in detail, ER 
construction errors and switching in subjects' use of a set diagrams. Euler's circles 
were chosen as the graphical formalism since they have a well-defined, computationally 
tractable, underlying semantics. Also, there is a relatively large amount of experimental 
data on how they are interpreted (e.g. Newstead, 1989, 199.5; Stenning & Cox, 199.5) 
and constructed (e.g. Grossen & Carnine, 1990; Ford, 1995). They have also been 
extensively studied theoretically (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
The switchERII system incorporated ER parsing- as the subject constructed his or 
her diagram, the system interpreted the ER. Compared to switchERI, the generality 
of the switchERII system was restricted. The ER environments of switchERI could be 
used to construct any type of ER for any type of analytical reasoning problem since the 
system possessed no knowledge of representational semantics. In switchER/1, however, 
it was decided to represent the semantics underlying Euler's circles in order to be able 
to parse the user's diagram dynamically during construction and offer feedback to the 
user in event of errors in construction. 
For study 3, two problems were selected, both of which are solvable using set diagrams 
of the Etder's Circle (EC) kind. The first problem was a practice problem developed 
by the author (Figure 7.1). The experimental problem used for data. collection was the 
'poets' problem employed in studies one and two. The poets problem is indeterminate 
in that many different, but valid, diagrammatic models can be constructed of the 
information. Data from studies one and two of this thesis, and from Cox, Stenning 
& Oberlander (1995), show that the poets problem is 'brittle' in the sense that it is 
highly sensitive to appropriate ER selection and requires accurate ER construction. 
Assessing prior knowledge of ER formalism 
The adoption of the poets problem also permitted the use of a more focussed and 
domain-specific test of prior knowledge than was the case with the card-sort taxonomy 
task employed in study 2. The task is based on one used by Newstead (1989) and 
subsequently by Stenning & Cox (1995), Stenning, Yule & Cox (1996) and Newstead 
( 1995). In the test, five Euler's circle diagrams were presented to the subject. Each 
diagram consisted of two circles one labeled 'A' and one labeled 'B'. Diagram 1 showed 
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11:31:49 am CD • ., 
Which slalement belov, is TRUE 
given the feels in the facllist? 
0 So..ae IIIOSSeS are ani..aals 
0 So..ae eukwy.tes .,.. aal..aals 
0 All ferns an plaats 
0 No aai111als haft chlorophyll 
181 All~nosses are eukaryotes 
Figure 7.1: Practice problem used in switchERII study 
the identity relation (circle 'A' and circle 'B' superimposed); diagram 2 showed a small 
circle ·A· inside larger circle 'B'; diagram 3 showed a small circle 'B' inside circle 
·A·, diagram 4 showed circles 'A' and 'B' intersecting and diagram 5 showed 2 non-
overlapping, disjoint circles 'A' and 'B' (Figure 7.2). 
l3elow the diagrams, 4 premises were listed in the order ALL As are Bs, NO As are 
Bs, SOME As are Bs, and SO:NIE As are NOT Bs. Adjacent to each premise were the 
numbers 1 to .5. Subjects were instructed : 
"Below this paragraph there are five circle diagrams labeled 1 to 5. 
They represent sets of objects (A's and B's). Below the circle diagrams 






Figure 7.2: Euler's Circle interpretation task due to Newstea.d (1989) 
CHAPTER 7. SWJTCHERII - AN INTELLIGENT !LE. 
there are four statements. Please circle the number(s) of the diagram(s) 
that the sentence is true of. If you think 'All A's are B's' is true of diagram 
3, circle 3 alongside that sentence. You may circle more than one number 
per statement. Please interpret "some" to mean "at least one and possibly 
all". 
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There is a substantial amount of data available on subjects' performance on this task 
and it can be used to detect a variety of interpretational error 'syndromes' such as 
conversion errors, 'Gricean' errors and 'island' responding. These error patterns are 
described in detail below. The diagrams selected by each subject for each statement 
are shown in Table A.l in Appendix A. 
switchERII features 
A major aim with switch.ERII was to construct an intelligent learning environment 
(ILE) rather than a passive system and to inform its design by means of findings from 
the switch.ERI and workscratching studies. 
As with switchERI, the aim was to build a system which presents problem stem in-
formation and associated questions and which provides a range of ER construction 
environments for subject to choose from and switch between. 
SwitchERII was implemented in LPA l\1acProlog 4.5 1. The development was made as 
modular as possible with the sections of Prolog code being divided at top level into a. 
interface, b. ER tools and c. diagram parsing routines. 
Switch ER!! incorporated a facility for subjects to re-order the problem stem sentences 
before (or at any time during) problem solving and/or ER construction. This feature 
was implemented because it was noted in the previous studies that subjects often re-
ordered the problem information in the course of re-writing the problem information 
or while constructing an ER. In a sense, sentence re-ordering can be thought of as a 
kind of ER construction activity. 
SwitchERII provides feed back to the user regarding: 
1 Logic Programming Associates Ltd, Studio 4, RVPB, Trinity Rd, London, S\Nl8 3SX. 
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• his/her progress through the problem 
• the comprehensiveness of his/her representation m terms of the proportion of 
problem information represented 
• the accuracy and validity of his/her diagrammatic model 
ER 'eo-construction' was suggested in the discussion of the switchERI study (see Chap-
ter 6, section on 'Implications for the Design of an Intelligent Learning Environment') 
and was implemented to a limited extent in switchER/1. In switchERII, when the user 
constructs a set diagram using the graphical ER construction environment, a 'propo-
sitionalised' re-representation of the problem stem information is entered into the text 
ER environment on a sentence by sentence basis as the subject works through the 
problem. For example, if an Euler's circle representation of 'All those who enjoy the 
poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot' is constructed in the graphics win-
dow, perhaps as a small circle labeled 'B' contained by a larger circle 'E', then the 
sentence 'Browning liker definite Eliot liker' is written into the text environment. 
The system's entries into the text environment are unobserved by the user, however, 
until sjhe switches from the graphics environment to the text environment. It should 
be noted that the sentence re-representation facility is not intelligent -if the subject 
incorrectly models the problem information in the graphical ER environment, a cor-
rect 'propositionalised' sentence corresponding to the currently-worked-on premise is, 
nevertheless, entered into the text environment. Future developments of the system 
could feasibly implement intelligent eo-construction, however. 
switchERII ER construction environments The three ER construction environ-
ments supported by switchERII are illustrated in Figure 7.3, Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. 
• The graphics environment provides an ER construction area and tools palette. 
The tools consist of an ellipse/circle drawing tool, an eraser tool and selection 
cursor. Ellipse labels are selected from a. scrolling list in a. dialogue box presented 
whenever an ellipse is drawn and which contains a list of entity names appropriate 
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521 Profe33or Klttredge:s literature :seminar include:s :studenb \t'ith varied ta:ste:s in poetry. 
G ./ All those In the semiiiU' who enloy the poetry of Brow11lng also ealoy the poetry of EHot. 2 
() ./ Those who enloy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
{) ./ Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Aude11. 
0 ./ All those who ujoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy tbe poetry of Do11ne. 
0 ./ Some of those who enjoy tbe poetry of Do11ne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
0 ./ Some of those who enloy tbe poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
CD./ All those who e11loy the poetry of Donne also e11loy the poetry of Frost. 
m m ~ 
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t.Ci33 Garfield enjoy:s the poetry of Donnc. 
Which of the follo'Wing mu:st be TRUE? 
!if Sbe may or may 11ot enjoy the poetry of Coleridge 
(2 L~e does not enjoy the poetry of Browning 
IDJ She enjoys the poetry of Auden 
ltJ She does not enloy the poetry ot Eliot 
I:J Sbe enloys the poecry of Colertdge 
Figure 7.3: Subject 6 using the switchER/1 diagram environment to construct a set 
diagram 
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529 Professor Klttredges litera.ture seminar includes students \iilh varied lutes In poetry. 
® ../ All those In the se111lnar who enjoy the poetry of Drowning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Q ../ So111e of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auden. 
Q ../ Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
0 ../ All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry of Donne. 
@ ../ So111e of those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
0 ../ All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Frost. 
0 -+ So111e of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
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Enjoys Frost ,Donne 
May enjoy Eliot ,Auden ,Browning, Coleridge 




t.tiss Garfield enjoys the poetry of Donne. 
Which of the follo'Wing must be TRUE? 
Bi:f She 111ey or 111ey not enjoy the poetry of Coleridge 
jil She does not enjoy the poetry of Drowning 
. G3 She enjoys the poetry of Auden 
I:J She does not enjoy the poetry of Eliot 









Figure 7.4: Subject 16 uses the switchERII text environment to re-write the problem 
information and to make notes. 
., 
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Professor Kittredges literalure seminar includes students \t'ith varied lutes in poetry. 
0 ../ All those In the seninar who enjoy the poetry ol Browning also e11joy the poetry ol EUot. 
0 ../ Those who enjoy the poetry ol Eliot duplse the poetry ol Coleridge. 
0 ../ Sone ol those who enjoy the poetry ol Eliot also enjoy the poetry ol Auden. 
0 ../ All those who enjoy the poetry ol Coleridge also enjoy the poetry ol Don ne. 
0 -+ So ne ol those who enjoy the poetry of Don ne also enjoy the poetry ol Eliot. 
C) -+ Sone ol those who enjoy the poetry ol Auden despise the poetry ol Coleridge. 
® ../ All those who enjoy the poetry ol Oonne also enjoy the poetry ol Frost. 
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1.53 
3:42:50 pm 
Miss Garlield enjoys I he poetry of Donne. 
Which of the follo-wing must be TRUE? 
IEJ She ••Y or nay not .njoy the poetry ol Coleridge 
[U She does not enjoy the poetry ol Browning 
llJ She enjoys the poetry ol Auden 
~ She does not enjoy the poetry of Eliot 
CJ She enjoys the poetry ol Coleridge 
Figure 7.5: Subject 14 using the switchERII matrix ER environment to construct a 
contingency table. 
., 
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to the problem (Figure 7.3) 2 . 
SwitchERII's graphic environment incorporates the interpretative semantics for 
set-diagrams (Euler circles) and detects the overlap of graphic elements such as el-
lipses, the containment of one graphic element by another, and non-overlap, non-
containment (i.e. disjoint) relationships between graphic elements. SwitchERII 
dynamically parses the subject's representation during construction and provides 
feed back. 
• The text environment provides basic word-processing facilities and a palette of 
first-order logic symbols (the symbols were also available from the keyboard). 
Buttons arrayed around the text area, when clicked, cause their labels to be 
written into the text area, thus saving typing and time for the subject ... e.g. 
clicking on button labeled 'Auden' causes the word 'Auden' to be written into 
text area at the current cursor position (Figure 7.4). 
Other buttons correspond to 'liker', 'disliker', 'definite' and 'maybe' (Figure 7.4). 
The reason for providing these nouns and adjectives (as opposed to a set corre-
sponding to the actual wording of the problem, i.e. all, enjoy, also, like etc, was to 
encourage what might be termed 'propositionalisation' during re-representation. 
For example 'If Browning liker then Coleridge liker' as a representation of 'All 
those in the seminar who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry 
of Eliot' is more an analogue of a set diagram using Eulers circles than a direct 
re-write of the original sentence. In other words, the 'If Browning liker then 
Coleridge liker' form is akin to converting the original subject-predicate-object 
syntactic form into a. propositiona.lised form midway between the original natural 
language and the more formal, single arity notation: 
Vx(b1·own-ingJiker(x)--+ eliotJike1·(x)) 
switchERII's shorthand might be termed 'partial propositionalisation' 
• Spreadsheet 
This environment consists of a 10 x 7 grid of cells. Text or numerical information 
can be entered into the cells (Figure 7.5). 
2 Note that, for illustration purposes, Figure 7.3 shows the entity label dialogue window with 5 of the 
G entity labels (poets' names) present. In actual use, only unused labels appear. 
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0 ./ Sone of I hose who enjoy lhe poelry of Eliol .Jso enjoy lhe poelry of Auden. 
Alllhose who enjoy I he poelry of Coleridge .Jso enjoy I he poelry of Donr.e. 
Sone of I hose who enjoy I he poelry of Donne .Jso enjoy lhe poetry of Bioi. 
Sone of I hose who enjoy lhe poelry of Auden despise lhe poelry of Coleridge. 
0 She 11ay or nay not enjoy lhe poelry of Coleridge 
0 She does nol enjoy lhe poelry of BroWfting 
o~ 
0 Alllhose who enjoy lhe poelry of Donne .Jso enjoy I he poelry of Fro si. 
[-d-e-le_t_e_t_lc-k--.s) (re-order) m Ill ~ 
firaphlc Editor 
l 
( Finished current sentence J 
TRY USING TEXT INSTEAD OF GRAPHICS ... 
0 She enjoys lhe poetry of Auden 
0 She does nol enjoy lhe poelry ol Ellol 
181 She enjoys lhe poetry of Coleridge 
Figure 7.6: 'Represent-ahead' ticks and system advice to switch following three ER 
construction errors. Note reversal errors (BE, DC) in diagram and resultant system 
message in lower window (Subject 9) 
User feedback provided by switchERII The subject indicates which problem 
sentence sjhe is working on by clicking on a radio button next to the sentence (e.g. 
Figure 7.6). The radio button then becomes filled with a green dot and a tick appears 
in between the radio button and the sentence. The ticks therefore indicate to the 
subject which sentences s/he has worked on so far. 
System feed back is also provided to the user in the problem sentence window. Under 
certain conditions, switchERII generates an arrow alongside a problem stem sentence, 
as shown in Figure 7.6. In the example shown, the subject has represented the first four 
1111 
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sentences of the problem in the graphical (set-diagram) environment- they have rep-
resented relationships between likers of Browning, Eliot, Coleridge, Donne and Auden. 
However, in doing so s/he has also (implicitly at this stage) represented the fifth and 
sixth sentences ('Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry 
of Eliot' and 'Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Co-
leridge'). Switch.ERII, following a parse of the current state of the set-diagram, detects 
this and flags this to the subject via the arrows. The arrows are termed 'represent-
ahead' arrows because they indicate a commitment to representing information ahead 
of the user's current position in his or her working through the problem information. 
System messages appear in the message window - the narrow window at the bottom 
of the display - as shown in Figure 7.6. There are five system messages: 
1. 'Tables are not advised for this problem - proceed anyway?' - this message was 
generated if the subject selected the table ER construction environment 
2. 'Please indicate the sentence you are now working on'- generated if the subject 
attempts representational activity without nominating which sentence is current 
focus of representational activity via clicking radio button alongside the sentence 
3. 'Maybe you weren't representing the right sentence?' This message is generated 
when the subject uses either the text or graphical ER environments if the problem 
entity labels (i.e. poets names) in the representation do not correspond to the 
currently selected sentence in the problem stem. 
4. 'There may be a problem with the representation ... ' - this message is generated 
when the system detects a semantic error in the subject's set-diagram. One of 
the most common reasons for this feed back to be given is because the subject 
'converts' during representation construction. An example of conversion is shown 
in Figure 7.6- the subject has represented 'All those who enjoy Browning also 
enjoy Eliot' with a small circle labeled 'Eliot' inside a larger circle 'Browning' -
whereas a correct representation could be a smaller circle 'Browning' contained 
by a larger circle 'Eliot' 
.5. The system message 'TRY USING TEXT INSTEAD OF GRAPHICS ... ' is 
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generated following three semantic errors in diagram construction and an explicit 
recommendation that the subject considers switching representational modality3 
Third study - switchERII 
The aims of the third study were: 
• to evaluate the efficacy of system feedback and guidance provided by switchER/1 
• to assess subjects' prior knowledge of Euler's circles and to investigate the re-
lationship between subjects' performance on a diagram interpretation task and 
their subsequent performance during diagram construction 
• to further study the processes, stages and time course of reasoning with self-
constructed ERs 
Pilot study 
Prior to the m am experiment, a pilot study involving 3 subjects was conducted in 
order to evaluate system performance and to finalise the details of the experimental 
procedure. The pilot study proved to be very worthwhile- numerous comments from 
the pilot subjects resulted in changes to the procedure and system. 
The instructions to subjects, for example, were modified in the light of the pilot 
study ... one of the pilot subjects was unclear about whether the 'poets' problem's 
questions had a single correct answer or whether several multiple-choice options could 
be chosen (the instructions ask for subjects to 'select the best answer choice given'). 
The pilot study also allowed a bug in the diagram parsing software to be detected - as 
a result 'higher resolution' overlap detection was incorporated. The positions of several 
interface buttons were also altered in response to pilot subject suggestions. 
-' Evidence reported in Cox, Stenning & Oberlander (1995) suggests that where a valid diagrammatical 
model is unavailable or inappropriate, the more expressive, linguistic, modality (i.e. natural language 
or first-order logic) is optimal in terms of performance on indeterminate problems such as the 'Poets' 
problem. 
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Subjects 
The subjects consisted of sixteen students (7 females and 9 males) from a variety of un-
dergraduate and masters level courses at the University of Edinburgh4 who responded 
to poster advertisements placed on noticeboards. The posters invited subjects to par-
ticipate in a study of 'computer-based problem solving' and offered £.5 as payment for 
a one-hour session. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups of eight. The two groups comprised 
the 'Feed back' (FB) and 'No feed back' (NFB) conditions. The FB group consisted of 
6 males and 2 females and the NFB group consisted of .S females and 3 males. 
Subjects in the FB condition used a version of switchERII which generated feed back 
and guidance during ER construction. The NFB subjects used a version of switchERII 
which did not display feed back messages5 . The switchERII systems used in the FB and 
NFB conditions were, in fact, identical except that the message-to-subject text strings 
in Prolog code of the version of switchERII used by the NFB group were replaced 
by empty strings. Hence the FB and NFB systems behaved identically in every way 
except that the NFB system did not display any of the .S message types in the message 
windov..r. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure (pre-test and switchERII trials) took approximately 4.5-
.SO minutes. 
Pre-test 
Subjects were first administered the pre-test of knowledge of Euler's method of rep-
resenting syllogistic premises. Details of the test (originally due to Newstead (1989)) 
were described above. The pre-test typically took .S-6 minutes to complete. 
'1 Cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, business studies, computer science, physics, and 
economics. 
5 n.b. Ticks and 'represent-ahead' arrows were displayed alongside the problem stem sentences in 
both groups. 
CHAPTER. 7. SvVITCHERIJ- AN INTELLIGENT /LE. 159 
switchERII trials 
Following the paper and pencil pre-test, subjects were introduced to the switchERII 
system via the practice example (Figure 7.1). The experimenter pointed out the vari-
ous screen windows and regions - problem information, ER construction environment 
icons, question windows, the ER construction area, system message window etc. Sub-
jects in the FB group were told that messages would appear if the system 'thought' 
there wa.c:; a problem with their representation. They were told that they were free to 
act on any system suggestions, or ignore them, as they saw fit. The sentence re-ordering 
facility was demonstrated to all subjects by the experimenter and each ER construc-
tion environment was demonstrated. In sw£tchERII, a particular ER environment is 
invoked by clicking on a button labeled with the environment's icon. The icon-buttons 
can be seen, for example, in Figure 7.3. The icons correspond to tabl•' ERs, text/logic, 
and graphics and their presentation order from left to right is randomly determined 
each time the switchERII program is run. The experimenter demonstrated the ER 
construction environments in whatever order the icons appeared, from left to right. 
The purpose of the icon randomisation was to reduce the effects of (inadvertent) sug-
gestions by the experimenter that a particular ER environment might be 'preferred'. 
Randomisation was also intended to minimise systematic biases in ER environment 
selection -such as, for example, any tendency by subjects' to initially select the left-
most ER environment. During the demonstrations, information 'carry over' from the 
graphical environment to the text environment was illustrated. It was emphasised to 
the subject that, whichever ER environment they used, they should indicate which 
sentence they were currently working on by clicking the radio button next to it. When 
the~r had finished representing the information in the sentence, they were instructed to 
click on the "Finished current sentence' button in the lower (system message) window6 . 
\Vhen the experimenter had finished demonstrating the system features, the subject 
attempted the practice problem on their own. \Vhen they had completed the practice 
example, subjects were asked if they were ready to attempt the experimental problem 
and whether they understood the system. Further demonstrations were given at that 
6 The expe1·imenter frequently had to remind subjects to do this during both practice and experimental 
problem solving sessions. 
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point, if required. When the subject indicated that they were ready to attempt the 
experimental problem, the experimenter told them that a screenrecorder would be 
run in the background but that this would not affect the operation of the system in 
any way. A miniature lapel microphone was attached to the subject's clothing and 
they were asked to 'think aloud' as they solved the experimental problem. They were 
further instructed that if they felt that thinking aloud was disrupting their performance 
they should not feel compelled to comply with the request. When they were ready, the 
experimental problem was run and the experimenter read out the following instructions: 
(In this problem) ... 'the questions are based upon a set of conditions. In 
answering, it may be useful to draw a diagram. For each question, select 
the best answer choice given.' 
Subjects were instructed to begin their solution using set diagrams. They were further 
told, however, that if they were unhappy with using set diagrams that they could 
switch to an alternative ER environment at any time. 
vVhen the subject indicated to the experimenter that they were ready to begin, the 
screenrecorder7 was started. The audiotape recorder was also switched on at that 
point. The only intervention by the experimenter from that point was to occasionally 
remind the subject to click the 'Finished current sentence' button. When the subject 
had answered the final (fourth) question, the experimenter stopped the screenrecorder. 
The experimenter made notes of his observations of the subject ass/he attempted the 
experimental problem. At the end of the session, the experimenter then questioned 
the subject for about 5 minutes. The conversation was audiotaped. 
Results 
Pre-test data - Euler's circle interpretation task 
'fable 7.1 shows the types of interpretation error made by each subject. Six subjects (3 
in each group) demonstrated error-free performance on the Euler's circle interpretation 
task. 
7 'Cameraman'- one of the Multimedia Utilities suite of programs, !vlotion Works International, San 
Francisco, CA. This utility produces Apple 'Quicktime' format screenrecordings. 
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Table 7.1: Conversion, Gricean, Island and other errors of interpretation 
Feedback No feedback 
Subject 1 3 .5 7 9 11 13 1.5 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Conversion X X 
GriceSO X X X X 
GriceSN X X X X 
Island NO X 
IslandSN X 
OtherOmit X X X X X X X X 
OtherComit X 
Total 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 0 2 1 3 5 1 0 0 
ProbScore 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 
Correct responses were defined as diagrams 1 and 2 for the premise 'All As are Bs', 
diagram .5 only for 'No As are Bs', diagrams 1,2,3 and 4 for 'Some As are Bs' and 
diagrams 3,4 and 5 for 'Some As are not Bs' (see Figure 7.2). 
The results can be compared to previous data on this task reported by Newstead 
(1989) and Stenning & Cox (199.5). The subjects in this study tended to perform at 
better levels than the undergraduate subjects studied by those previous researchers, 
though it must be born in mind that the sample size is much smaller here (n=l6) than 
was the case for Newstead (n=40) and Stenning & Cox (n=138). The proportions 
of subjects correctly responding for each quantifier were as follows (S&C=Stenning & 
Cox, New=Newstead): 
• ALL .75 (S&C=.61; New=.60) 
• NO .94 (S&C=.81; New=.75) 
• S01viE . .SO (S&C=.29; New=.33) 
• SOME-NOT .62 (S&C=.38; New=.29) 
The usual pattern across quantifiers was replicated here (ALL easiest, SOME most 
difficult). 
The majority of subjects (10 out of 16) made errors of omission and/or commission. 
The error patterns were idiosyncratic but at least three 'syndromes' could be identified. 
These were errors of conversion, 'Gricean' interpretation errors and what the author 
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terms 'island' responses. For each subject, 7 measures were derived conversion 
errors, Gricean errors on 'Some As are Bs', Gricean errors on 'Some As are not Bs' 
' 
island responding on 'No As are Bs', island responding on 'Some As are not Bs', errors 
of omission not accounted for by conversion, Gricean or island errors and finally errors 
' ' 
of commission not accounted for by conversion, Gricean or island errors. 
Conversion errors Conversion was deemed to have occurred when the subject chose 
diagram 1 alone as a model of 'All As are Bs'. That is, the subject interprets 'All As are 
Bs' to be equivalent to the statement 'All Bs are As', i.e. they 'convert' the universal 
quantifier. Table 7.1 shows the number and type of errors committed by each subject 
on the interpretation task. Two subjects converted (S108 , S15). 
Gricean errors These errors are characterised the adoption of a natural language 
interpretation of 'some' as excluding the possibility of 'all' (Grice, 1975). 
Despite explicit instructions9 to adopt a. logical and not a natural language interpre-
tation of 'some', 6 subjects showed Gricean errors. In this study Gricean errors on 
existential positive and existential negative premises have been distinguished. The 
former (Gricean-some) errors are defined operationally as the selection of diagrams 3 
and/or 4 only as being true of premise 'Some As are Bs'. The latter (Gricea.n-somenot) 
errors are defined as the selection of diagrams 3 and/or 4 only as being true of the 
premise 'Some As are not Bs'. 
The results suggested that the subjects in the present study were slightly less prone 
to G ricean interpretation errors than samples reported by Stenning & Cox ( 1995) and 
Newstead (1989). Four subjects (2.5 percent) demonstrated Gricean interpretations 
for the existential quantifier 'some' (S&C=40 percent, New= 30 percent). Four sub-
jects (:2.5 percent) showed Gricea.n errors on 'Some-not' (S&C= 38 percent, New= 27 
percent). 
8 Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that SlO selected diagrams 4 and 5 in addition to diagram 1 as 
being true for the universal affirmative 'All As are Bs'. This error of commission is very unusual 
and S 10 was therefore classified as a 'converter'. 
~ Recall that subjects were told in the instructions that 'Some' should be interpreted to mean 'at least 
one and possibly all'. 
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Island responses The term 'island' responding is coined here but describes a phe-
nomenon noticed by the author in previous data (Stenning & Cox, 1995). It is defined 
operationally as a response in which the subject interprets the identity diagram (di-
agram 1) and diagram 2 as valid models of 'All As are Bs' - but then subsequently 
interprets diagram 2 as being consistent with the premise 'Some As are not Bs' 
that is, interpreting diagram 2 as representing an 'island' of As in a 'sea' of Bs. In 
other words, the phenomenon is one of inconsistent semantics in which the subject's 
interpretation of spatial inclusion as metaphor for set membership holds for 'All As are 
Bs' but then metaphor changes when 'Some As are not Bs' is interpreted - whereas 
for 'All As are Bs' the small circle A is taken to represent a set containing both As and 
Bs, in an 'island' response, the small 'A' circle is interpreted to represent an 'island' 
of As in a 'sea' of B 's. Island interpretation errors differ from conversion and Gricean 
errors in that they are due to inconsistent application of the 'spatial-containment-for-
set-membership' metaphor across quantifier conditions. 
Island-NO responses (Table 7.1) are defined as the selection of diagrams 2 and/or 3 for 
'No As are Bs'. Island-SN responses are defined as the selection of diagram 2 as being 
true of 'Some As are not Bs'. 
Table 7.1 shows that subject 8 manifested an island interpretation of 'Some As are 
not Bs' and subject 10 did so in response to 'No As are Bs'. For subject 8, island 
responding was associated with Gricean errors and for subject 10 island responding 
was associated with both Gricean and conversion errors. 
Errors of commission versus errors of o1nission As Stenning, Yule & Cox (1996) 
point out, the psychological literature has tended to focus upon errors of commission 
where subjects make inferences that are invalid (as in the case of conversion errors). 
However, errors of omission such as failing to conclude that 'some B are A' given 'some 
A are B' have been studied very little. In the current study errors of omission were 
clefi ned as diagram omissions not accounted for by those associated with conversion, 
Gricean or island responses. As table 7.1 shows, only one subject (S10) made an error 
of commission not accounted for by conversion, Gricean or island errors. 
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SwitchERII results 
The switchERII screenrecordings were replayed by the experimenter. A 'first pass' 
through the data permitted the development of a coding sheet for the recording of 
significant problem solving and ER events. The screenrecordings were then played 
several more times and the experimenter recorded the incidence, frequency, type etc. 
of various events. A summary of the screenrecording event analysis data is presented 
in Table 7 .2. 
As Table 7.2 shows, 3 subjects made use of switchERII's problem stem sentence re-
ordering facility. Re-ordering the sentences was associated with high rates of correct 
responding to the problem's questions- the 3 subjects who re-ordered scored 3, 4, and 
4 out of 4 respectively. The row labeled 'Solution focus' in Table 7.2 indicates whether 
subjects built a complete model of the problem information (problem stem focus) 
or built partial models of the information on a question by question basis (question 
focus). Most subjects adopted the problem focussed approach. Two subjects reasoned 
mostly with a complete problem model but built question-specific models for question 
3 (subject 9) and questions 1-3 (subject 16). 
The next section of rows in Table 7.2 shows, for feedback group subjects, the frequency 
with which switchERII gave various feed back responses. The row headings correspond 
to the system messages 'Tables are not advised for this problem, proceed y /n '; 'Please 
indicate the sentence you are currently working on'; ':Niaybe you weren't representing 
the right sentence'; 'There may be a problem with your representation' and 'Try using 
text instead of graphics ... '. The label 'rep ahead' refers to the number of times that 
· rPpresent-a.head' arrows were generated by the system for that subject. Note that the 
two subjects for whom switchERII generated the highest number of 'represent-ahead' 
arrows (S9 and S10) performed relatively poorly in terms of correct question responses. 
The section of Table 7.2 that refers to the type of ER errors made during construction 
requires some explanation. The notation 'rev BE' for example indicates that the subject 
constructed a set diagram in which 'All those who enjoy Browning also enjoy Eliot~ 
is represented by a. small circle 'Eliot' contained by a larger circle 'Browning' instead 
of a. smaller circle 'Browning' contained by a larger circle 'Eliot' i.e. a reversal error. 
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Table 7 2· )witchERII d' .. screenrecor mg ana ys1s - general results 
Group Feedback 
Subject 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 
Re-order? y y 
Solution focus stem stem stem stem stem/qn stem stem stem 
First sent. rep'd 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Tables not advised 
Pis ind sent 1 
Maybe weren't ... sent 1 1 3 6 
Maybe problem ... rep 2 4 3 2 1 
Try text instead ... 1 1 
Rep. ahead arrows 2 2 2 1 5 2 2 1 
No.ER switches 0 0 2 1 0 1 3 0 
No. errors in ERs 0 1 2 0 3 3 1 1 
Type ER errors - •forVCD rev BE - rev BE rev BE rev BE rev OF 
- rev CD - rev CD 3for•CB 3jor··CB 
- - 3forVDF rev CD 
All sent rep'd? y n y n n y y y 
Final (set) ER valid? y n y y n n 11 11 
ER corrected? - n - - n n n y@q4 
No. uses delete 2 4 7 0 6 0 8 8 
ER construct 5'41" 5'02" 10'13" 12'41" 13'05" 13'54" 12'00" 6'17'. 
Total (to q4 ans) 18'08" 14'24" 21 '47" 22'12" 21'39" 26'45" 24'08" 15'27" 
q1 response e e e a e e a a 
q2 response b b b b b b b b 
q3 response e d e e d c e cl 
q4 response c c c c c c c c 
Score total/ 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 
Group No feedback 
Subject 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Re-order? y 
Solution focus stem stem stem stem stem stem stem stem/qn 
First sent. rep 'd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tables not advised - - - - - - - -
Pis ind sent - - - - - - - -
Maybe weren't ... sent - - - - - - - -
Maybe problem ... rep - - - - - - - -
Try text instead ... - - - - - - - -
Rep. ahead arrows 2 0 2 3 7 2 2 2 
No.ER switches 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 
No. errors in ERs 2 0 0 1 3+ 0 1 1 
Type ER errors 3forVBE - - rev OF rev CD - rev BE •for3DE 
- - rev OF -
- - 3forVBE -
All sent rep'd? y y y y y y y y 
Final (set) ER valid? n noset y n n y n n 
ER corrected? part y-text n 2 fails y/n n 
No. uses delete 5 0 5 8 4 3 7 2 
ER construct 7'52" 3'04" 4'33" 14'01" 6'40" 5'02" 16'10" 16'05" 
Total (to q4 ans) 13'06" 15'16" 11'19" 24'16" 20'36" 16'36" 23'49" 26'57" 
q1 response e cl a a a a a a 
q2 response b b b b e b b b 
q3 response e e e e d a e e 
q4 response c c c c e c c c 
Score total/ 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 
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Other entries, such as 3for·V indicate that the subject represented 'Some' via ellipse 
intersection instead of 'All' via an ellipse container-contained relation in their set 
diagram, etc. 
Effect of switchERII system feedback upon performance The effects of switchERJI's 
feed back were subtle. There were substantial effects attributable to features such as 
the 'represent ahead' arrows that will be discussed later in this chapter in the context 
of a detailed case study. However, the effects of the explicit system feedback messages 
(e.g. 'There may be a problem with the representation ... ') were not striking. There 
was no significant difference between feedback and no-feedback group subjects in terms 
of score (median score for feedback group subjects was 3 (out of 4), for no-feedback 
subjects it was 3.5). Neither did the groups differ significantly in terms of time spent 
on the problem (mean for 8 feedback subjects = 20.5 minutes, s.d.= 4.47; for 8 no-
feed back subjects, mean = 19.0 minutes, s.d. = 5.83). However, as the median score 
levels suggest, there were several subjects in each group who scored at ceiling level 
in terms of correctly answered problem questions. The effects of feedback might be 
expected to manifest themselves in the performance of subjects in the middle range of 
performance. To examine this hypothesis, the data of subjects who performed in the 
middle range (2 or 3 out of 4 questions answered correctly 10 ) were analysed. 
There was a suggestion in the data that middle-range subjects in the feed back group 
tended to modify their ERs more frequently than subjects in the no-feedback group. 
The frequency of use of the graphical delete tool was taken as an index of the number 
of set diagram modifications (Table 7.2. The 6 middle-performing feedback subjects 
averaged 11 5 uses of the delete tool during set diagram construction compared to 3.5 
uses in the 3 middle-performing no-feedback group subjects. This difference was not 
statistically significant, however. 
ivlicldle-performing feedback group also tended to spend longer constructing their ERs 
than their no-feedback counterparts (mean time for ER construction= 9 minutes, s.d. 
= 3.90; versus 5.7.5, s.d.= 2.22). This is consistent with extra use of the delete tool 
10 i.e. excluding ceiling performing subjects (S7, S13,S6,S8,S14 and S16) and the one floor-level per-
forming subject (SlO) 
11 Median. 
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1,able 7.3: Relationship between average (rned'ran) errors · t t t' k d on In erpre a ron tas an 
I . I I 1 11 c ts. ana ytrca reasomng score eve - a subje 
Reasoning score out of 4 1 2 3 4 
Interpret errors (median) 5 1 1 0.5 
No. of subjects 1 3 6 6 
and also with responding to system feedback. 
Several subjects reported that they did not attend to the lower (system message) 
window or that they 'didn't notice' the system messages since they were concentrating 
on the problem solution. This issue is discussed further below in the context of a 
detailed case study. 
Relationship between interpretation and performance on problem questions 
Table 7.3 shows the relationship between subjects errors on the interpretation task 
(see Table 7.1) and score (correct answers out of 4) to the Poets problem questions for 
all subjects. The data suggest that question performance is remarkably resilient to a 
wide range of interpretation errors in the sense that for only one subject (S10) were 
errors of interpretation on the pre-test predictive of poor reasoning performance on the 
Poets problem. In particular, Gricea.n errors do not seem predictive of performance 
with self-constructed ER.s. 
These results support other recent findings. For example, decoupling of error patterns 
on interpretation tasks and tasks requiring inference have recently been noted in the 
domain of syllogistic reasoning by Newstead (1995) and Stenning, Yule & Cox (1996). 
These results extend those findings - to the author's knowledge, this is the first study 
to have investigated the relationship between graphical interpretation task errors and 
subsequent performance when reasoning with graphical, self-constructed ERs. 
Conversion errors The relationship between subjects' performance on ER inter-
pretation tasks and their performance when reasoning or making inferences with ERs 
is far from clear. Newstead (1989) found that different measures of illicit conversion 
(i.e. sentential and graphical) failed to correlate in predicted ways. Conversion er-
rors have been shown by Stenning, Yule & Cox (1996) to be a predictor of generally 
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poor reasoning performance but not of illicit conversion during syllogistic reasoning12 
Subjects who converted on either the sentential interpretation task or the graphical 
interpretation task (or on both ta..;_;ks) demonstrated significantly poorer performance 
on 'conversion susceptible' syllogistic reasoning problems. However, this significant 
difference was also found on 'conversion unsusceptible' problems. 
To explain the decoupling, Newstead (1995) appeals to depth of processing differences 
(i.e. processing is assumed to be deeper in inference tasks and shallower in interpre-
tation tasks) - hence fewer than predicted errors on inference. Stenning, Yule & Cox 
( 1996) offer an explanation based on individual differences in inference strategies. 
In the present study, the task was not one of inference on sententially presented three 
term syllogisms but one in which subjects were required to reason with quantifiers on 
a puzzle type problem. The in erpretation task and inference tasks differ in terms of 
abstraction/ realism. The interpretation task is posed 'abstractly' (e.g. 'All As are Bs '), 
whereas the inference task is 'thematic' in Newstead's (1989) terms in that the terms 
refer to (hypothetical) poet-liking individuals (e.g. 'All those who enjoy the poetry of 
Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot'). Newstead (1989) , however, showed that 
there is little difference in interpretation performance attributable to statement realism 
or concreteness. Yule ( 1995) has shown the same for inference tasks. The fact that 
the two tasks differ along that variable, therefore, does not compromise the Newstead 
Euler's circle interpretation task as a pre-test for the poets problem. 
In the present study, subjects were instructed to begin their solutions by using Eu-
ler's Circles. The cognitive and semantic properties of diagrams, combined with the 
effects of representation externalisation and active construction, make reasoning with 
graphical ERs a profoundly different situation from that of interpreting presented rep-
resentations. It is not surprising, therefore, that performance differs under the two 
very different conditions. However, the literature has not tended to distinguish be-
tween types of graphical reasoning task. These results indicate that the processes of 
construction and externalisation make reasoning with ERs under those conditions a 
profoundly different cognitive task from tasks that merely require the interp1·etation of 
12 Iviajor and minor premises presented sententially, subject writes conclusion. Stenning, Yule & Cox 
used all 64 syllogisms. 
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ERs. 
These results also demonstrate that findings in the diagrammatic reasoning literature 
that are based solely upon interpretative tasks are severely limited in their generality. 
Reversal errors in Euler's circle ER construction The most common error in 
graphical ER construction (reversals), seemed to be more reliably associated with con-
version and island responses on the pre-test than with Gricean errors. Both subjects 
who showed conversion errors on the pre-test manifested reversal errors during ER con-
struction. This was to be expected in these subjects since they regard 'All As are Bs' to 
be synonymous with 'All Bs are As'. Both subjects who gave 'island' responses on the 
pre-test also made reversal errors. Gricean errors, though, were more or less equally 
divided between reversing subjects (3 Gricean responders) and non-reversing subjects 
(2 Gricean responders). Newstead (1995) examined whether Gricean implicatures mea-
sured on interpretation tasks are reflected in syllogistic reasoning (i.e. inference task) 
performance (Newstead, 1995). He analysed existing data from the literature but also 
presented data from new experiments. Newstead (1995) concludes that the relation-
ship is very poor. He argues that the deeper processing required by the logically more 
complex inference tasks causes subjects to make relatively fewer Gricean errors than on 
interpretation tasks. The data here too suggest that Gricean errors on interpretation 
tasks are poor predictors of performance in reasoning tasks requiring inference. 
As Table 7.2 shows, half of the subjects (8) made reversal errors during ER construction 
and 7 subjects (discounting S4 who didn't produce a set diagram) did not show reversal 
errors. 
l\lost reversals occurred in representations of the Browning/Eliot and Coleridge/Donne 
universal quantifier relations. Table 7.4 shows the construction sequence for the ele-
ments in each subject's set diagram. One striking feature of the data is the significantly 
higher number of draw (and erase/redraw) sequences of activity in the construction 
activity of subjects who made reversal errors. The mean number of element-drawing 
events for the 8 reversing subjects was 11.75 (sd=4.68, n=8) and the mean for non-
reversing subjects was 6.71 (sd=l.80, n=8). This difference was statistically significant 
(t = -2.67, df = 13, p < .01). Hence, it seems that subjects who make reversal er-
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rors also tend to delete and redraw significantly more elements of their representation 
than their non-reversing counterparts. This finding could not be attributed to a higher 
prevalence of switching out of the diagrammatic ER environment by non-reversing 
subjects since more of the reversers were switchers ( 4 subjects) than was the case for 
the non-reversing subjects (3 subjects). Further analyses revealed that subjects who 
made reversal errors spent significantly more time on their solutions (mean time from 
start to answering final question = 22 minutes versus 17 minutes for non-reversers; 
t = -2.11, df = 13,p < .05). 
There were two particularly surprising results, however. The first was the failure of 
system feed back to prevent reversal errors or cause subjects to modify their ERs. Five 
of the 8 feedback group subjects made reversal errors during construction, despite 
system feed back messages indicating that there may be a problem with their represen-
tation. Several feed back group subjects remarked in the post-session interview that 
they did not see or attend to system messages in the lower window since they were 
concentrating on the upper problem, question and representation windows. Subject 7, 
for example, when asked by the experimenter in the post-session interview about the 
system message, replied '(I) ... couldn't tell you what they said'. Subject 13 reported 
that he 'didn't notice' the system messages. Future versions of the switchERII system 
may need to incorporate more prominent system message displays. 
The second surprising result was based on a comparison of the problem question scores 
of reversing and non-reversing subjects. A Mann- VVhitney 'U' test between the question 
scores (out of 4) of subjects in the 2 groups was not significant. 
II ence it seems that serious errors in ER construction are associated with a.) signif-
icantly more ER activity in terms of the creation and deletion of ER elements, b.) 
conversion and island errors of interpretation and c.) significantly longer ER construc-
tion times and total time spent on the problem. 
lTltimately, though, these factors do not seem to affect performance in terms of re-
sponding to the problem's questions and the reason for this cannot be attributed to 
switching behaviour. 
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Graphical reversal and algebraic reversal 
To recapitulate, graphical reversal was a common error in set-diagram (Eulers' circle) 
construction. Seven of the 16 subjects made at least one reversal error (Tables 7.2, 
7.4). 
As mentioned ll1 Chapter 3, in the discussion of the effects of linguistic factors upon 
comprehension, reversals are common 'correspondence' errors (Greeno, 1977) that are 
observed when subjects translate word problems into algebraic formulae. A reversal 
error is defined as a tendency to match word order in the problem to the entity order 
in the representation of the problem's information. The well-known 'students and pro-
fessors' types of problem provide a good example. Wollman (1983) reports that one in 
three college students produce the erroneous algebraic representation 6S=P for the sen-
tence 'There are 6 times as many students as professors'. Clement, Lochhead & l'donk 
(1981) found that 37% of engineering students and 57% of non-science students made 
this type of error. Kaput (1987) argues that the high error rate in word-problem-to-
algebra translations (mostly of the 6S=P variety) is due to natural language overriding 
the rules of algebraic syntax and reference. 
The screenrecording data logged in the current study permitted Kaput's (1987) trans-
lation hypothesis to be examined in the case of graphical reversal. The order in which 
subjects added the elements of their set-diagrams was examined in order to see if con-
struction order parallelled the order in which entities occurred in the problem. Screen-
recorded construction sequences were coded for each subject at the single graphical 
element level of granularity. The data are presented in Table 7.4. The coding notation 
<'mplo~'ed is explained in the caption to Table 7.4. 
lising the data in Table 7.4 1 the order of first appearance of graphic elements (e.g. la-
beled circles) was identified for each subject. The elements of an error-free, problem or-
dered13 set diagram ER would appear in the order Browning, Eliot, Coleridge, Auden, 
Donne, Frost (BECADF). It was possible to compute, for each subject, the number of 
times that their element sequence departed from the 'ideal' sequence. Taking the data 
13 One in which the order of construction of elements of the diagram corresponds to the order in which 
t.he entities are ordered in the problem stem (assuming the stem sentences have not been re-ordered). 
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from table 7.4, and discounting repeated elements, the following sequences are obtained 
for each subject: S1 E,C,A,B,D,F (0); S2 B,E,C,D,A,F (2); S3 B,E,D,A,C (3); S4 -
(excluded); S.5 E,C,D,A,B,F (4); S6 B,E,C,A,D,F (0); S7 E,B,C (5); S8 B,E,A,C,D,F 
(2); S9 B,E,A,D,F,C (4); S10 B,E,C,D,F,A (3); S11 B,E,C,D (3); S12 B,E,C,A,D,F (0); 
S13 B,E,C,A,D,F (0); Sl4 B,E,C,A,D,F (0); S15 B,E,C,D,A,F (2); S16 B,E,C,A,D,F 
(0). 
Computing the number of elements that were 'out of place' compared to a 'pure' 
problem ordering revealed a significant relationship between the number of graphical 
elements 'out of place' (shown in brackets for each subject following each sequence) 
and problem question score. For subjects who re-ordered the problem sentences prior 
to constructing their ER, the number of elements out of place metric was computed in 
relation to the re-ordered sequence. For subject 1 the revised order was ECABEDF, 
for subject 7 it was BECDFA, the procedure was not relevant for subject 16 who 
re-ordered after set diagram construction. 
The median problem question score of 9 subjects who had 0,1 or 2 elements of their 
ER 'out of place' was 4 (out of 4), and that of 6 subjects who had 3 or more graphical 
elements 'out of place' was 2. The difference was significant when tested using the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test, z( corrected) = 2.30, p < .03 (Siege! & 
Castellan, 1988). 
1\!Ioreover, the rank-order correlation between the number of ER elements out of place 
and the number of errors in the subject's ER was large and highly significant 14 (Spear-
man's p = .82, n = 14, p < .005). 
It therefore seems that problem ordering of graphical elements during translation from 
word problem to diagrammatic representation is beneficial in terms of accurate ER con-
struction and question problem solving performance. This is in contrast to translation 
from word problem to algebraic representations where problem ordering is associated 
with translation error. 
:\ major shortcoming of the '6S=P' type of translation studies is that none have exam--
14 Two subjects were excluded from the correlational analysis - S4 did not produce a graphical ER and 
S7 was dropped because her data was highly idiosyncratic - an outlier who manifesttd 5 graphical 
elements out-of-place but made no errors during ER construction. 
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ined the effect of student-professor reversal errors upon actual algebraic reasoning, as 
opposed to si m pie translation from language to (often ill-formed) formulae. 'Students 
and professors' problems are a kind of interpretation task. As we have seen in data 
from the switchERII study, interpretation task performance and reasoning task perfor-
mance are often radically decoupled. Later in this section, data will be presented that 
relate the validity of a subject's ER (i.e. it's well-formedness), to answer correctness 
and the extent to which responses are commensurate with a direct read-off from that 
ER. It will be seen that even flawed ERs can be useful aids to reasoning. As long as the 
semantics are internally consistent for the user, and the representation is not used for 
communication with other individuals, idiosyncratic, personal, forma.lisms can function 
adequately. This is an interesting phenomenon which warrants further research in the 
domains of algebraic translation and graphical reasoning. 
Validity of ERs, answer correctness and extent to which responses are com-
Inensurate with read-off from ER. The dynamic screenrecordings afforded a. de-
tailed analysis of the relationship between the validity or correctness of subjects' ERs 
and the extent to which their responses to problem questions were commensurate with 
read-off from their ERs. An analysis of the relationship between those factors for each 
of the four problem questions was beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, it was 
decided to perform the analysis for one of the four problem questions only. An item 
analysis formed the basis of the decision to select question 1 for this in-depth analysis. 
An item analysis15 revealed that, of the four questions posed by the poets problem, 
question 1 was the most sensitive discriminator. Question 1 divided the 16 subjects into 
two fairly equal groups consisting of 9 correct responders and 7 incorrect responders. 
Responses to question 1, therefore, were chosen to investigate whether subjects' answers 
were necessarily commensurate with direct read-off from their ERs- an issue that was 
introduced and discussed in the context of studies 1 and 2 (workscratching analysis 
and switchERI study). 
The screenrecording data revealed that all 9 correctly responding subjects gave answers 
that were commensurate with direct read-off from their ERs whether or not their ERs 
15 Examination of extent to which question discriminates between subjects. 
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Table 7.4: Sequence of graphical ER construction by subjects in FB and NFB groups 
(n.b.•w=disjoint with; 3w= intersects with). Note that this notation is not formally 
complete (e.g. for distinguishing between varying cases of 3 ellipse intersection) but it 
IS SU ffi . b' I ll b d h ctent to unam 1guous y capture a 0 serve cases in t is study. 
Subj. Grp EC construction sequence 
Sl FB E; C-.wE; A3wE, C; BinsideE, B3wA; 
DoutsideC, A, B, D3wE; FoutsideD, F3wE 
S3 FB B; EoutsideB; D-.wE, B; A3wE, A-.wB; 
Ddeleted; Dredrawn, D3wE, A, D-.wB; Adeleted; C-.E, B, D; (incomplete) 
ss FB E; C-.wE; DinsideC; AinsideE; Adeleted; BoutsideE, B-.wC; 
A3wB, E, C, D; Adeleted; AinsideB; A3wE; Ddeleted; DredrawninsideC; 
FoutsideD, FinsideC; Bdeleted; BredrawninsideE, B-.wA; Cdeleted; 
C1·edrawninsideD; Fdeleted; Ddeleted; Adeleted; Aredrawn3wE; A-.wB, C 
D1·edrawnaroundC, D3wE, D-.wB, A; 
FredrawnaroundD, F3wE, F-.wB, A; switch to text ql, switch back to EC q3 
S7 FB E; BinsideE; C-.wE, B; switch to text ... 
S9 FB B; EinsideB; C-.B; A3wB, E; DinsideC; Ddeleted; 
D redrawn inside C;F3wC, D; ansql&2; all deleted, rebuilt at q3; 
B; F3wB; C3wB; A3wB, F; D3wC 
Sll FB B; EinsideB; C3wB, C-.wE; 
DinsideC, D-.wB; switch to text 
Sl3 FB B; EinsideB; C3wB, C-.wE; A3wE, B, C; DoutsideC; 
D3wB, A; FoutsideD, F3wA, B; switch to text, switch back to graphic q2; 
all deleted;C; Cdeleted; B; F3wB; Fdeleted; 
E3wB; C-.wE, B; switch to text q3 
Sl5 FB B; EoutsideB; C-.wE; DoutsideC; D-.wE; Ddeleted; 
D redrawn outside C,D3wE; A3wE; FinsideD, F-.wE, C; 
(corrects Fat q4);deletesF, D; 1·edrawDoutsideC, D3wE; 
D-.wB; redraws F outside D, F3wE, F-.wB 
S2 NFB B; E3wB; C-.wE, B; DinsideC; Ddeleted; DinsideC; 
A3wC, D, E; Adeleted; Ddeleted; 
DoutsideC, D3wE, D-.wB; A3wE, A-.wB, C, D; 
FoutsideD, F3wE, F-.wB, A 
S4 NFB selects graphic ER environment 
but no construction activity - switches to text 
S6 NFB B; EoutsideB; C-.wB, E; A3wE, A-.wB, C; 
DoutsideC, D-.wE, A; Ddeleted; D3wC, D-.wA, E; 
Ddeleted; Dred,·awn3wE, D-.wC, B, A; Cdeleted; 
CinsideD, C-.wE, A, B; FoutsideF, F3wE; F-.wB, A 
S8 NFB B; EinsideB; deletes£; A3wB; deletesA; EoutsideB; 
C-.wE, B; A3wE, A-.wB, C; DoutsideC, D-.wE, A; 
FoutsideD, F-.wE, A; deletesD; D3wF, C, E, D-.wB, A; 
deletesC, F, D; D3wE, D-.wB, A; C3wD, C-.wA, E, B; 
Cdeleted; CinsideD, C-.wE, A, B; FinsideD, F-.wC, E, A, B 
SlO NFB B; EoutsideB; CoutsideE; DoutsideC; FoutsideD; A3wB, AinsideE, C, D, E, F; 
Cdeleted; Fdeleted; CinsideD, CoutsideE, A, B; FoutsideD, C, E, B, A; 
alldeleted; B; EinsideB; CoutsideB, E; D3wB, DoutsideE, DinsideC; 
AinsideE, B, D, C; FinsideC, FoutsideD, B, E, A; deletesall; B; E3wB; 
C-.wB, E; A3wE, B, A-.wC; DinsideC; FinsideD 
Sl2 NFB B; EoutsideB; C-.wE, B; A3wE, A-.wB, C; 
DoutsideC, D-.wE, A, B; F3wE, D, F-.wB, C, A; 
Fdeleted; FoutsideD, C, F3wE, F-.wA, B 
Sl4 NFB B; EinsideB; C-.B, E; A3wE, B, C; DoutsideC, D3wA, D-.wB, E; 
Ddeleted; DoutsideC, D3wE, A, B; Ddeleted; 
DoutsideC, A, D3wE, B; Adeleted; A3wE, B, AinsideD, A-.C; 
FoutsideD,A,C,F3wB,E;switch to text; switch to table; switch back to diagram 
Sl6 NFB B; EoutsideB; C-.wE, B; A3wE, A-.B, C; 
Cdeleted; Credrawn-.wB, E, A; DoutsideC, D-.wA, E, B; 
FoutsideD, C, F-.wA, E, B; switch to text(ql); switch back to diagram(q4) 
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were valid models of the problem information. Five subjects read correct answers from 
error-free ERs. Four subjects read-off (correct) answers from ERs containing at least 
one error. 
This result is surprising. As in the switchERI study, it seems that once again reading off 
from ones ER, even if there are errors in the ER, is a better strategy than abandoning 
the ER. 
Six of the 7 remaining subjects gave (incorrect) responses to question 1 that were 
inconsistent with a response based on read-off from their ERs again, whether or not 
their ER was a valid model of the problem information. Four subjects gave wrong 
answers to question 1 despite constructing a valid ER, two gave wrong answers that 
were inconsistent with direct read-off from their (invalid) ER. Only one s·ubject gave 
an incorrect response to question 1 that was commensurate with a direct read-off from 
his (incorrect) ER. 16 
The screenrecording data showed that 6 of the 9 subjects who answered question 1 
correctly used set diagrams at the time of responding. Three used textual represen-
tations. Four of the 7 subjects who gave incorrect responses to question 1 used set 
diagrams. It is interesting to note, however, that three of the four subjects whose 
(incorrect) responses were not consistent with their (valid) ERs used textual repre-
sentations. The lack of specificity of the sentential modality may have caused read-off 
errors in those cases. Two subjects whose set diagram ERs were error-ridden and whose 
(incorrect) responses were inconsistent with those (erroneous) ERs, appear therefore 
to have abandoned their flawed ERs in favour of internal strategies. 
Switching 
Subjects in the feedback and no-feedback groups did not differ in the extent to which 
they switched ERs during reasoning. Four feedback subjects switched at least once 
and three no-feedback subjects switched (Table 7.2). 
Switchers tended to score more highly than non-switchers on problem questions (me-
16 Subject 9 who made a reversal error in his set diagram when representing the relationship between 
Coleridge and Donne likers. 
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dian score=4 versus median score of 3). The difference, however, was not significant 
when tested using Mann-Whitney's 'U'. 
Since switching involves the use of multiple representations, it is reasonable to expect 
that switchers might take longer to solve the problem than non-switchers. The groups 
differed significantly in terms of solution times- switchers, mean=21.9 mins, s.d.=.5.34 
mins; non switchers= 17.2 minutes, s.d. = 4.4 mins, t=1.91, df=14, p < .05. This 
finding replicates the results of the switchERI study. 
Interpretation errors and switching There was a suggestion in the data that 
ER switching behaviour in subjects who made relatively few errors of interpretation 
represented a fundamentally different strategy from switching in subjects who made 
more interpretation errors. Th· data are presented in table 7.5 - 'good' performance 
on the interpretation pre-test is defined as 0 or 1 error and 'poor' performance is defined 
as 2 or more errors (see table 7.1). 
A Mann- \"'hitney 'U' test between the problem question scores of switching and non-
switching subjects who performed well on the interpretation task approached signif-
icance (p=.057). The median score of switchers in that group was 4 and that of 
non-switching subjects was 3. The difference between solution times was significant 
(rvlann- \"'hitney 17 p < .02)). 
The difference between the scores of switching and non-switching subjects who per-
formed poorly on the interpretation test was not significant (median score=3 for both 
groups). The difference between solution times for those subjects (Table 7.5) was also 
not significant. 
These results suggest that switching ERs during reasoning might represent very dif-
ferent processes in the two groups of subjects shown in Table 7.5. For those subjects 
who comprehend the semantics of set-diagrams and who made relatively few errors 
of interpretation on the pre-test, switching is associated with better performance and 
longer solution times. Those subjects switch judiciously, and exploit graphical and 
non-graphical representations for their expressive properties, in response to changing 
li Used instead of 't' due to non-normal distribution and small N. 
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Table 7.5: Relationship between interpretation error level on pre-test and switching 
cl uring problem solving, in terms of median problem question score and mean solution 
time 




Subjects S5,S13,S14,S16 Sl ,S3,S9,S2,S6,S12 
Median score (out of 4) 4 3 
Mean time (m ins) 24.25 15.83 
Poor 
Subjects S7,Sll,S4 S15,S8,S10 
Median score (out of 4) 3 3 
Mean time (m ins) 21.33 20.00 
demands of the task. They may be said to be engaging in true heterogeneous reasoning. 
In contrast, the switching behaviour of subjects who performed poorly on the interpre-
tation pre-test represents an attempt to escape from a representation whose formalism 
they do not understand. Switching under those circumstances is not associated with 
improved performance or changes to solution time. 
Switching case study 
Subject .5 will be presented as a case study example of 'judicious' switching. S5 per-
formed well on the interpretation pre-test task, demonstrating no conversion, island, 
Gricean or other errors. 
The screenrecording reveals that he selected the ER construction environment 10 sec-
onds after the problem was presented. He read the problem stem information for 1 
minute 24 seconds before beginning ER construction activity. Then, as instructed, he 
began his solution by constructing a set diagram. Table 7.4 shows his ER construction 
sequence. He did not choose to re-order the problem information. Unusually, he began 
by representing sentence 2 of the problem first (he was the only subject to do so). Sen-
tence 2 states 'Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 1 
Subject .5 drew two disjoint ellipses and labeled the one on the left 'E' and the one on 
the right 'C'. Next he chose to work on sentence 4 - 'All those who enjoy the poetry 
of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry of Don ne.' He drew a smaller circle 'D' inside 'E', 
thereby making a reversal error. Clicking the 'Finished current sentence' button then 
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caused the system to respond with the message 'There may be a problem with the 
representation ... '. He did not act on this advice. Sentence 1 was represented next -
'All those in the seminar who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of 
Eliot'. He drew a large circle around the circle 'E' and labeled it 'B'. Circle 'B' was 
disjoint with circles 'C' and 'E'. 
The system now placed a 'represent-ahead' arrow next to sentence 5 ('Some of those 
who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot'). In the then current 
representation, though, circles 'D' and 'E' were disjoint. Sentence 3 was chosen next 
('Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auclen '). This 
time S.5 drew a large ellipse 'A' that intersected with all 4 circles (E,B,C,D). He then 
erased 'A' and redrew it inside 'B' but intersecting with 'E'. The system responded by 
displaying a second 'represent-ahead' arrow alongside sentence 6 ('Some of those who 
enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge') which indicated that S.5 
had made an implicit commitment to representing the relationship between 'A' and 
'C'. Actually, 'A' and 'C' were disjoint in his diagram (i.e. a valid model of sentence 
6). Next, circle 'D' was deleted from inside circle 'C'. It was redrawn in the original 
configuration almost immediately. S5 now attempted to represent the final sentence 
of the problem 'All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of 
Frost'. He seemed uncertain about where to place the 'F' circle, but eventually drew 
it around 'D' (and contained by 'C'). He then erased circle 'B' and redrew it inside 'E~ 
but disjoint with 'A'. Circle 'C' was deleted and redrawn inside 'D' (and therefore also 
inside 'F'). 
There now followed several minutes of checking in which S5 compared his representation 
against the two sentences which had 'represent ahead' arrows adjacent to them (i.e. 
the sentences 'Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry 
of Eliot' and 'Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of 
Coleridge'. In its then current state, his set diagram was inconsistent with the first 
sentence since 'D' and 'E' were disjoint, but it was consistent with the second sentence 
assuming 'some' was interpreted as 'all' (circles 'A' and 'C' were disjoint). 
Circle 'F' was deleted, circle 'D' was deleted, circle 'A' was deleted, 'A' was redrawn 
again intersecting with 'E' but with the intersection region in upper left of 'E' instead of 
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r ~ File Edit Mouje Trocks Windows 3:54:11 pm CD J.il ., 
Prolct:s:sor Killredge:sliteroturc :seminar includ" 9tudenl:s \i'ith wried ta:ste9 in poetry. ~ 1 
0 ./ All those In the se-.lnw who enjoy the poetry of Browning elso enjoy the poetry of EUot. 2 
0 ./ Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
Ml:s:s Gatfleld enjoys the poetry of Donne. 
Which or the follo\i'ing rauat bo TRUE? 
~ 
0 ./ So-.e of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auden. 
0 ./ All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge elso enjoy the poetry of Donne. 
® ./ So-.e of those who enjoy the poetry of Don ne elso enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
0 ~ So-.e of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Colertdge. 
0 ./ All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne elso enjoy the poetry of Frost. 
EJ She •ay or -.ay •ot enjoy the poetry of Coleridge 
w:J She does not enjoy the poetry of Brownirtt 
(i::,~e~al~~;trc~jl f&lii.#.6ra~r;J:I ii±J !lml ~ 
Gr3phtc E('!itor 
0 p 
I:J She enjoys the poetry of Auden 
~ She does not eft!oy the poetry of Eliot 
fEI Sbe enjoys the poetry of Coleridge 
Figure 7.7: Subject 5's set diagram representation immediately prior to switching to 
text. 
lower right where it was before- 'A' was still disjoint with 'B'. Next, 'D' was redrawn, 
this time intersecting with 'E' and totally enclosing 'C'. 'F' was redrawn around 'D'-
note that both 'D' and 'F' intersected 'E' but did not intersect 'B' within 'E' or 'A'. 
The ER was now a valid model of the problem information. S5 depresses the 'Finished 
current sentence button' and the system responds without a feedback message (i.e. the 
model is valid. 
Subject 5's ER at this point is shown in Figure 7.7. 
Subject .5's attention was now turned to question 1 ('Miss Garfield enjoys the poetry 
_I 
1--
.. , ..... ,,:;; 
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of Donne, which of the following must be TRUE' (5 answer choices)). Throughout the 
recording S5 moved the mouse cursor around as his gaze and attention shifted from 
problem sentences, to ER, to question ... Hence it provided a reliable indication of where 
his attention was being directed. At this point, S5 switched to the text ER environ-
ment and read the system generated 'propositionalised ', re-written, problem sentences. 
They read ... 'Eliot liker definite Coleridge disliker'; 'Coleridge liker definite Donne liker'; 
'Browning liker definite Eliot liker'; 'Eliot liker maybe Auden liker'; 'Donne liker defi-
nite Frost liker';'Donne liker maybe Eliot liker' (see Figure 7.8). Twelve minutes had 
elapsed up to the point of switching. The subject read the system generated senten-
tial representation and question 1 for about one minute. He then selected the 5th 
answer choice to question 1 'She enjoys the poetry of Coleridge'. This is incorrect -
the correct response is the first answer option ('She may or may not enjoy the poetry 
of Coleridge'). 
Subject 5 now selected the second question window 'Mr Huxtable enjoys the poetry 
of Browning, he may also enjoy any of the following poets, EXCEPT ... ' (5 answer 
choices). He then read the system generated propositions. For question 2, S5 added 
his own pseudo-logic notation to the text window, below the system generated propo-
sitions. He typed 'Browning -T Eliot' , which was merely re-writing the system's 
prepositional representation of the original problem sentence. S5 then chose the sec-
ond response option for question 2 'Coleridge' (correct). At this point the subject had 
been working on the problem for approximately 15 minutes. 
S5 now selected the third question 'Jvis Iganuchi enjoys the poetry of Coleridge. Which 
of the following must be FALSE?' (5 response choices). Instead of proceeding with 
question 3, however, the subject returned to question 2 (presumably to check his 
answer) and added 'Eliot -T-, Coleridge' below 'Browning -T Eliot'. Having done this, 
S.5 did not change his answer to question 2, but selected question 3 again. He added 
'Coleridge -T Don ne' to the text window, read the system generated proposition 'Don ne 
liker definite Frost liker', he added 'Donne -T Frost', then deleted 'Donne -T Frost', 
highlighted references to Donne in the system-generated propositions, highlighted 'Eliot 
liker definite Coleridge disliker', typed 'Coleridge -T-, Eliot' and re-read his own and 
the system generated text for about 30 seconds. It is interesting to note that S5 used 
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Eliot liker definite Colerid.ge disJ.ilcer 
Coleridge lilcer definite Donne l.ilcer 
Browning lil<er definite Biot liker 
Eliot liker maybe Auden liker 
Donne liker definite Frost lilcer 
Donne li1cer maybe Eliot li1cer 
Browning._.. Eliot 
Eliot -+-.Colerldge 
Coleridge ._.. Donnc 
Coleridge -t --,EJiot 
Maybe you weren't representing the right sentence? 
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I:J AU those who enjoy the poetry or Ellol elso enjoy Browning 
EJ None ot those who despise the poetry of Frost enjoy Auden 
[3 Some of those who enjoy l~den despise Coleridge 
l3 None ot those who enjoy Browning despise Don ne 









Figure 7.8: Subject 5's sentential representation immediately prior to switching back 
to his set diagram at question 4. 
the representation exclusively in his solutions to the questions - he did not refer to 
the window containing the original problem statement. He then selected answer option 
.) to question 3 'She may enjoy the poetry of Eliot' (correct). Elapsed time was now 
approximately 19 minutes. 
Subject 5 's textual ER at this point is shown m Figure 7 .8. 
Question 4, the final question, was now selected: 'Based on the information provided, 
which of the following statements concerning members of the seminar must be TRUE?' 
Note that the final question differed from the others in that it did not propose a 
.... 
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hypothetical person who liked a particular poet, instead it posed a different task -
one of assessing the truth value of each response option assertion. The subject spent 
about one minute reading question 3 and then switched back to his original set-diagram 
representation. At this point approximately 20 minutes had elapsed. 
S.5 started to work down the 4th question's 5 response options, the cursor alternating 
between the question window and the set-diagram, mirroring SS's shifts of attention. 
When he reached the third response option ('Some of those who enjoy Auden despise 
Coleridge '), his attention shifted to the problem stem window, he checked and re-
checked, noticing that the problem stem contained exactly the same statement. He 
almost decides to select that response option but moved on to check response options 4 
and 5 against the diagram. Neither option 4 or 5 were selected as the answer, however, 
and S5 selected 'Some of those who enjoy Auden despise Coleridge' as the answer 
(correct). Total time spent on the problem was 21 minutes and 47 seconds. Subject 5 
answered 3 out of 4 questions correctly. 
The purpose of presenting subject 5's reasoning protocol in so much detail is to at-
tempt to convey the richness of the screenrecorded data and to discuss the role of 
switchERII's feedback. The screenrecordings reveal a great deal about a.na.lytica.l rea-
soning with ERs. For example, when answering questions 1 to 3, subject 5 preferred a. 
mixture of the system-generated sentences and his own pseudo-logical representations. 
On question 4, however, he used his self-constructed set-diagram in combination with 
the problem statements in the problem stem window. Note that in both cases, a. degree 
of heterogeneous reasoning occurred. It involved two types of textual representation 
(prepositional sentences and pseudo-logic) in the first case and two modes of represen-
tation (set diagram and original problem sentences) in the second case. For question 
4, the set diagram permitted faster checking of statements against the model than the 
sentential representation would have. 
At the end of the session, the experimenter asked S5 inter alia: 
Did any of the system's feedback help you? 
S.5 replied: 
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... yes definitely, 'coz I was misreading the 'All', the universal quantifier ... I 
was actually interpreting it the wrong way round and that was system 
feed back that reminded ... that showed me that ... 
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However, the screenrecording protocol shows that S5's self-corrected errors in set-
diagram construction was not prompted by the overt system message ('There may be 
a. problem with the representation ... ') but by S5 's reflection upon the significance of 
the 'represent-ahead' arrows. The represent-ahead feed back from the system indicates 
to the subject that their set-diagram represents information in sentences that they 
have not yet reached in their progress through the problem. The subject's attention 
is drawn to those sentences and this prompts the subject to check his model against 
them. This process resulted in subject 5 spotting his reversal errors. Hence, the 
'represent-ahead' arrows functioned as a 'flag' (Corbett & Anderson, l990; Schooler & 
Anderson, 1990), serving to draw attention to a state of affairs but not feeding back 
much information content or 'knowledge of results'. This type of feedback is preferred 
by some students since it is less disruptive when they under heavy cognitive load. As 
Schooler & Anderson (1990) write: 
... , the processing of feedback ... (competes)... for limited cognitive re-
sources. When a subject is provided with feedback, the feedback neces-
sitates that they set new goals to process it. When they re-emerge from 
the feedback episode, the previous goals may have been lost, increasing the 
likelihood that the subject would rely on the feedback. In contrast, if the 
feedback processing were somewhat less disruptive, then they might return 
from the feed back episode with their goals intact. (p.707) 
This example of the 'flag' function of the represent ahead arrows may help to ex-
plain why there were not larger differences in performance between the feedback and 
no-feed back conditions in study 3, since represent-ahead arrows were generated by 
switchER!I for subjects in both groups. However, only feedback group subjects re-
ceived overt system feed back of the 'There may be a problem with the representation .. ' 
kind. Data from the subject 5 case study suggest that when the subject is actively en-
gaged in interpreting and discerning the significance of system feed back (as in the case 
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of 'represent-ahead' arrows) is more effective in facilitating ER correction than overt 
system messages. The reflection and self-correction promoting effects of flag tutoring 
certainly warrant further study. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The switchER/1 data show that not all errors of ER interpretation predict perfor-
mance on tasks in which subjects construct and reason with ERs. This finding points 
up the importance differences between reasoning with ERs under those two conditions 
- hitherto this distinction has not been made in the literature. Conversion and 'island' 
interpretation errors are particularly associated with reversal errors during construc-
tion. 
Reversal errors during ER construction were very commonly observed and were some-
times associated with construction slips and sometimes associated with more profound 
semantic misconceptions. 
The switchERII study replicated the switchERI finding that subjects who respond to 
questions in a way that is consistent with their ERs score better than subjects whose 
responses are not commensurate with their ER whether or not the ER is a correct 
model of the infornwtion. Abandoning ones ER and reasoning internally (as opposed 
to switching to a different kind of ER) is a poor strategy which results in poor perfor-
mance. The cognitive load imposed by the poets problem is too great for solely internal 
reasoning (except for a few exceptional individuals). Considering all subjects together, 
switching to a different ER costs time, but preserves performance. However, two dis-
tinctly different kinds of switching can be identified within subjects. For subjects who 
understand the semantics of set diagrams, switching to a different ER during prob-
lem solving represents 'true' heterogeneous reasoning in which representations in both 
the graphical and sentential modalities are judiciously exploited for their expressive 
properties. Skilled switching is reflected in good performance (i.e. correctly answered 
problem questions). In contrast, switching by subjects whose understanding of set-
diagram semantics is poor represents 'thrashing' - a less principled search for useful 
problem representations. The latter type of switching does not improve performance. 
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As specificity theory would predict, subjects tend to read off erroneous conclusions 
from valid sentential ERs more frequently than they do from graphical ones. 
The poets puzzle is a difficult analytical reasoning problem which places a high cog-
nitive load upon the subject at all phases of the solution process, especially during 
representation construction. During that phase of reasoning, the subject has no ad-
ditional cognitive resources available for processing explicit error messages presented 
sententially. Other, less intrusive, less semantically content-laden forms of feed back, 
such as the 'represent ahead' arrows seemed to prompt more self-reflection and ER 
corrections than overt feedback messages. This finding is consistent with findings from 
'flag' tutor experiments reported by C01·bett & Anderson (1990) and Schooler & An-
derson ( 1990). 
Future work and development of switchER syste1ns 
The results suggest a range of improvements tha.t can be considered for implementation 
on future versions of swdch.ER. 
An obvious improvement would be to broaden switch.ERII's ER repertoire to include 
the semantics of homomorphic representations such as plans and maps. This would 
entail programming the system to parse and comprehend graphical features such as 
arrays and object orderings. This would permit swdch.ERII to intelligently interpret 
subject's diagrams for problems such as the office allocation problem. Another useful 
representational formalism would be network diagrams or acyclic graphs. There is a 
class of analytical reasoning problems that pose questions about family inheritance for 
which network diagrams would be useful. 
.lvlatrix ERs could also be usefully parsed - the system could use its representation 
of the problem information to detect the dimensions of data in the user's table. If 
the user constructs a table in which neither row or column headings correspond to the 
problem's salient dimension (e.g. prize ordering in the dogs and prizes problem), then 
system feedback could be provided. 
It would be relatively straightforward for the system to diagnose and remediate ER 
construction mistakes such as reversal errors in real time, on-line. SwitchERII's feed-
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back could easily be extended to include more detailed feedback of the form 'The 
relationship of Browning-likers and Eliot-likers seems to be reversed in your current 
representation.' The system could offer to auto-correct such reversal errors if the user 
wished. 
Future versions could also make text and graphics concurrently available. The decision 
to permit only serial access to switchERII's ER environments was based on method-
ological requirements. Requiring subjects to switch between representations provided 
an unequivocal method of tracking their reasoning behaviour. 
The current switchERII graphical ER environment does not support use of the identity 
diagram 18. This facility could be added in the next version. 
A more major extension would be to implement intelligent ER eo-construction in which 
the semantics of the subjects graphical representation are preserved when the system 
builds a parallel representation in the sentential modality. In other words, the subjects 
original representation is replicated 'warts and all'. 
There is also plenty of scope for switchERII's feedback to be improved. In switchERII 
all the system feed back messages indicate problems with the representation - perhaps 
subjects should also receive positive feedback, such as 'Your representation seems OK 
so far. .. ' 
There are also several issues regarding feedback that warrant further attention. The 
switchERII results suggest that the cognitive load of ER construction is too high to 
permit the user to read detailed system feedback messages. Flag feedback, in which 
the system signals a potential problem by means of a non-linguistic flag, might be more 
effective than detailed feedback messages. 
The system could also monitor the extent to which the subject's responses to the 
problem questions are consistent with his or her representation. In the case of a valid 
model, the system could point out the inconsistency. In the case of an invalid ER, the 
system might ignore the inconsistency and assume that the subject had abandoned the 
ER and was reasoning internally. 
18 The diagram for 'All As are Bs' in which circles A and B completely overlap. 
Chapter 8 
General thesis discussion 
Sumn1ary of what has been achieved 
Using interactive learning environments to study the process and time-course of rea-
soning with ERs proved to be highly informative. The dynamic approach provided 
useful insights into cognitive processes at each stage of reasoning and offered numerous 
methodological advantages over the study of static, residual workscratchings. 
The results emphasise that effective reasoning with ERs involves the interaction of at 
least 3 factors: (a) within-subject variables such as the subject's representational reper-
toire (prior knowledge) and representational modality preferences (cognitive style); (b) 
skill at overcoming a large variety of barriers to comprehension and an ability to dis-
cern the salient attributes and characteristics of different problem types and (c) an 
understanding of the semantic and cognitive properties of graphical and non-graphical 
representational systems coupled with an ability to match those properties to the prob-
lem's task demands. 
These factors will be discussed further under 4 main headings: problem comprehension, 
ER selection and construction, individual differences, and constructivism. 
Problen1 con1prehension 
The linguistic and structural features of analytical reasoning problems make compre-
hension difficult. The 'register' of the language in which the problems and questions 
are presented represents a major linguistic barrier to comprehension. A high degree of 
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self-monitoring is required in order to avoid slips such as reversal errors. The manner in 
which problems are posed also violates several Gricean co-operative discourse maxims, 
most noticeably that of manner. Analytical reasoning problems tend to be obscurely 
expressed and information is not typically well-ordered from the problem solver's per-
spective. They are far from being 'maximally informative' - a general characteristic 
of puzzles, of course. 
Analytical reasoning problems have a bearing on a significant range of issues in the 
classroom, especially in maths and science where students are expected to develop 
arguments of some sort. Because of their puzzle-like nature, analytical reasoning prob-
lems are, in many ways, an analogue of many tasks that are used in teaching. There is 
a sense in which some aspects of teaching consist of uncooperative discourse. Teachers 
do not 'give away' solutions to problems and often use exercises posed in puzzle (unco-
operative) form (e.g. word algebra problems). Like word algebra problems, analytical 
reasoning problems are expressed in ways that 'real world' problems are expressed 
£.e. as verbal problems posed in English. In these respects analytical reasoning is an 
authentic educational domain. 
Comprehension is also affected by a range of structural factors- for example, subjects 
have to discern the number and type of dimensions in the problem, extract implicit 
information and cope with negatively stated information. 
Ideally, the reasoner needs to build up a full problem information context by taking 
time to read the questions as well as the information in the problem stem. Research in 
the physics domain (e.g. Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon & 
Simon, 1980) has shown that experts tend, inter· alia, to spend more time than novices 
on analysing and understanding problems, but produce faster solutions. The switchER 
subjects rarely did this- instead they tended to rush into representation selection. This 
may partly explain poor ER decisions such as discourse ordering the content of tables 
when efficient read-off from the point of view of question-answering would be better 
facilitated by ordering along a single salient dimension. Although, differently ordered 
tabular representations can be informationally equivalent, the nature of the questions 
posed will determine whether they are also computationally equivalent for the task of 
reading-off information. In analytical reasoning problems, the best way of determining 
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the salient dimension is to read the questions as well as the problem stem, something 
that few students appear to do spontaneously. Most subjects in the switchER studies 
read the questions for the first time following ER construction, rather than before or 
during ER construction. Hence, for most subjects, ER construction proceeded in the 
absence of what Bernado & Okagaki (1994) have termed a full 'problem information 
context'. One reason for this might be that the cognitive load associated with over-
coming the linguistic and structural barriers of the problem stem is so high that there 
is no spare capacity for question look-ahead. Future switchER systems might offer 
support to the reasoner in this respect by monitoring which parts of the problem and 
questions the subject has read and offering a suggestion to read the questions before 
selecting and constructing an ER. 
Skilled analytical reasoners become test-wise and are quick to spot opportunities to 
prune the search space. The clearest example is provided by the office allocation 
problem - spotting determinate information such as 'Mrs Green is entitled to Office 
.5' and representing it first provides an 'anchor' to which related information can be 
efficiently linked. In that problem, for example, the only two non-smokers must flank 
office .5. Hence, the information about Mrs Green provides the basis for a major 'split 
into cases' and, in Amarel's (1968) terms, represents a 'critical point' in the problem. 
One of the most important comprehension tasks confronting the reasoner is assessing 
the degree of indeterminacy in the problem. For the skilled problem solver, this factor 
heavily influences the choice of representational system, and the choice of a specific ER 
within the system. If more than one model of the information can be constructed, as in 
the case of the poets problem, then the problem is indeterminate. Generally, the weak 
expressiveness of graphical systems makes the linguistic modality (natural or logical 
language) a better choice than graphics for representing indeterminacy. However, if 
the subject has been taught a set-diagram formalism such as Euler's circles, then the 
property of specificity that diagrams share with internal (cognitive) representations 
makes them cognitively more tractable (Stenning & Oberlander, 199.5). In addition, set 
diagrams, as with all graphical representations, permit subjects to use the bandwidth 
and computational efficiency of their visual-spatial cognitive subsystems. This permits 
(seemingly effortless) visuo-spatial judgments to be substituted for linguistically-based 
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reasoning which may be more error-prone and difficult (e.g. Larkin & Si m on, 1987). 
ER selection & construction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the ER that a subject chooses depends, inter· alia, upon: 
• interpretation and comprehension of the problem's explicit and implicit informa-
tion 
• interpretation and comprehension of problem solving task posed 
• an ability to recognise the salient features and characteristics of the problem 
• a matching of the problem's salient features to an appropriate ER formalism 
• an appropriate ER formalism being in the subject's repertoire 
• the subjects cognitive style and/m· tendency to use exter·nal representations 
Graphical representations that possess abstraction-expressing properties, such as mul-
tiple diagrams or annotated diagrams, offer the 'best of both modalities' since a general 
rule, from the work reported here and elsewhere (Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1995), 
seems to be select a representation with sufficient expressive power· to captur·e the inde-
terminacy in the problem, but not more than is needed. This rule is not symmetrical, 
however - generally speaking, selecting weakly expressive representations (graphics) 
for problems which require abstraction has more serious consequences in terms of rea-
soning performance than selecting expressive representations for determinate problems 
(Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
Switching ERs 
The questions associated with an analytical reasoning problem are typically quite var-
ied in terms of their task demands. This means that the task requirement can change 
as problem solving progresses. For this reason, as the work reported here and by Cox, 
Stenning & Oberlander (1995) has shown, subjects' ability to select the ER recom-
mended by the analytical reasoning 'crammer' does not predict reasoning performance 
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very well. The skilled reasoner changes his or her ER as task demands change. Data 
from the three studies reported in this thesis show that subjects often utilise multi-
ple representations in their solutions, either concurrently or serially via ER switching. 
Two distinctly different types of switching were observed. One kind ('thrashing') is 
associated with poorer performance, is impasse driven and reflects less comprehensive 
prior knowledge, inability to select an appropriate ER and hazy problem comprehen-
sion. Thrashing corresponds to a trial and error-based strategy for ER selection and 
may reflect a relatively impoverished ER repertoire (factor a. above) and/or changes 
in the subject's problem comprehension (factor b.) . 
. Judicious switching, on the other hand, is opportunistic and associated with high levels 
of problem comprehension and skilled matching of ER properties to changing task 
demands. Judicious switching reflects expert behaviour in which eh anges in the task 
demands of the problem prompt the reasoner to switch representations. The reasoner 
skillfully matches the cognitive and semantic properties of the new representation to 
the new task requirements. Knowledge of a range of representations (factor a.. above), 
a high level of problem comprehension (factor b.) and a good grasp of the ERs' 
representational formalisms (factor c.) are all required. 
Constructivism 
The Euler's circle interpretation task used in the switch.ERII study illustrated that 
performance under conditions in which subjects interpret prefabricated diagrams does 
not necessarily predict performance under conditions in which the subject reasons 
with an ER that they themselves have constructed. The reasons for the decoupling are 
complex. One part of the explanation is that subjects are under much greater cognitive 
load when constructing ERs than when interpreting them. During ER construction 
they attend to the task very closely and hence may be less prone to make slips. 
Another part of the explanation is that the process of externalising cognition confronts 
the reasoner with his or her misconceptions or ambiguities in ways that interpreting 
pre-fabricated diagrams does not. As far as the author is aware, this distinction has 
not, hitherto, been addressed in the literature. 
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There are strong reasons to believe that subjects reason better with representations 
that they construct than with provided, 'prefabricated', ER.s. To the author's knowl-
edge, only two studies in the literature have directly demonstrated the advantages of 
active construction. 
In the syllogistic reasoning domain, the process of constructing an external represen-
tation (Etder's circles) has been shown to result in richer learning outcomes than the 
use of pre-fabricated diagrams (Grossen & Carnine, 1990). Hesse et al. (1995) have 
shown that subjects who are permitted to manipulate diagrams perform better than 
subjects who use static representations. 
In explaining the effectiveness of constructivist approaches, there is a need for explana-
tions to go beyond merely attributing the superiority of 'a required diagram-drawing 
response' to 'deeper processing' (Grossen & Carnine, 1990, pp. 179-180). In the au-
thor's view, part of the explanation lies in the effects of constructing ERs in terms of 
externalising one's cognition. T'he effects of externalisation can be partitioned into ef-
fects akin to the 'self-explanation effect' and effects that derive from the re-presentation 
of stimuli to oneself via externalisation. 
Roles of externalisation 
Externalisation and the self-explanation effect As suggested in Chapter 1, the 
self-explanation effect may operated uring translation across modalities (e.g. from ver-
bal to diagrammatic or vice versa). The modality in which an ER is constructed (i.e. 
linguistic or graphical) may affect the operation of the processes that are assumed by 
Chi et al. (1989) to underly the self-explanation effect. In the case of constructing 
a diagram for example, the semantic properties of graphics may confront the learner 
with his or her poor problem comprehension since, unlike language, graphics force 
a determinate representation that is severely limited in terms of the amount of ab-
straction that can be expressed (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). They suggest that 
graphical representations compel certain classes of information to be represented and 
that these representations are less expressive of abstraction than sentential representa-
tions. Graphical ERs, by their limited ability to express abstraction, may provide more 
salient and vivid feedback to a comprehension-monitoring, self-explaining student than 
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'self-talk' in the linguistic modality. Specificity theory (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995) 
provides grounds for predicting that the process of translating information j1·om a lin-
guistic representation such as natural language or logic to a graphical representation 
might be more effective than translation from one representation to another within the 
same modality. 
Limited support for an account of this kind is provided by Lewis (1989), who reports 
that 'translation training' (in which students were taught about the types of statements 
found in arithmetic word problems) was ineffective and even counterproductive. How-
ever, when translation training was combined with training in problem-diagramming 
strategies, performance gains were significantly greater than from either type of train-
ing alone. The role of diagramming in the Lewis (1989) study may have been to focus 
attention on the task, facilitate learning-by-doing and to provide a channel through 
which the self-explanation effect could operate. Studies of self-explanation during 
problem solving with ERs may help to shed light on to the mechanisms of both repre-
sentation externalisation and self-explanation. Further support is provided by Katz & 
Anzai (1991) 1 who took protocols from an undergraduate as she learned to represent 
and solve vector arithmetic problems. They report that as her expertise increased, the 
role played by the vector diagrams she produced changed. Katz & Anza.i ( 1991) report 
that as her expertise increased, her diagrams helped her to recognise useful calculations 
that she may not have otherwise discovered. 
Externalisation - turning one's representations into stimuli As reviewed in 
Chapter 1, Reisberg (1987) sees the process of constructing an ER as a. procedure for 
'widening the context of understanding' and 'turning ones representations into stimuli'. 
ER selection and construction consist of dynamic iterations and interactions between 
external and mental models. This was illustrated by Hinton 's (1979) cube task which 
demonstrates that often subjects' mental images are not fully elaborated and that 
attempts to mentally re-construct the image of an object (e.g. the patterning of corners 
of an imaginary cube held between forefinger and thumb) are often less effective than 
constructing an external representation such as a diagram. It helps to turn ones initial 
1 Reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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internal representation into an external stimulus which, upon re-processing, assists 
with finding a solution. 
In other words, the process of externalisation helps to disambiguate ambiguous men-
tal images. In a similar way, the process of drawing an ER such as a diagram (i.e. 
externalising a mental model) can facilitate problem solving. One interpretation of 
Reisberg's view is that externalisation facilitates the transfer of information between 
cognitive subsystems in ways that are not possible internally according to the dual-
coding hypothesis (e.g. Paivio, 1986). 
Individual differences 
Prior knowledge 
ER selection is affected profoundly by subjects' prior knowledge, and individuals differ 
widely in terms of their ER 'repertoires'. Apart from the studies reported here, few, 
if any, studies to date have attempted to relate subjects' prior knowledge of ER for-
malisms to their reasoning performance. Subjects' prior knowledge of ER formal isms 
was assessed in both switchER studies. In the switchERI study, the card sort task 
showed wide individual differences between subjects in terms of their prior knowl-
edge and representational repertoires. For domain-specific representations, such as 
set-diagrams, which have a.n underlying formalism that must be learned, lack of prior 
knowledge predicts poor performance if the subject attempts to use the ER. For more 
ubiquitous ER forms, such as tables, the link between prior knowledge and success-
ful use is less strong. One means of addressing this issue might be to provide direct 
instruction to students on a. range of representational formalisms independently of par-
ticular subject-matter domains. The idea. of a.n 'ER curriculum' is discussed further 
below. 
In the switchERII study, the Euler's circle interpretation task was of Newstea.d (1989) 
was used as a. pre-test of prior knowledge. A range of common error patterns were 
observed across subjects and there were considerable individual differences between 
subjects in terms of errors of omission/commission. The switchERII study results 
demonstrated that traditional error patterns (e.g. conversion, Gricea.n) on the Euler's 
CHAPTER 8. GENERAL THESIS DISCUSSION 19.5 
circle intetprelation task did not necessarily predict performance on tasks in which 
subjects construct and reason with ERs. 
Cognitive style 
The results of the studies reported here show that there is large variation between 
subjects in the types and modalities of ER that they use in their solutions. There 
is also large variation in the kinds of ER that individual subjects use on different 
problems. One source of the variation is likely to be individual differences in cognitive 
style. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, individual differences along what can very loosely be termed 
the 'visualiser-verbaliser' dimension have been shown to be important in reasoning with 
ERs (MacLeod, Hunt and Mathews, 1978; Matsuno, 1987; Riding & Douglas, 1993; 
Ford, 199.5; Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1994, 1995; Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 
1995; Oberlander, Cox & Stenning, 1994, 1995). 
An implicit assumption in many studies (e.g. Frandsen & Holder, 1969), is that sub-
jects who score poorly on psychometric tests of spatial visualization therefore prefer 
or tend to use the linguistic modality internally and/or externally when reasoning. 
This assumption is not justified and the relationship between internal cognitive modal-
ity preferences and the use of external representations requires much more research. 
For example, it would be interesting to examine whether subjects classified as highly 
spatial reasoners or diagrammatic modellers respond to efforts to broaden their ER 
repertoire by training in the use of non-graphical external representations. To the au-
thor's knowledge, this has never been demonstrated and remains an interesting topic 
for future research. 
Riding & Douglas (1993) have shown that subjects independently classified a przort 
as 'visualisers' pr·oduced more graphical ERs in their responses to a reasoning problem 
than their 'verba.liser' counterparts. 1vlacleod et al. (1978) clearly demonstrated that 
some subjects use a. visual strategy and others use a. verbal strategy on the sentence-
picture verification task. Non-diagrammatic reasoners have been shown to be more 
prone to select weakly expressive representations for indeterminate problems (Sten-
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ning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995). Subjects report widely different types of internal 
imagery during reasoning- some subjects imagine depictions of scenes, whereas others 
reason with internal (imagined) graphical diagrams (Matsuno, 1987). Recent analyses 
of students reasoning with Hyperproof suggest that the idea of 'cognitive modality 
preference' that is implicit in many notions of cognitive style might be too simplistic 
- skilled performance with ERs seems to involve dynamic bi-directional translation 
between modalities, whereas less skilled reasoning is associated with more activity 
within a particular modality (Oberlander, Cox, Monaghan, Stenning & Tobin, 1996). 
Another interesting question that warrants further research, therefore, concerns the 
extent to which individual differences in reasoning with ERs reflects immutable dif-
ferences in cognitive modality preference (i.e. cognitive style differences along some 
kind of 'visualiser-verbaliser' kind of dimension) and to what extent do they reflect 
differences in prior knowledge and are therefore malleable? The rationale for suggest-
ing that 'ER curricula' be taught directly to students (discussed below) is predicated 
on the latter assumption. 
Implications for theories of reasoning 
An adequate theory of reasoning must be capable of accommodating individual differ-
ences- 'cognitive tractability' and 'substituted perceptual judgment' theories cannot 
be the whole story, since individual differences in reasoning with ERs are quite wide, 
as demonstrated in the studies reported here and by others. 
Degree of externalisation 
Another paten tially important individual difference, one that is orthogonal to linguis-
tic/graphical modality preferences, and one that has received no research attention, is 
the extent to which individuals externalise their reasoning. The results of the studies 
to be reported in this thesis and those of others (e.g. Schwartz, 1971) show that most 
subjects (usually > 80%) use ERs in their solutions to ER problems. In the case of 
the 'office allocation' problem, the study 1 data show that 7 (9%) out of 77 subjects 
did not produce an ER in their solutions to the problem yet performed well in terms 
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of correct responses to the problem questions2 . 
A minority of subjects, then, choose to solve some analytical reasoning problems with-
out constructing an ER. If no ER is selected, then reasoning must proceed exclusively 
via. mental processes. In that case, it is difficult to know whether the subject failed to 
use an ER because he or she didn't know which ER to select, or whether the subject 
recognised the type of ER required but did not have it in his or her repertoire. Alter-
natively, the student might be very competent and may not require an ER. However, 
as the results show, accurate performance in the absence of an ER is observed far more 
often on easy problems than on structurally more difficult ones and so task difficulty 
(cognitive load) is a determining factor. 
In between the 'full blown' use of an ER and an exclusively internal strategy, there 
is a class of what might be termed 'minimal' ER strategies involving the partial ex-
ternalisation of reasoning. Subjects may simply re-formulate or translate the problem 
information, re-arranging the premisses for example in an attempt to remediate the 
'uncooperative' nature of the information presentation. Another 'minimal' strategy ob-
served in the switchER studies was the use of the multiple-choice check boxes alongside 
each question. A few subjects initially check all the boxes and subsequently uncheck 
individual boxes as alternative responses are eliminated. This might be termed an 
'elimination array' strategy. 
Do ERs serve the same function for all subjects? As we have seen, subjects certainly 
differ in the modality of the ERs they use - partly clue to cognitive style effects, partly 
clue to the representational demands of the problem, and partly due to their prior 
experience and ER repertoire. But even in the case of subjects who build 'full blown' 
ERs, the ER may be more 'central' to the reasoning of some subjects than for others. 
ERs probably serve different functions for different people. Subjects probably vary 
in the way in which they partition their internalised and externalised cognition. The 
proportion of reasoning that is externalised by a particular subject may also vary at 
different stages of reasoning. Some subjects may use an ER to keep track of their 
progress through the problem. while reasoning internally for the most part. Other 
2 Thirty-four subjects (44%) used a linguistic ER and thirty-six (47%) used a graphical ER (Cox & 
Brna, 1995). 
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subjects may exploit the cognitive and semantic properties of the ER fully in their 
reasoning, adopting a model-based mode of reasoning. 
Subjects differ too in the extent to which they interact with or operate upon their 
graphical representations. For fully model- based (i.e. diagrammatic) reasoners, the 
level of interaction and the amount of inter-modal translation of information is greater 
than for their less diagrammatically inclined counterparts (Oberlander, Nlonaghan, 
Cox, Stenning & Tobin, 1996). However, when diagrammatic reasoners are unable to 
use graphics3 , then their performance is degraded to a greater extent than less 'ER 
sensitive' subjects (Cox, Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). 
The way forward- future work 
Graphics curriculum 
In general, if a representational formalism is capable of expressing indeterminacy, then 
the user requires direct instruction in order to use it effectively. This is certainly true in 
the linguistic modality since propositional/first-order logic and some types of natural 
language usage must be learned. It is also true of representations in the graphical 
modality- set-diagram formalisms such as Euler's Circles require training for effective 
use. In contrast, maps, network diagrams4 (e.g. London underground map), and 
tabular representations (calendars, sports fixture tables, etc.), are ubiquitous and are 
not usually the subject of direct instruction. 
For many students, the range of ERs that they are familiar with when they emerge from 
their formal education (i.e. their representational repertoire is quite 'hit and miss'). 
They may happen to know about and understand semantic networks because their 
biology teacher represented food webs in that way. They may happen to understand set-
diagrams because they studied set theory in mathematics. Results from the taxonomy 
task used in the switch.ERI study show that only 25% of subjects showed evidence 
of accurately discriminating set diagrams from other circular representations - that 
3 Perhaps because the information to be represented is indeterminate and hence graphically inexpress-
ible or because the subject is unfamiliar with an appropriate graphical formalism. 
4 Actually, network diagrams ar·e capable of expressing indeterminacy -see Stenning &)nder (1995). 
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is they indicated in their choice of labels ('set' diagram, 'Venn' diagram etc.) that 
they understood the formalism of the representation. Why is it that so few students 
are capable of using such a useful formalism? The answer may lie, at least in part, 
in the nature of the school curriculum. In current curricula, students are typically 
introduced to specific ER formalisms in highly domain-dependent contexts. Often, 
curricula offer only vague advice to teachers and specifically mention only a. narrow 
range of ERs. For example, the UK National Curriculum 5 suggests the use of the 
following representations: 
'frequency tables', ' ... graphs and diagrams, including block graphs, pic-
tograms and line graphs; ... pie charts' (maths, key stage 2) 
' .. bar charts . line graphs, pie charts, frequency polygons, scatter diagrams 
and cumulative frequency diagrams' (maths, key stages 3 & 4) 
' .. extract and interpret information presented in simple tables and lists' 
(maths, attainment target 4) 
'Pupils should be taught to ... use a. wide range of scientific and technical 
vocabulary and conventions, and to use diagrams, graphs, tables and charts 
to communicate information and to develop an argument;' (science, key 
stage 4 (double)) 
'use graphs to identify relationships between variables;' (experimental and 
investigative science, key stage 4 (single)) 
'pupils should be taught ... how distance, time and speed can be deter-
mined and represented graphically;' (science, key stage 4 (single) physical 
processes) 
'pupils should be taught to ... make maps and plans at a variety of scales, 
using symbols, keys and scales ... '(geography, key stage 3). 
5 The National Curriculum, Department for Education, London: HMSO 
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No specific references to other important representational formalisms such as set dia-
grams, network diagrams or tree diagrams could be found in the National Curriculum. 
For this reason, some students may emerge from the school system with unnecessarily 
limited ER repertoires and may not be exposed to useful ER formalisms such as set 
diagrams or network diagrams. 
Part of the reason why ERs, especially diagrammatic ERs, have been ignored in cur-
riculum development, might stem from negative attitudes such as those alluded to in 
Chapter 1, where it was noted that among teachers of logic and mathematics, graphical 
methods of external representation remain highly controversial. Eisenberg ( 1992), for 
example, points out that, in the mathematics community, the idea that mathematics 
must be communicated in a non-visual manner is 'deeply rooted'. Attitudes towards 
graphical representations are s• metimes seemingly inconsistent. Graphical represen-
tations can be assigned different status depending upon whether they are used as a 
conceptual aiel or as a medium of communication. Eisenberg (1992) illustrates this by 
citing Hilbert: 
I have given a simplified proof of part (a) of Jordan's theorem. Of course, 
my proof is completely arithmetizable (otherwise it would be considered 
non-existent); but, investigating it, I never ceased thinking of the diagram 
(only thinking of a very twisted curve), and so do I still when remembering 
it. 
As also mentioned in Chapter 1, Sutherland (1995, p.80) also makes the point that: 
In our culture where sentential systems have higher status than visual sys-
tems, 'academic' is almost always synonymous with articulate. 
In the logic domain, Barwise ( 199:3) quotes the views of Neil Tennant as representative 
of the attitude of traditional logicians to the role of diagrams in logical proofs: 
[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; 
... it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, ... it has no proper 
place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only 
of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array. (Tennant, 1986). 
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How might all students be provided with a basic ER repertoire? An 'ER curriculum' 
might be one answer. This could be taught in a domain-independent manner, like 
English. This is not the first call for such a curriculum. Recent years have seen several 
pleas for such training. For example, Guri-Rozenblit (1988) has written: 
Since the construction of schematic representations seems to be a notori-
ously difficult task to perform, and the interpretation and processing of 
visual displays poses problems of understanding, it seems important to in-
clude the learning and practicing of visual skills into the basic reading and 
writing skills in schools' curricula. The use of practice of visual language 
is to be learned as any other language ... (p.232) 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Balchin & Coleman have written: 
It is hoped that the concepts of graphicacy and ingraphicacy will be taken 
up and d·eveloped by educationists, to mould the vague idea of visual aids at 
large into a more integrated goal of education, and to carry it down into the 
earliest stages to take its rightful role as one of the essential underpinnings. 
(p. 947) 
Also Twyman (1979) states: 
.. formal teaching of graphical language appears to be limited, ... , to the 
'verbal/numerical' mode of symbolization ... In recent years young children 
have been taught how to produce simple line graphs, bar charts, and pie 
charts from data they have acquired themselves. At a later stage in their 
education, those specialising in certain fields may well learn the particular 
approaches to graphic language that are held to be appropriate to their spe-
cialty. On the whole, however, it is true to say that children are not taught 
to read the wide range of graphic language they will be confronted with in 
later life. Still less of course are children taught to originate information in 
anything like the range of approaches to graphic language presented in the 
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matrix6 ( p.143-144) 
Lewis (1989), too, writes that ... 
'it seems appropriate to recommend including specific training of students' 
representation skills within the mathematics curricula of American schools.' 
(p530) 
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It is impossible to anticipate every reasoning situation that students might face, and 
individual differences preclude a curriculum that is too prescriptive about ER selection. 
However, an ER curriculum should include general information about the cognitive and 
semantic properties of representational systems and token representations within those 
systems. Ways of taxonomising representations could be compared (e.g. Twyman 
with Lohse et al., etc.). The role of ERs in various kinds of task (reasoning/problem 
solving, data visualisation, communication) should also be considered. The advantages 
of heterogeneous reasoning should be stressed. The general approach should be one 
that aims to expose students to wide range of ER formalisms so they may select ERs 
on a principled basis and at the same time indulge their cognitive modality preferences. 
Would such an approach work? The likely answer is 'yes' since several intervention 
studies provide good evidence for the effectiveness of direct instruction in ER use -
Grossen & Carnine (1990); Frandsen & Holder (1969); Lewis (1989) and Lindva.ll, 
Tamburino & Robinson (1982). 
As educational technology becomes more and more integrated into the curriculum 
and the variety and sophistication of data visualisation and external representation 
techniques increase as a result of information technology, the issue of an ER cur-
riculum is likely to increase in importance. \\lhereas, in the era of paper and pencil 
and chalkboards, representations were laborious to construct, and difficult to modify, 
new technologies make a large range of representational formalisms easier to exploit. 
Animations and 3-dimensional representations can quickly be created and displayed. 
Graphical tools are influencing visual thinking to the same, and possibly greater, de-
6 Twyman's (1979) table of ER forms which crosses 4 modes of symbolization with 7 methods of 
configuration. 
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gree that word processing tools influence writing7 . Currently, corn pu ters do not parse 
graphical input to the same extent as alphanumeric input, but this situation is likely 
to change quickly. Technology has not yet advanced to the stage where it is capable 
of making intelligent decisions about the assignment of representational formalisms or 
modalities to information. Until it does, and probably even afterwards, students must 
be equipped with heuristics and principles for making representational decisions on 
a. principled basis. They will need those skills in order to fully exploit information 
technology in the development and communication of their ideas, for problem solving 
a.ncl to fully realise the potential of information technology for augmenting cognition. 
; Current examples that are being integrated into educational curricula include the Texas Instruments 
Tl-92 graphing calculator running Cabri interactive software for geometry and the Hyperproof pro-
gramme which supports a diagrammatic approach to teaching logic (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1994). 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This final chapter summarises the contributions of the thesis and lists some of the 
implications of the work for future research. 
Thesis contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are: 
1. an investigation of the use of multiple representations in reasoning, particularly 
ER switching behaviour 
2. a number of empirical results related to reasoning with ERs: 
• single ERs are not equally effective for every question in a problem's set and 
hence reasoning with multiple ERs is often effective 
• subjects can use incorrectly constructed ERs successfully (to the extent that 
they perform better using the incorrect ER than they do if they abandon 
it) 
• consistency of answers with read-off from ERs is associated with better 
performance than inconsistent responding even in cases where the ER is a 
paT'iially incorrect rnodel of the infor·mation 
• subjects seem, often, to allocate too few resources to problem comprehension 
• tabular (matrix) representations are usually best for determinate problems 
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• target-oriented ER construction is superior to discourse-ordered construc-
tion 
• contingency tables yield uniformly poor performance 
• there were several lines of empirical support for specificity theory- when the 
expressivity of an ER is matched to the determinacy level of the problem, 
better performance results. However, the performance penalty of allocating 
a weakly expressive representation to an indetermiate problem is greater 
than using a strongly expressive representation for solving a determinate 
problem. Also, subjects tend to read-off erroneous conclusions from valid 
sentential ERs more frequently than they do from graphical ones. 
• ER switching is relatively common during ER construction 
• switching is positively related to problem difficulty 
• switching extends solution time but preserves performance 
• impasse-driven switching can result in 'thrashing' 
• opportunistic switching behaviour represents the judicious assignment of a 
representational system to a task 
• students do better if they fully comprehend the semantics of the ER formal-
ism that they attempt to use in their solutions - idiosyncratic representa-
tions are associated with poor performance 
• not all errors of ER interpretation predict performance on tasks in which 
subjects const1·uct and reason w-ith ERs 
3. the development of a process account of the cognitive events associated with the 
( .) ) stages of analytical reasoning with ERs 
4. provision of comprehensive and structured reviews of the literatures on: 
• the psychometrics of analyical reasoning problems and their linguistic and 
struct u ra.l properties 
• ER taxonomies and classification schemes 
• the semantic and cognitive properties of ERs 
• reasoning with ERs in a wide variety of domains 
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• individual differences (prior knowledge, cognitive style) m reasoning with 
ERs 
.5. development, through an iterative design process, of switchERII - an intelligent, 
interactive learning environment for reasoning with ERs 
6. the elucidation of cognitive mechanisms by which the process of externalisation 
facilitates reasoning performance and is central to a constructivist account of 
reasoning with ERs 
7. the proposal of a mechanism by which the use of diagrammatic ERs may facilitate 
the self-explanation effect 
8. a study of the relationship between subjects' prior knowledge of ER formalisms 
and their reasoning with ERs 
9. the development, via card sort methodology and cluster analysis, of a taxonomy 
of ERs used by subjects in problem solving 
10. a comparison of subjects' performance under conditions in which they interpret 
prefabricated ERs with their performance under conditions in which they spon-
taneously select and construct their own ERs 
11. an innovative methodology in data acquisition z.e. use of ILE's, dynamic user-
system interaction logging techniques 
12. the development of an argument in favour of directly instructing students (via 
an 'ER curriculum' and in a. relatively domain independent way) to use a. wide 
variety of useful representational formalisms 
Of these, the most valuable contributions are probably those relating the expressive 
properties of representations to task characteristics, the identification of two types of 
switching behaviour and the demonstration of decoupling between ER inte1·pretation 
and construction and use. 
Studying the ways in which externalisation and self-explanation processes facilitate 
reasoning is also of theoretical interest and will be the subject of future work. 
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F\1ture work 
The future work suggested by the thesis includes: 
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1. extending the representational semantics of switchER/1 to include node and arc 
diagrams, first-order logic, topographical representations such as plans and maps, 
etc. 
2. the development of a relatively domain-independent 'ER curriculum' for teach-
ing students how to use a wide variety of representational formalisms in both 
sentential and graphical modalities 
3. investigating individual differences in 'cognitive style', in particular the relation-
ship between psychometrically assessed internal cognitive modality preference 
(e.g. imagistic versus sentential) and overt external representational behaviour 
(e.g. tendency to use graphical versus sententia.l ERs) 
4. determining whether subjects identified as 'visualisers' or 'verbalisers' in terms of 
their cognitive modality preference can be trained to broaden their ER repertoires 
in their less-preferred modality - i.e. testing the immutability /malleability of 
cognitive style 
.5. investigating various types of user-feedback using switchER/1 
6. re-using the switchER user-system interaction recordings as resources for future 
learners 
7. further investigating ways in which mappings between information presented in 
the problem stem and elements of the representation can be preserved for the 
benefit of the reasoner 
8. investigating subjects' use of multiple representations- especially comparing the 
serial use of multiple representations (ER switching) with the concurrent use of 
multiple representations (heterogeneous reasoning). \V hat effect does the severe 
cognitive load of information integration (in the case of concurrent multiple ERs) 
have upon performance? 
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9. investigating ways in which switchERII might encourage subjects to self-monitor, 
avoid translation slips and to generally spend longer at the problem comprehen-
sion stage prior to ER selection 
10. investigating ways in which switchERII might check whether the subject's re-
sponses to a problem's questions are consistent with direct read-off from his/her 
ER. The objective would be to encourage the reasoner to respond consistently 
11. implementing more intelligent 'ER eo-construction' such that the system builds 
an ER in parallel with the user but in a different modality - the eo-constructed 
representation should reflect the original with as much fidelity as possible, per-
haps including errors 
12. investigating further the r ''Oposal that skilled performance with multiple ERs in-
volves dynamic bi-directional translation between modalities rather than merely 
a preference for reasoning either graphically or sententially 
1viost of the areas identified as topics for future work are interesting. However, some are 
of greater theoretical interest than others. The highest priority topics for future work 
would include extending the representational semantics of switchERII, and developing 
an ER curriculum, though both are fairly long-term prospects. 
Pragmatically, the easiest-to-implement topics are those that involve improvements 
to switchERII - such as building in a mechanism to check whether the subject's 
responses are consistent with his or her ER. Another relatively straightforward study 
would be to investigate the effects of various types of user feedback and to improve the 
mappings between problem stem information and elements of the user's representation. 
Finally, another short-term goal would be to conduct more research into subjects' use 
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Appendix A 
Three examples of analytical reasoning problems 
Problem 1 
An office manager must assign offices to six staff members. The available offices, num-
bered 1-6 consecutively, are arranged in a row, and are separated only by six-foot high 
dividers. Therefore, voices, sounds and cigarette smoke readily pass from each office to 
those on either side. 
Ms Braun 's work requires her to speak on the telephone frequently throughout the day. 
Mr vVhite and Mr Black often talk to one another in their work, and prefer to have 
adjacent offices. 
Ms Green, the senior employee, is entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window. 
Mr. Parker needs silence in the office(s) adjacent to his own. 
Mr. Alien, Mr. White and Mr. Parker all smoke. 
Ms Green is allergic to tobacco smoke and must have non-smokers in the office(s) adjacent 
to her own. 
Unless otherwise specified, all employees maintain silence in their offices. 
Questions: 
1. The best location for Mr White is in Office 1 ,2,3,4,5 or 6 ? 
2. The best employee to occupy the office furthest from Mr Black would be l'vlr Alien, 
Ms Braun, Ms Green, Mr Parker, Mr White ? 
3. The 3 employees who smoke should be placed in Offices 1,2 & 3; 1,2 & 4; 1,2 & 6; 
2,3 & 4; 2,3 & 6 ? 
4. Which of the following events, occurring one month after the assignment of offices, 
would be most likely to lead to a request for a change in office assignment by one 
or more employees? 
Problen1 2 
Ms Braun 's deciding that she needs silence in the office(s) adjacent to her own 
Mr Black's contracting laryngitis 
Mr Parker's giving up smoking 
Mr Alien's taking over the duties formerly assigned to Ms Braun 
l'vls Green's installing a noisy teletype machine in her office. 
Professor Kittredge's literature seminar includes students with varied tastes in poetry. 
All those in the seminar who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auden. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry of Donne. 
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Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Frost. 
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1. Miss Garfield enjoys the poetry of Donne. Which of the following must be true? 
She may or may not enjoy the poetry of Coleridge. 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Browning. 
She enjoys the poetry of Auden. 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
She enjoys the poetry of Coleridge. 







3. Ms Inaguchi enjoys the poetry of Coleridge. Which of the following must be false? 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Auden 
She enjoys the poetry of Donne 
She enjoys the poetry of Frost 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Browning 
She may enjoy the poetry of Eliot 
4. Based on the information provided, which of the following statements concerning 
the members of the seminar must be true? 
Problem 3 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Browning 
None of those who despise the poetry of Frost enjoy the poetry of Auden 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge 
None of those who enjoy the poetry of Browning despise the poetry of Donne 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Frost despise the poetry of Donne 
In this year's Kennel Show 
1. an Airedale, a boxer, a collie and a Do berm an win the top four prizes in the show. Their 
owners are Mr. Edwards, Mr. Foster, Mr. Grossman and Ms. Huntley, not necessarily 
in that order. Their dogs' names are Jack, Kelly, Lad and Max, not necessarily in that 
order. 
2. Mr Grossman 's dog wins neither first nor second prize. 
3. The collie wins first prize. 
4. Max wins second prize. 
5. The Airedale is Jack. 
6. Mr. Foster's dog, the Doberman, wins fourth prize. 
7. Ms. Huntley's dog is Kelly. 
Questions: 
1. First prize is won by: Mr Edward's dog, Ms Huntleys dog, Max, Jack, Lad? 
2. Mr Grossmans dog: is the collie, is the boxer, is the Airedale, wins 2nd prize is 
Kelly ? 
3. Which statement correctly lists the dogs in descending order of their prizes? 
I. Kelly; the Airedale; Mr. Edwards dog 
11. The boxer; :Mr. Grossman's dog; Jack 




II and Ill only? 
II only? 
I and Ill only? 
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is owned by Mr. Foster ? 
is owned by Mr. Edwards ? 
is the boxer ? 
is the collie ? 
wins third prize ? 
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5. On the basis of statements 1 ,3,4,5 and 6 only, which of the following may be de-
duced? 
I. Max is the boxer 
11. The Doberman is Kelly or Lad 
Ill. Jack wins third prize 
I and 11 only ? 
I and Ill only ? 
11 and Ill only ? 
I, 11 and Ill ? 
Neither I, 11 nor Ill ? 
:\PPENDIX A. 
Example ERs - workscratch-
ing figures 
r 
figure A.l: Plan, Problem L 
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Figure A.2: Vertical plan , Problem 1 
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Figure A.3: Minimal plan, Problem l 
'233 
, \PPEi'vDJX A. 
Figure AA: \"e rtical plan. Problem l 
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Figure A.5: Ordered text, Problem 1 
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Figure A.6: Directed graph, Problem 2 
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Pigure A.9: Set diagram, Problem 2 
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Figure A.lO: Set diagram (non unified). 
Problem 2 
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Figure A.ll: Set diagram using rectangles, 
Problem 2 
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Figure A.l6: 'Letters . 
tation, Problem 3 and lmes' represen-
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Single Models - Ignoring Alternatives 
(B) She dos not enjoy the pc 
Figu re A.l7: Set d iagram, Problem 2 - on ly one of ma ny possible models of problem 
A PPENDIX A. 
'Inve nted' Annotations 
brown1nc ... 
Figure A.l8: Subject using switchERI diagram tool to construct ·set diagram' -
a nnotated with various arrowcd lines 
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The Use of Multiple R epresentations 
:*e and m~ have DOIHIDOke!s in the 
Figure A.l9: Use of multiple representations on Problem 1 
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{ 
figure A.20: Use of multiple representations on Problem 3 textual notes plus plan 
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Representation recommended by Brownstein et al. for 
Problem 2 
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Euler's circle interpretation task data from switchERII 
study. 
Table A.1: Diagrams selected by each subject for each statement in Euler circle inter-
pretation task- see also Figure 7.2. 
Group Feedback 
Subject 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 
All A's are B's 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 2 1,2 1 
No A's are B's 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Some A's are B's 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 3,4 1,2,3,4 3,4 1,2,3,4 2,3,4 
Some A's are not B 's 3,4,5 3,4,5 3,4,5 3,4 4,5 3,4 3,4,5 3,4,5 
Group No feedback 
Subject 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
All A's are B's 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,4,5 2 1,2 1,2 
No A's are B's 5 5 5 5 2,3 5 5 5 
Some A's are B 's 1,2,3,4 2,3,4 3,4 3,4 2 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 
Some A's are not B 's 3,4,5 3,4 3,4,5 2,4 3 3,4,5 3,4,5 3,4,5 
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The effect of graphical and 
sentential logic teaching 
on spontaneous external representation 
Richard Cox, Keith Stenning, & Jon Oberlander 
A study of two logic courses employing different modalities of information presen-
tation (Stenning, Cox, & Oberlander, 1995) demonstrated improvements of general 
reasoning ability as measured by Graduate Record Exam (GRE) type analytical ability 
reasoning pre- and po!"t-course tests, as well as interactions between students' pre-coursc 
aptitudes and modal1.y of teaching. This paper investigates the reasoning processes in-
volved in the students' solutions of one sub-scale of the GRE problems from that study 
by analysing their 'work-scratchings' on analytical reasoning (AR) items. These data 
are used to examine changes in what representations students select; their association 
with correct and incorrect solutions; the changes in selection brought about by teaching 
different kinds of students in different kinds of courses; the association between these 
changes and improvements in solution performance; and the relation between intuitive 
teaching recommendations and a theoretically motivated taxonomy of representations. 
Stenning & Oberlander (1995) present a theory of the cognitive differences between 
graphical and sentential representations which ascribes major cognitive properties of 
graphics to weakness of expressiveness. We apply this theory to the GRE AR problems 
and derive principled predictions of some constraints on the appropriateness of repre-
sentations for problems. Analysis of. the students' spontaneous representation selections 
shows that representational strategies do change differentially as a result of different 
teaching methods; the kinds of representation proposed by intuitive teaching recom-
mendations as embodied in 'crammers' are globally correlated with success at solution; 
the theoretically based predictions of appropriate representations based on weakness of 
expression make rather better predictions that can be related to individual differences 
between students known to be important predictors of performance. These results are 
argued to have important practical pedagogical implications. 
Keywords: problem solving, self-constructed representations, diagramatic reasoning, 
visualization, individual differences, spontaneous representations. 
1. Introduction 
The present paper is a subset of a larger 
study - a field evaluation of different ways 
of teaching elementary logic to undergradu-
ate students. 
~}1!:'{:1::00-t 0 ~ t )( 1:: J: 0 f{~~t;t7}-((.J.£i*-(!) (cl ~((.J~t: 
ffiti::&I!T~JJ!4!;, IJ f" ""- r • ::J .. , 1 A, ~-A· A j-=.. 
:..-- 1',:; 3 :..-- • :.:f-.t{-7 :..-- ?'- (AOll :::1 ~ .:L=-7-:..-- 3 
/ fiJf 1l-t / 1 - , .:r.. :; / / { 7 * ~(:). 
This study had the goal of testing a the-
ory of the contrasting cognitive properties 
of sentential and graphical representations. 
But the study also had the practical goal 
of evaluating a new interactive computer 
environment Hyperproof (HP) (Barwise & 
Etchemendy, 1994) as a method of teach-
ing first order logic (FOL). Stehning, Cox, & 
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Oberlander (1995); Cox, Stenning, & Ober-
lander (1994); Oberlander, Cox, & Stenning 
(1994) and Oberlander, Cox, & Stenning 
(1995) provide accounts of the main study. 
In this paper, we focus upon the relationship 
between the expressiveness of representations 
and their effectiveness in problem solving. 
One group of Stanford undergraduates was 
taught with HP. Information in HP is pre-
sented in two forms, as sentences of logic 
and as diagrams depicting 'blocks worlds'. 
A comparison class of students was taught 
syntactically, using a sententially-based nat-
ural deduction system (i.e. in the traditional 
way). The HP students and the comparison 
class students were given two tests before and 
after 12 week logic courses. One of these tests 
was a pseudo-GRE Analytical Ability test. 
Stenning, Cox, & Oberlander (1995) show 
that students in both the traditional natural 
deduction control course and the HP course 
show substantial (14%) increases in GRE AR 
pre- to post-test scores. The GRE is designed 
to be an uncoachable test. The GRE test 
sets problems at least superficially quite un-
like the problems encountered in the courses, 
but which are known to correlate with general 
reasoning ability. We regard them as a useful, 
if imperfect, test of transfer of learning. The 
same study uncovered strong interactions be-
tween pre-test aptitudes for solving AR prob-
lems, the kind of logic course taken, and sub-
sequent pre- to post-test score changes on the 
'blocks world' (BW) test. 
When doing the GRE AR test students 
were allowed to make whatever rough work-
ings they chose on the test sheets. Stu-
dents were advised that 'drawing diagrams 
might be helpful to them in answering some 
of the questions', just as in real GRE tests. 
We refer to these rough workings as 'work-
scratchings'. The purpose of this paper is 
to use these work-scratchings from the G RE 
AR test to throw additional light on students' 
reasoning processes and the changes brought 
about in them by logic teaching. Whereas 
the main contrast in teaching interventions 
between HP and traditional logic courses is 
a contrast between representations presented 
to students, these work-scratchings are rep-
resentations freely constructed by students. 
But they can be subjected to similar theo-
retical analysis. 
Our original interest in HP was in its use of 
heterogeneous representations, both graphi-
cal and sentential. The HP environment pro-
vides graphical 'blocks-world' representations 
of models of sets of sentences of FOL, along 
with rules of inference for 'moving' informa-
tion back and forth between diagram and sen-
tences. We had been developing a theory of 
the distinctive cognitive properties of graph-
ical representations choosing Euler's graph-
ical method of teaching syllogistic logic a~ 
our example domain (Stenning & Oberlan-
der, 1995). That theory develops the classi-
cal observation that many graphical systems 
are weakly expressive in the technical logical 
sense. That is, there are many abstractions 
which they cannot express, at least without 
indefinitely large disjunctions of diagrams. 
Computational theory shows why weakness 
of expressive power allows tractable reason-
ing for any reasoner, whether human or ma-
chine (e.g. Levesque, 1988). For an exam-
ple of the implications of inexpressiveness for 
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tractability of reasoning the reader is referred 
to the discussion of the semantics of HP be-
low. Our theoretical motivation for studying 
HP was to extend this theory of graphics from 
the analysis of Euler's Circles to a larger do-
main using quite different graphical devices, 
and to study a more realistic learning situa-
tion. 
Our theory provides an analysis of HP 
graphics which predicts that certain aspects 
of their semantics will be critical for deter-
mining their impact in teaching. This theory 
can also be applied, at least in broad out-
line, to the work-scratching representations 
spontaneously constructed by students as we 
will illustrate here. One of the appeals of 
using the GRE AR test for an investigation 
of graphical and sentential teaching methods, 
with a theory based on a logical analysis of 
expressive power, is that the GRE is a wholly 
verbal test in its pre~entation of problems, 
and in its collection of responses. Our analy-
sis of the usefulness of graphics looks for the 
benefits in terms of semantic properties as 
opposed to simply perceptual ones. 
The GRE analytical ability scale actually 
consists of two subscales: logical reason-
ing (argument analysis) and analytical rea-
soning ( AR --- constraint satisfaction prob-
lems). Items in both subscales are pre-
sented sententially. This paper focusses on 
the work-scratchings produced by subjects 
in the course of their solutions to items on 
the AR subscale. Performance on the logi-
cal reasoning (argument analysis) subscale is 
not the focus of this paper and will not be 
discussed. 
The AR subscale items consist of con-
Nov. 1995 
straint satisfaction puzzles of the kinds illus-
trated in Figures 2 and 3. In fact, there are 
two kinds of AR subscale item which we re-
fer to as determinate and indeterminate prob-
lems. Determinate problems state sufficient 
constraints to determine a unique satisfying 
model. Figure 2 presents an example deter-
minate problem. A set of constraints is stated 
which in fact determine a single unique model 
which satisfies them all. Because there is a 
unique model, it is possible to construct a di-
agram representing the problem information. 
Althoug~ this particular example is about 
spatial relations, the critical determinant of 
whether or not a diagram can be drawn is 
whether there is a unique model. 
Despite the verbal surface of the AR sub-
scale, it turns out that its two types of item 
(determinate and indeterminate) are com-
posed of problems which differ in their model 
theoretic properties in just the way that our 
theory predicts should distinguish problems 
for which graphical approaches are appropri-
ate. The students' work-scratchings therefore 
allow us to apply the same general concepts 
to the pre- and post-test performance that we 
apply to HP itself. 
One advantage of the work-scratching data 
is that it allows examination of students' 
spontaneous selection of external representa-
tions (ERs), and their private1> use of rep-
resentations at pre-test, and effects of differ-
ent teaching on their selections at post-test. 
Any changes in representational choice can 
1) Subjects in the study were unaware that their 
workscratchings would be seen or analysed later by 
the experimenters. In most previous studies of sub-
jects' use ofERs, (e.g. Schwartz, 1971) subjects have 
been encouraged to 'show their working'. 
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then be related to changes in AR scores, and 
to students' other performances. Although 
there is awareness amongst the AI and math-
ematical communities that finding good rep-
resentations for problems is critical to rea-
soning success (see e.g. Polya 1957; Simon, 
1981; Kaput, 1987; Kaput, 1992), not many 
studies of students' spontaneous use of rep-
resentations and effects of teaching on these 
habits have been reported. Amarel (1986, 
1990) pioneered the AI study of representa-
tion selection. His conceptualisation of the 
problem as one of describing a space of rep-
resentational systems from which reasoners 
must select, and within which they perform 
their reasoning, is an important contribution 
in itself. Our own approach to a theory of 
differences between graphical and sentential 
modalities of representation can be seen as 
another approach t.o Amarel's questions. 
The difference between what a token rep-
resentation (a particular diagram or piece of 
text) represents, and what the system of rep-
resentation of which it is a member forces 
its users to represent, is initially subtle, but 
nevertheless far-reaching. In general, textual 
systems always can specify a piece of infor-
mation, but they allow their users to leave 
information unspecified. Graphical systems, 
in contrast, often enforce the representation 
of some classes of information. Both the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the modalities 
stem from this difference, as we shall see be-
low. We focus not on what systems can repre-
sent, but on what they must represent. This 
distinction can only be drawn at the system 
level. Unless a diagram or a text is conceived 
of as a member of a system of possibilities, 
there is no basis for defining what all tokens 
must represent. Only when systems of rep-
resentation are distinguished from their to-
kens can the issue of selecting between them 
emerge. 
This emphasis on the system can be clar-
ified by contrasting our approach with the 
well-known approach to media/modality dif-
ferences of Lark in & Simon ( 1987). Their ap-
proach emphasises differences between what 
they call informational and computational 
equivalence of token representations. A to-
ken text and a token picture may represent 
the same information, but one may make 
it much easier to compute inferences from 
this information than the other. For exam-
ple, graphical representations allow the par-
allel searching mechanisms of our eyes to 
find relevant items of information much more 
quickly and easily. We do not disagree with 
these observations, but suggest that they re-
sult from deeper differences between the sys-
tems of representation concerned. Imple-
mentations of fast parallel search are possi-
ble for graphical systems because these sys-
tems are logically inexpressive. For exam-
ple, if a system cannot denote the same thing 
with alternative expressions, this enormously 
simplifies search. Graphics generally can-
not do this: languages generally can. But if 
one takes very circumscribed sentential lan-
guages which cannot express these abstrac-
tions, then there will be computational im-
plementations which allow just as facile in-
ference to be performed on their representa-
tions as is the case with graphics. One has 
to know what system of representations a to-
ken is drawn from in order to know which 
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general computational regimes will be appli-
cable. We believe that this shift of empha-
sis onto reasoning as selecting representation 
systems affords insight into human behaviour 
as well as issues of machine design. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We be-
gin by sketching the theoretical approach to 
graphics, and its application to both HP and 
the range of representations in the students' 
work-scratchings. We then describe the rel-
evant methodology of the study and present 
the results of using the work-scrat~hings anal-
ysis to explore students' test-scores, and 
changes in test-scores with logic teaching. Fi-
nally, we discuss both theoretical and practi-
cal implications of these findings. 
2. The semantic properties of 
graphical representations 
We now give an illustration of the applica-
tion to HP graphics of our analysis in terms 
of expressiveness and tractability. Stenning 
& Oberlancler (1995) and Stenning & Inder 
(1995) give more general accounts. Stenning 
& Oberlander (1991) give an elementary ap-
plication of the theory to tabular representa-
tions which il; especially relevant in the cur-
rent context. 
The HP universe of discourse is a domain 
of polyhedra which have shapes (tetrahedron, 
cube, dodecahedron), sizes (small, medium 
and large), and positions on an eight by eight 
chequer board. Graphical representations of 
HP 'worlds' consist of diagrams of the che-
querboard with icons differing in shape and 
size in the obvious way, placed singly on 
squares on the chequerboard. The icons may 
or may not have one or more labelling let-
Nov. 1995 
ters on them, but no two icons ever have the 
same label. Particularly interesting features 
of the diagramatic system of representations 
are some 'tricks' for expressing limited, but 
nevertheless useful, abstractions. Figure 1 
shows an example of an HP graphic. 
One type of icon is a cylinder. Note that 
there are no cylinders in HP worlds. Cylinder 
icons stand not for cylinders, but for polyhe-
dra of unspecified size and shape. There is 
only one size of cylinder icon, but cylinder 
icons can bear badges indicating the shape 
of the denoted object. Another abstraction 
device is a paper bag icon which stands for a 
polyhedron of unspecified shape. Paper bag 
icons come in three sizes denoting the three 
sizes of their contained polyhedra. Another 
abstraction trick is an off-board area known 
as Tombolia in which icons may be placed. 
Icons in Tombolia denote objects that are not 
in Tombolia but at some unspecified position 
on the board. Finally, there is the possibility 
of having a set of HP diagrams which rep-
resent alternative possible HP worlds. They 
are essentially clisjunctions-the world is a .. 'i 
in one or another of the individual members 
of the set. 
In the case of this specific graphical sys-
tem it is easy to illustrate what is meant by 
the limited expressiveness of graphics as com-
pared to the FOL sentences. The HP graph-
ical system easily expresses some facts, say 
that there is a cube which is either small, 
medium or large in the front right hand cor-
ner, or the fact that there is a small cube 
somewhere. But it is not possible to express 
the fact that there is a small cube in the 3rd 
row from the front, or that there is a cube 
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Figure 1 The Hyperproof (HP) interface. The main window panes-graphical and 
calculus-are supplemented by control palettes. The situation being viewed is the fifth 
in the course of the proof, and corresponds to the fifth diamond-shaped 'situation' icon in 
the body of the proof. The graphical window pane contains three symbols of varying degrees 
of abstraction. 
that is small or medium but not large. A 
particularly interesting class of abstractions 
inexpressible in HP graphics are indetermi-
nacies of identity. It is not possible to state 
that there is something that is large in the 
back row, and something that is a cube in 
the back row, without specifying whether or 
not they are the same thing. Strictly speak-
ing, these propositions can be expressed in 
HP graphics, but only by forming enormous 
disjoined sets of all possible worlds consistent 
with the information. Although these sets 
would be technically finite, they may contain 
many millions of full diagrams and would be 
quite impractical for reasoning. 
Conversely, it is easy to see how the 
ability to express arbitrary abstractions (as 
FOL can) may rapidly lead to inferential in-
tractability. For example, if there :•re a num-
ber of polyhedra about which we have incom-
plete and logically independent abstract de-
scriptions, we may have to make immensely 
complex inferences about their relative iden-
tities in order to carry out simple tasks. In 
graphical representations, this problem does 
not generally arise. For many tasks which 
do not require the expression of these ab-
stractions, the diagrammatic representations 
which do not allow them to be expressed in 
the first place will be much more efficient. 
On the other hand, if a task requires an ab-
straction for efficient reasoning (because a 
very large number of alternative cases other-
wise have to be listed) then graphics will be 
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pathological. Generally, the best representa-
tion will be one which has sufficient power 
for the task, but not any more power than is 
needed. 
3. The GRE problems and the 
workscratching representations 
As mentioned earlier, the GRE analyti-
cal ability scale itself is divided into two 
subscales- 'logical reasoning' and 'analytical 
reasoning' (AR)2). Logical reasoning items 
require argument analysis and verbal reason-
ing skills for their solution and are not the 
focus of this paper. The AR items consist of 
constraint satisfaction puzzles of the kinds il-
lustrated in Figures 2 and 3. In fact, there are 
two kinds of AR item which, as we mentioned 
earlier, we refer to as indeterminate and de-
terminate problems. Many of the determi-
nate and indeterminate AR problems do not 
deal with spatial relations, but it is neverthe-
less possible and often helpful to construct 
diagrams for them. Set diagrams which use 
inclusion within closed curves to define sets 
are a common example. 
There is also a close association between 
diagrams and tabular representations (see 
Stenning & Oberlander (1995) for an ex-
tended discussion). The row and column 
headings of a table enforce simultaneous rep-
resentation of their classes of information. To 
take an example G RE problem, a table of in-
formation with dog breeds as column head-
ings and their owners names as row headings 
enforces the simultaneous representation of 
2) Logical reasoning and AR items are mixed to-
gether unidentified in the analytical ability scale of 
the GRE. 
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both owner and breed on any element rep-
resented. It is not possible to express the 
existence of a dog of some breed without de-
termining its owner, or vice versa. 
The reason that the properties of having 
a unique model, and of being diagrammable 
are related is because diagrams are inexpres-
sive. If there are many alternative models of 
the constraints, then a diagram will only be 
possible with abstraction 'tricks' which hap-
pen to capture the right set of models, and 
it is usually difficult and often impossible to 
find such trick~. 
Most of the reasoning necessary to solve 
the problem in Figure 2 can be embodied in 
the process of constructing a diagram of office 
allocations. Reading the answers to the more 
straightforward questions off a correct dia-
gram is relatively trivial. Even for the ques-
tions which demand consideration of alterna-
tive models, a representation of the unique 
initial model is a powerful aid. 
Graphical reasoning generally places the 
burden of inference on the processes of repre-
sentation construction, de-construction and 
re-construction3 ). 
AR indeterminate problems are more mis-
cellaneous, but none of them present con-
straints which determine unique models, and 
constructing a diagram is generally impossi-
ble or at least not useful. Figure 3 presents 
an example indeterminate problem. 
A few AR problems are intermediate be-
tween determinate and indeterminate prob-
lems in that although they consist of a set 
3) The extent to which a representation resists modi-
fication is an important cognitive dimension proposed 
by Green (e.g. 1989). 
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An office manager must assign offices to six staff members. The available offices are numbered 1-6 and are 
arranged in a row, separated by six foot high dividers. Therefore sounds and smoke readily pass from one to 
others on either side. Ms Braun's work requires her to speak on the phone throughout the day. Mr White and 
Mr Black often talk to one another in their work and prefer to be adjacent. Ms Green, the senior employee, is 
entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window. Mr Parker needs silence in the adjacent offices. Mr Alien, Mr 
White, and Mr Parker all smoke. Ms Green is allergic to tobacco smoke and must have non-smokers adjacent. 
All employees maintain silence in their offices unless stated otherwise. 
( 1 ) The best office for Mr White is in 1, 2, 3, 4, or 6? 
( 2) The best employee to occupy the furthest office from Mr Black would be Alien, Braun, Green, Parker 
or White? 
( 3) The three smokers should be placed in offices 1, 2, & 3, or 1, 2 & 4, or 1, 2 & 6, or 2, 3, & 4, or 2, 3 & 
6? 
( 4 ) Which of the following events, occurring one month after the assignment of offices, would be most likely 
to lead to a request for a change in office assignment by one or more employees? 
Ms Braun's deciding that she needs silence in the office(s) adjacent to her own 
Mr Black's contracting laryngitis 
Mr Parker's giving up smoking 
Mr Alien's taking over the duties formerly assigned to Ms Braun 
Ms Green's installing a noisy teletype machine in her office. 
Figure 2 Example of a determinate AR problem and associated questions. 
Professor Kittredge's literature seminar includes students with varied tastes in poetry. 
All those in the seminar who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auden. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry of Oonne. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Oonne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Frost. 
( 1 ) Miss Garfield enjoys the poetry of Donne. \Vhich of the following must be true? 
She may or may not enjoy the poetry of Coleridge. 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Browning. 
She enjoys the poetry of A uden. 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
She enjoys the poetry of Coleridge. 
( 2) Mr Huxtable enjoys the poetry of Browning. He may also enjoy any of the following Poets, except: 
Auden Coleridge Donne 
Eliot Frost 
( 3) Ms Inaguchi enjoys the poetry of Coleridge. Which of the following must be false? 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Auden 
She enjoys the poetry of Oonne 
She enjoys the poetry of Frost 
She does not enjoy the poetry of Browning 
She may enjoy the poetry of Eliot 
( 4 ) Based on the information provided, which of the following statements concerning the members of 
the seminar must be true? 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Browning 
None of those who despise the poetry of Frost enjoy the poetry of Auden 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge 
None of those who enjoy the poetry of Browning despise the poetry of Oonne 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Frost despise the poetry of Donne 
Figure 3 Example of a indeterminate AR problem and associated questions. 
of constraints they do not determine unique 
models. Sometimes diagrams may be help-
ful for these problems in representing models 
of sub-sets of constraints and thereby guid-
ing choice of which subsets of premisses are 
required to answer which questions. 
So AR determinate problems are ones for 
which an inexpressive diagram is useful be-
cause there is a unique model solution and 
a diagram can represent this solution. Prob-
lems are presented in highly expressive lin-
guistic modality and one solution method 
is to find a weakly expressive representa-
tion. This strategy requires judgement of 
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which problems are determinate problems-
they are not labelled in any way in the test. 
To see whether a problem has a unique 
model, and so decide whether to construct 
a diagram, is not trivial. There are some 
problems which carry immediately accessible 
cues to the fact that constructing a model 
is impossible or inappropriate. For example, 
the nature of the questions may make this 
clear. But often the only method for decid-
ing whether there is a unique model is to at-
tempt to specify one. I· this case, there are 
some useful rules of thumb as to how to go 
about this process. It is best to start from 
any determinate information. In the exam-
ple, this is the information that 'Mrs. Green 
is entitled to Office 5'. Then any information 
that can be linked to this 'anchor' should be 
incorporated. In the example in Figure 2, the 
only two non-smokers must flank Green's of-
fice, and these two alternatives provide a ma-
jor 'split into cases'. The further information 
is then used to find out which of these classes 
of cases must contain the correct model. The 
reason why it is good to use determinate in-
formation early is that it leads to a pruning of 
the search space in which model construction 
proceeds. 
Because the sequence of use of information 
in solving a problem can be critical, the test 
setters frequently manipulate the surface se-
quence of constraints so that the best order 
of inference is obscured. Observing students 
solving these problems reveals that domina-
tion by the presented sequence where this is 
not a good solution sequence is a common 
difficulty. 
A descriptive study of subjects' knowledge 
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of representational formats (Cox & Brna, 
1993) used sorting methods to empirically 
arrive at categories for classifying students' 
work scratchings. The categories emerging 
from that study, and from one by Schwartz 
(1971), were: matrices/tables, set enclosure 
diagrams, sentences reordered, networks, in-
formal grouping/ordered texts, logic/formal 
sentential notations, miscellaneous, and no 
representation. 
Our theory did not predict that the other 
categories of representation would be useless 
for determinate problem solution. Because 
the reordering of the premisses in the infer-
ence process is often critical, we would expect 
even re-writing the questions in certain ways 
to be useful for some problems. But in gen-
eral we would expect them to contribute to 
only part of solution processes. 
Normative schemes of representation for 
GRE problems are available in published 
'crammers' (e.g. Brownstein, Weiner, & 
Green, 1990). These works do not typically 
provide general rules about what representa-
tion to use, but they do at least provide a rep-
resentation of 'folk teaching wisdom' against 
which we can compare students' spontaneous 
constructions, and the predictions of our the-
oretical analysis. 
In summary, earlier analysis of this study 
shows that that logic teaching of both a tra-
ditional kind and using HP does generally 
enhance students' scores on GRE AR and 
BW tests. The sort of representations im-
posed on the students by teaching regimes 
interact with students' pre-course aptitudes, 
in determining post-course changes in reason-
ing, and in proof-styles developed in course. 
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This study focusses on the relation between 
spontaneous constructions of styles of rep-
resentation on AR items of the GRE tests, 
and these other performances. In particular 
it asks whether the same theoretical analysis 
of representations in terms of their expres-
sive power is insightful for these self-produced 
representations. 
4. Overview of the Study 
Methods 
Stenning, Cox, & Oberlander (1995) give a 
fuller account of the main study. An overview 
of the relevant features of the method is pre-
sented here for the reader's convenience. 
Two logic courses, one based on HP and 
the other on traditional syntactic natural de-
duction teaching were given to two groups 
of first-year Stanford undergraduates. Com-
plete pre- and post-course data was obtained 
for 16 of the 22 subjects in the HP group and 
for the 13 subjects in the Syntactic group. 
Assignment to courses could not be strictly 
randomised because the courses had to run 
in different semesters, but the course de-
scriptions by which students chose them were 
not differentiated in any way by the content 
or method of teaching. Students could not 
know that one course was 'graphically ori-
ented' ahead of signing up. To control for 
the motivational effects of computer-use, the 
'traditional' class also used a special version 
of HP that had the "graphics window dis-
abled, leaving only the 'sentential window' 
containing the representations on which tra-
ditional teaching is based. The traditional 
course used Bergman, Moor & Nelson (1990) 
a.':i a text: the HP course used the lecture 
notes which subsequently became Barwise & 
Etchemendy ( 1994). 
Two tests of reasoning were developed in 
order to measure the effects of teaching by 
comparing pre- and post-course score: the 
GRE test and the BW test. This report 
focusses upon the kinds of external repre-
sentations (ER.s) used by subjects in their 
responses to determinate and indeterminate 
AR items of the GRE test such as the exam-
ples in Figures 2 and 3. All students took 
parallel forms of GRE and BW test before 
and after their logic course. All the tests 
had a time limit. Students were free to se-
lect which items they attempted within the 
time. Students knew that the purpose of the 
tests was purely to aid our research in assess-
ing the teaching methods, and that neither 
their GRE scores nor their workscratchings 
would be available to the teachers, or affect 
their course assessment. 
Summary of results 
In brief, students were classified as model-
hi or model-la reasoners before the logic 
course on the basis of their scores on the 
GRE AR problems in the pre-test. There was 
overall improvement of performance on G RE 
determinate items from pre- to post-test for 
both logic courses. 
The model-hi students responded to HP 
teaching differently from model-lo reasoners 
in that their rate of improvement on 'blocks 
world' reasoning was significantly higher. 
However, the same kind of students (model-
hi) in the syntactically taught class actually 
declined in their B W test performance rela-
tive to their model-lo counterparts. The gen-
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eral effects of logic training upon pre- and 
post-test measures have been reported in de-
tail elsewhere (Cox, Stenning, & Oberlander, 
1994; Stenning, Cox, & Oberlander, 1995). 
Evidence from the logging software record-
ings made during the computer-based HP 
exam suggests that the individual differences 
are reflected at the level of the structure of 
logical proofs that students build. Detailed 
results of the proof-log analyses can be found 
in Oberlander, Cox, & Stenning, 1994; Ober-
lander, Cox, & Stenning, 1995). 
5. Analysis of Workscratching 
data 
We first describe how the workscratching 
data was categorised and scored and then 
present the results relating representations to 
other performance. 
Method 
As mentioned earlier, the categories 
adopted for this study were derived from 
Cox & Brna (1993) and Schwartz (1971): 
matrices/tables, set enclosure diagrams, sen-
tences reordered, networks, informal group-
ing/ ordered texts, logic/formal sentential no-
tation,s, miscellaneous, and no representa-
tion. Of these categories, the first two are 
constrained in their expressiveness. Theory 
would expect these two kinds of representa-
tion to be particularly useful for solving de-
terminate problems. Because they are weakly 
expressive, neither is generally capable of rep-
resenting problems that do not have a unique 
model. These categories accord closely with 
the range of representations recommended by 
the crammer authors. It seems that students 
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and authors share a common categorisation. 
Since our focus of interest was whether 
representation selection accuracy (RSA) im-
proved as a result of logic teaching, and how 
RSA related to reasoning performance, some 
normative scheme of representation selec-
tion for each problem was required. Rather 
than initially imposing our theoretical anal-
ysis for this purpose, we adopted the nor-
mative scheme of the crammer, and return 
later to compare this with our theoretical 
constructs. RSA score was defined as the 
number of correct representation selections 
made by the subject on 6 AR problems. In-
dependently, two raters categorised the work 
scratchings on subjects' test papers. For each 
subject there were potentially4> six determi-
nate reasoning items-three on the pre-test 
and three on the post-test, yielding scores 
that range from 0 to a maximum of 3 on each 
sub-test for each subject. Raters were given a 
shuffled stack of test papers and asked to sort 
them into the following categories of ERs: 
matrix/tables (explicit row by column organ-
isation of dimensions); sentence re-write (re-
writing sentences in a different order); net-
work graphics/directed graphs; set diagrams; 
informal groupings/ordered text (information 
circled, placed in close proximity, connected 
by hyphens, etc.); logic/notations; miscella-
neous (those that did not fit into other cate-
gories) and no representation. 
The raters were instructed to place each 
work-scratching into an appropriate category. 
They were allowed as much time as they 
needed to complete the sort. If more than 
4) Assuming that the subject attempted all of the 
items. 
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one representation was evident in a student's 
solution, the raters were instructed to clas-
sify the one that the subject 'probably used' 
in their solutions. Inter-rater agreement was 
83% on the 'work-scratchings' categorisation 
task.· The two raters disagreed on 29 items 
( 17%). To resolve the disagreements, the 
raters were subsequently asked to coopera-
tively sort the 29 items into mutually agreed 
categories. 
Results We first report the effects of teach-
ing modality on RSA scores. We then re-
port on the relationship between RSA score 
and reasoning success at AR problems. Fi-
nally, we turn to examine our theoretical 
claim about the role that weak expressive-
ness plays in determining the usefulness of a 
representation for reasoning. 
To examine changes in RSA score as a func-
tion of teaching modality we categorised sub-
jects' RSA performances on the pre-test, and 
on the post-test. 
'Poor' RSA was defined as failure to se-
lect recommended ERs on half or less of the 
items attempted. 'Accurate' RSA was de-
fined as accurate representation selection on 
more than half the items attempted. For 
each group (HP and Syntactic), the number 
of subjects showing a change from poor to 
accurate RSA from pre- to post-test was cal-
culated together with the number of subjects 
who showed the reverse change. 
In the HP group, 1 subject changed from 
accurate to poor, 7 subjects were accurate at 
both pre- and post-tests, 1 subject was poor 
on both pre- and post-tests and 7 subjects 
changed positively from poor to accurate. In 
the Syntactic group, 2 subjects changed from 
accurate to poor, 6 subjects were accurate 
at both pre- and post-tests, 2 subjects were 
poor on both pre- and post-tests and 3 sub-
jects changed positively. Of the 7 positively 
changing subjects in the HP group, 4 were 
model-hi reasoners and 3 were model-lo rea-
soners. Of the 3 positively changing subjects 
in the Syntactic group, 1 was a model-lo rea-
soner and 2 were model-hi reasoners. A bi-
nomial (nonparametric) change test (Siegel 
& Castellan, 1988) revealed that a signifi-
cant proportion of the HP subjects demon-
strated positive change in RSA (p < .05). 
The proportion of positively changing sub-
jects in the syntactic group was not signif-
icant (p = .188). Thus, for a significant 
proportion of HP subjects, the experience of 
learning logic graphically improved ER selec-
tion in a different kind of model-based rea-
soning domain. 
Item-by-item analysis of response patterns 
provides some insight into the nature of these 
RSA changes. The proportion of each group 
(HP and Syntactic) that responded correctly 
was computed for each question associated 
with the problems. There were 13 questions 
in total on the pre-test and 13 at post-test. 
On the pre-test, the proportion of correct re-
sponses differed substantially5> between HP 
and Syntactic groups on only two questions 
(in favour of the Syntactic group). At post-
test however, the pat terning differences were 
much more marked. The HP group consis-
tently outperformed the Syntactic group on 
4 out of 5 questions on the first post-test 
5) i.e. 15% or greater difference in proportions re-
sponding correctly. 
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AR problem6>. Both groups responded with 
similar patterns across the 4 questions of the 
second post-test problem. On the the third 
problem, however, the pattern was reversed, 
with Syntactic group students outperforming 
the HP students on 3 out of 4 questions7>. 
Given that both groups improved simi-
larly in terms of score from pre-to-post logic 
course, these results suggest that whereas at 
pre-test the scoring patterns were similar in 
the two groups, at post-test the groups dif-
fered in terms of the items that contributed 
to the post-test scores. The main impact of 
changes in representation selection strategies 
due to logic teaching appears to happen in 
the HP students. The Syntactic group shows 
improvements in reasoning which may be due 
to factors other than representation selection. 
We now turn to consider the relation be-
tween RSA and AR reasoning success. Table 
1 shows the relationship between the number 
of correct representations selected and score 
on each of 3 problems at pre- and post- tests 
grouped by teaching treatment (HP and Syn-
tactic groups). 
Table 1 suggests that there is a positive re-
lationship between RSA and reasoning score 
for subjects in both groups, at both pre- and 
post-tests. Regression analysis of RSA score 
with reasoning score as the dependent vari-
able reveals that there is a positive correla-
tion between RSA and reasoning success if 
all subjects are pooled (pre-test (R = 0.40, 
6) That problem required a 4 by 3 tabular represen-
tation for effective solution. 
7) The third post-test problem required a seating-
plan schematic and was similar to the pre-test 'of-
fice allocation' problem except that it was partially 
indeterminate. 
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Table 1 Mean scores (out of 13) on 
AR items as a function of number of 
correct representations selected for pre-
and post-test. Note that no subjects in 
either group used zero correct represen-
tations at either pre or post-test. 
RSA Mean S.D. N 
Pre-test 
Hyperproof 
1 6.37 3.34 8 
2 6.00 1.41 4 
3 9.00 3.46 4 
Syntactic 
1 6.20 1.30 5 
2 7.80 2.59 5 
3 9.33 2.89 3 
Post-test 
Hyperproof 
1 5.33 3.79 3 
2 8.86 1.68 7 
3 8.67 3.20 6 
Syntactic 
1 5.25 1.50 4 
2 9.20 2.86 5 
3 9.75 2.99 4 
p < .05); post-test (R = 0.47, p < .02)). Sep-
arate analyses of the teaching groups reveals 
that the strongest (and only significant) rela-
tionship in the four subanalyses is in syntacti-
cally taught students at post-test (R = 0.59, 
p < .04). 
The model-lo subjects (both teaching 
groups combined) showed weak, positive, 
non-significant relationships between RSA 
and reasoning score at pre-test (R = 0.27, 
n.s.) and post-test (R = .33, n.s.). How-
ever, for model-hi subjects, there were strong 
and significant positive relationships at both 
pre-test (R = 0.54, p < .03) and post-test 
(R = 0.63, p < .007). This is not unex-
pected, since model-lo and model-hi subjects 
were selected on the basis of AR pre-test per-
formance. 
Vol. 2 No. 4 Spontaneous representations 69 
RSA related to graphical semantics 
Logic teaching, particularly HP teaching, 
does improve RSA and RSA, as scored by 
'expert recommendations', is at least weakly 
correlated with correct solutions in GRE 
determinate-problem reasoning. But there 
remains the question of whet her the expert 
recommendations can be related to the the-
ory of the cognitive properties of graphics 
outlined in the introduction. Are weakly 
expressive graphical representations effective 
when abstraction is unnecessary, and ineffec-
tive when it is ? The expert recommenda-
tions of the crammer are more finely classified 
than the binary classification into strong and 
weak representations. To examine whether 
expressiveness is an important factor in effi-
cacy, we classified the cram mer's categories 
into weak representations incapable of ab-
stractions, and non-weak representations ca-
pable of some abstraction. We also classi-
fied problems into those whose constraints 
defined a unique model (determinate prob-
lems), and those which merely defined a class 
of models (indeterminate problems). 
Table 2 gives the median scores and num-
bers of subjects (HP and Syntactic groups 
combined) employing weak and strong rep-
resentations on AR problems that they at-
tempted. The representations defined as 
weak or non-weak for each problem were, 
for example, for pre-test problem 1 (the 
problem illustrated in Figure 2): weak ERs 
were plans ( 1 dimensional arrays); non-weak 
were ordered text and informal groupings. 
For pre-test problem 2 (the problem illus-
trateed in in Figure 3): weak ERs were 
set diagrams, tables; non-weak were net-
Table 2 Median reasoning scores on 
the six G RE AR problems classified by 
weakness of representation selected and 
by number of models defined by prob-
lem constraints. 
Median(n} 
Problem Weak Non-weak 
Determinate 
Pre-test 1 3 (14} 3 (14} 
Pre-test 3 5 (3} 2.5 (10} 
Post-test 1 4 (26) 2 (3} 
Indeterminate 
Pre-test 2 - (0} 3 (21} 
Post-test 2 3 (2} 4 (24} 
Post-test 3 2 (11} 3 (3} 
work/directed graphs, logic, and text. 
Examination of the data in Table 2 reveals 
a general tendency for selection of a weak rep-
resentation to be associated with a high score 
for determinate problems, and a low score for 
indeterminate problems. There is only one 
exception: pretest Problem 1 is equally suc-
cessfully solved with either choice of repre-
sentation. Subjects often appear to choose 
inappropriate representations as classified in 
this way. 
Regression analysis of choice of representa-
tion strength against the dependent variable 
reasoning score revealed a significant nega-
tive slope for determinate problems (R = 
-0.25, p < .04) contrasted with a signifi-
cant positive slope for indeterminate prob-
lems (R = 0.33, p < .009). This is evidence 
of the value of fitting the power of the rep-
resentation to the type of problem predicted 
by our theory. 
Unlike the analysis of RSA and reason-
ing score, this analysis of weak and non-
weak representations used on determinate 
and indeterminate problems does reveal sig-
nificant individual differences between the 
model-hi and model-lo groups of students, 
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though not between the teaching treatments. 
The regression of strength of representation 
against determinacy of problem shows that 
there is a significant positive relation between 
model-hi subjects' reasoning scores and 
their weak/non-weak representation selection 
(R = 0.60, p < .001) on indeterminate prob-
lems. For model-lo subjects the regression 
of strength of representation against deter-
minacy of problem shows a non-significant, 
negative relation between model-lo subjects' 
reasoning score and their weak/non-weak re-
presentation selection (R = -0.15, n.s.) on 
indeterminate problems. An examination of 
the score means revealed that, for model-hi 
subjects, the use of a weakly-expressive rep-
resentation on indeterminate problems was 
associated with decreased scores to a much 
greater extent than was the case for model-
lo subjects. Model-lo subjects scored equally 
well on indeterminate problems with either 
weak or non-weak representations. This sug-
gests that for model-lo students, reasoning 
is less externalised - these students may be 
less 'ER sensitive' than their model-hi coun-
terparts. 
On determinate problems, neither model-
lo students nor the model-hi students show 
any significant relationship between strength 
of representation and reasoning scores. The 
regression coefficients were R = -0.33, n.s. 
and R = -0.13, n.s. for model-lo and model-
hi subjects, respectively. On the determi-
nate problems, the score means indicate that 
model-hi subjects scored equally well with ei-
ther weak or non-weak representations, but 
that model-lo subjects tended to score poorly 




Are the effects of logic teaching on general 
reasoning performances mediated by changes 
in representation strategies? And can the 
data of spontaneous representation selection 
reveal this mediation? Students' RSA as as-
sessed by the 'crammer' scheme does improve 
between pre- and post-tests, more so amongst 
the HP students. Although this general im-
provement in ·RSA seems to be correlated 
with improved reasoning performance, it is 
not significantly related to the individual dif-
ferences between subjects which are strongly 
related to changes in reasoning with logic 
teaching. However, when representation se-
lection is assessed by the theoretically driven 
distinction between weak and non-weak rep-
resentations, and their fitness for problem is 
assessed by the logical structure of the items 
(determinate or indeterminate), the nature 
of the effect of selection and the part that 
individual differences play in determining re-
actions to teaching emerge. 
The scores of model-hi subjects show great 
sensitivity to representation strength on in-
determinate problems, whereas model-lo sub-
jects' scores show sensitivity to representa-
tion strength on determinate problems. 
Why is RSA not more strongly associated 
with reasoning performance? A partial ex-
planation is that the task requirements of 
the 4 or 5 questions associated with each AR 
problem vary quite widely. For example in 
the 'office allocation' example presented ear-
lier, Cox & Brna (1995) have shown that sub-
jects' use of plans, tables or no ER can be as-
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sociated with good performance on questions 
1 to 3. On question 4, however, subjects who 
do not use an ER tend to score better. Ques-
tion 4 (see Figure 2) requires the subject to 
assess the impact of hypothetical changes to 
the originally given information. The task 
requirement is not one that is facilitated by 
straightforward read-off from an ER - there 
is a need to reason internally about alterna-
tive models and the number of individuals 
affected. Before the HP course was taught 
we predicted, on the basis of the semantic 
analysis of HP's abstraction 'tricks' that HP's 
impact on learning logic would hinge on stu-
dents' abilities at using these devices to rea-
son about models which are close relatives 
of specific depictions-in other words to ex-
tend completely concrete representations to 
express some limited abstractions. This pre-
diction is born out in analyses of the different 
proof styles that emerge from HP teaching 
which are chiefly differentiated by use of ab-
straction symbols (Oberlander, Cox, & Sten-
ning, 1995). The fact that students fail to 
develop ad hoc systems for representing not-
quite determinate GRE AR problems within 
generally weak representational systems is 
perhaps not surprising. 
Of course, there is more to reasoning than 
representation selection. Another source of 
score/representation dissociation is the cor-
rectness of the token representation. Cox 
& Brna (1995) found that 23% of a large 
sample of subjects constructed erroneous rep-
resentations for the 'office allocation' prob-
lem. One error pattern accounted for a third 
of the errors observed. Furthermore, of the 
subjects who produced erroneous represen-
tations, just under half gave question re-
sponses that were fully consistent with their 
(wrong) representations. The remaining sub-
jects seemed to be selective about which parts 
of their representation they 'believed' in. In 
other words, one interpretation is that those 
subjects showed some awareness of their rep-
resentation 's inadequacy. An interesting and 
seemingly paradoxical finding emerged from 
the analysis in relation to this point. Subjects 
who answered the questions in a manner that 
was consistent with their (wrong) representa-
tions tended to score better than those whose 
answers were inconsistent with their (wrong) 
representations (Cox & Brna, 1995). 
RSA as measured by crammer recommen-
dations gives a less insightful analysis of 
reasoning scores than our theoretically mo-
tivated but simpler scheme predicated on 
weakness of expression interacting with de-
terminacy of problem constraints. Several 
reasons might underlie this result. First, 
the crammer recommendations may simply 
be too fine grained. Functionally appropriate 
selections may be categorised as innapropri-
ate simply because the crammer has a 'pet' 
representational choice. Secondly, crammer 
recommendations may actually be dysfunc-
tional. There is evidence for both explana-
tions. For example, there are strong seman-
tic relations between the various categories 
of determinate representations, e.g. tables 
and set-diagrams (see Stenning & Tobin, in 
press), and between indeterminate represen-
tations, e.g. networks and logic (see Sten-
ning & Inder, 1995). The evidence is that se-
lections amongst these finer grained distinc-
tions may not be important for these reason-
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ing problems. Secondly, the crammer actu-
ally makes some recommendations which are 
hard to justify simpliciter. An interesting 
case is pre-test problem 2 (Figure 3) where 
the problem is quite radically indeterminate 
but where the crammer (Brownstein et al., 
1990) recommends set-diagrams. In fact, the 
crammer actually tries to invent a dotted-
circle notation as an augmentation for set di-
agrams to allow the requisite abstractions to 
be expressed. This augmentation is seman-
tically incoherent. This is not to say that 
set-diagrams need be comp ~tely useless for 
this problem. At a meta-level, they can be 
used to identify pairs of premisses (from the 
total of eight premisses) which form the syllo-
gisms that when solved provide the answers. 
Indeed, these syllogisms can themselves be 
solved using set diagrams with some abstrac-
tion tricks. What set diagrams cannot do is 
to provide a representation of all eight pre-
misses, even using dotted circles, which is 
what the crammer recommends. 
The analysis of weak/non-weak representa-
tions applied to determinate/indeterminate 
problems reveals that what leads to really 
poor performance is attempting to use weak 
representations on indeterminate problems 
which require abstractions they cannot ex-
press. This is even more damaging to rea-
soning than trying to use non-weak repre-
sentations that can express abstractions on 
problems that do not require them. This dif-
ference is visible in Table 2 and is reflected 
in the greater significance of the regression 
of representation selection on performance in 
the indeterminate problems. Some of this dif-
ference is undoubtedly a feature of the range 
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of problem difficulty. Since these problems 
can quite frequently be solved by some stu-
dents without any ER, and since even min-
imal reordering of premisses can serve as a 
useful representation, it is hardly surprising 
that non-weak representation of weak prob-
lems can prove less harmful to reasoning than 
trying to force an indeterminate problem into 
a weak representation that cannot actually 
express the information accurately. 
The analysis of the individual differences 
between model-hi and model-lo subjects was 
revealing of the role of representations in an-
alytical reasoning. Although model-hi stu-
dents are defined by their ability on AR, the 
subset of these problems where their selection 
of representations is most strongly correlated 
with their reasoning success is in the partially 
indeterminate problems. These students ap-
pear to be adept at avoiding the use of weak 
representations for indeterminate problems. 
This pattern is consistent with the obser-
vation that these students are adept at us-
ing HP abstraction tricks to structure their 
HP exam proofs (Oberlander, Cox, & Sten-
ning, 1995). Rather than thinking of them 
as 'visual' thinkers in the traditional folk 
phenomenology, we should think of them as 
adept at achieving some abstraction of repre-
sentation, possibly by elaborations of graph-
ical semantics. 
The educational implications of taking ER 
selection seriously are potentially consider-
able. As long as representation selection is 
only pursued at the level of the crammer's 
rules of thumb, it remains hard to teach. Al-
though the theory advanced here is coarse 
grained it is teachable. Determinacy of prob-
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lem is well-defined, and so is weakness of ex-
pressiveness. The evidence presented here is 
that this coarse-grained theory is sufficient to 
mediate real differences in success at reason-
ing on these problems. 
When it comes to asking what stance 
teachers should take to individual differences 
of the kind noted here, there are broadly 
two options. All students could be explic-
itly taught the same methods of representa-
tion selection or students could be encour-
aged to implicitly follow their existing rep-
resentational modality preferences. The sec-
ond position is compatible with the view that 
the cognitive style of the learner is relatively 
immutable, and that it is best to adapt in-
struction to style, rather than vice versa. 
This is the approach advocated by Snow 
based on studies of Aptitude-Treatment In-
teractions (cf. Snow, Federico, & Montague, 
1980). To the authors' knowledge, only one 
study has demonstrated that the 'visualiser--
verbaliser' dimension is responsive to edu-
cational intervention (Frandsen & Holder, 
1969). The research presented here cannot 
decide between these alternatives, but it does 
show how further research might contribute 
to an answer to the question. 
Perhaps a domain-independent 'graphics 
curriculum' should be devised and gener-
ally taught as advocated many years ago by 
Balchin & Coleman ( 1965). The authors tend 
towards the view that students should be en-
couraged to broaden their representational 
repertoires. We agree with Barwise (1993) 
that "efficient reasoning is inescapably het-
erogeneous (or 'hybrid') in nature" and with 
diSessa (1979, p.250), who, in a paper on 
learnable representations of knowledge, has 
written: 
The fundamental assumption be-
hind ... (the) ... idea of multiple 
representations is that rich, overlap-
ping collection of different views and 
considerations is much more a char-
acteristic of preciseness in human 
knowledge than a small, tight sys-
tem. In terms of problem solving the 
claim is that the parity of restate-
ment or translation is as or more 
important to problem solving itself 
than the hierarchy of deduction. 
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